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Global warming has finally become a reality for the inter-national community; the facts have become indis-putable. For example, 2005 was just declared the
warmest year on record, widespread coral bleaching is occur-
ring at an accelerated rate, and the weather patterns of the past
year were more severe than in previous cycles. These indicators
can no longer be ignored, and the international community has
begun efforts to reduce the worldwide release of greenhouse
gases. In our opinion, one of the most notable responses is the
emergence of a global emissions trading market.
In short, emissions trading is the economic response to
global warming. Trade occurs as those who have exceeded their
emissions limits buy credits from others. These systems first
appeared in the United States in the mid-1970s; however, emis-
sions trading gained the attention of the general public in the
1990s when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency put a
limit on sulfur dioxide emissions in
an attempt to reduce acid rain.
Currently, the emissions trading
market has expanded globally with
the establishment of the Kyoto
Protocol and other mechanisms to
tackle climate change. The Kyoto
Protocol binds ratifying nations to a
system of cap and trade, leading to
the emergence of a global market for
carbon emissions. 
According to the International Network for Environmental
Compliance & Enforcement (“INECE”), governments and
industry have widely accepted emissions trading strategies for
emissions reductions because they provide potential financial
rewards for reductions and promote cost-effective regulation.1
Emissions trading schemes are most often used where a gov-
ernment limits emissions in a defined area and then allows trad-
ing within that area (the “cap and trade” system). Governments
distribute emissions allowances (i.e. limits on annual emis-
sions) to businesses within the area, often based on perform-
ance standards and historic fuel use. Businesses that do not
acquire enough permits to cover their emissions face financial
penalties. In an emissions trading market, entities not able to
stay below their designated emissions limits may purchase
credits from those able to stay below their limits. Thus, emis-
sions trading allows businesses to reduce their emissions in a
manner that is efficient, while providing emissions reduction
benefits for the region as a whole. 
Such a regulatory system may prove to be an effective
means of mitigating the rate of global warming, but only with
effective compliance. Without effective monitoring, reporting,
and verification of emissions reductions, for instance, business-
es might not have an incentive to reduce their emissions.
On November 17-18, 2005, INECE hosted a workshop in
Washington, DC, entitled Confidence Through Compliance in
Emissions Trading Markets.2 Experts gathered from around the
world in order to “identify linkage issues, promote effective-
ness, and emphasize the importance of achieving high rates of
compliance in emissions trading systems.” Staff members of
Sustainable Development Law & Policy acted as rapporteurs for
the workshop. In this special issue, we are pleased to present our
report on its outcome, materials from the workshop, and articles
from practitioners involved in emissions trading.
This special issue of Sustainable Development Law &
Policy examines current topics in the development of emissions
trading markets. The articles discuss the successes, failures, and
future challenges of addressing global warming through emis-
sions trading. Even within the last
few years, we have seen climate law
as a whole become increasingly
complex as a growing number of
players appear. In an effort to step
back and look broadly at the impli-
cations of an international emissions
trading system, we have also includ-
ed several articles on issues that may
become pertinent in the future. For
instance, what are the implications
of emissions trading on the World Trade Organization? How can
regions of the world that are involuntarily excluded from inter-
national schemes address global warming concerns? 
As we debate the kinks in a system that is supposed to help
the environment while also being financially prudent, we must





1 For more background on emissions trading, see INECE-Environment Agency
(England And Wales) Workshop on Compliance and Enforcement for Emissions
Trading Schemes, 16 -18 March 2004, http://inece.org/news/discussionpaper.pdf. 
2 For more information and documents related to the INECE workshop, please
visit http://www.inece.org/emissions. 







Emissions trading is a market-based mechanism designed toallow firms to choose the most cost-effective strategy tomeet environmental standards. The success of sulfur diox-
ide (“SO2”) and nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) emissions trading sys-
tems in the United States and the launch of the ambitious European
Union Emissions Trading System (“EU ETS”) underscore the
value of emissions trading as a tool for environmental policy.
As more and more countries accept the need to address cli-
mate change on a priority basis, emissions trading will play an
increasingly significant role as a governance strategy that not
only creates incentives for firms to cut greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions but also spurs technological innovation that ensures
this is done at the lowest cost. But only with high levels of com-
pliance will emissions trading systems achieve reductions in
GHG emissions efficiently, effectively, and equitably.
Achievement of high levels of compliance hinges on robust and
effective strategies for monitoring, reporting, and verification,
where confidence in the system relies on timely and accurate
information on emissions levels, allowance holdings, and
trades. Without such reliable data, the system fails to meet its
environmental objectives. 
The central focus of the workshop “Confidence Through
Compliance in Emissions Trading Markets,” which took place
in November 2005 in Washington, DC, was on the monitoring,
reporting, and verification (“MRV”) of emissions trading and
associated cross-border strategies and issues, as these are the
main elements of any effective compliance and enforcement
strategy.1 The International Network for Environmental
Compliance & Enforcement (“INECE”), in cooperation with its
partners, the Netherlands’ Ministry for Housing, Spatial
Planning, and the Environment (“VROM”), the Environment
Agency (England and Wales), the European Commission, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Washington College
of Law at the American University, and Resources for the
Future, organized the Workshop as a follow-up to the
“International Conference on Compliance and Enforcement of
Trading Schemes in Environmental Protection,” hosted by the
Environment Agency and INECE in March 2004 at Oxford
University.2
The Workshop explored the role of compliance and
enforcement (“C&E”) strategies in emissions trading systems as
essential elements to maintaining a trading system’s environ-
mental effectiveness and economic efficiency. Specifically, the
goals of the Workshop were to:
• Develop a set of best practices for achieving C&E in
emissions trading programs;
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• Raise awareness of the value and importance of trad-
ing programs and emphasizing the role that C&E play
in achieving environmental objectives and ensuring
market credibility and investor confidence;
• Identify key requirements of effective emissions trad-
ing systems; and 
• Assess available information and define additional
needs for creating an operational “common currency”
and a network allowing (inter)national trading among
different trading systems.
This article examines MRV strategies of the EU ETS, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) SO2 and NOx
trading programs, and, to the extent applicable, the new Dutch
NOx trading system. This article also compares regulatory cul-
tures and MRV models in the EU and United States and high-
lights key challenges to achieving high levels of compliance.
INTRODUCTION TO KEY CONCEPTS
The use of emissions trading systems as an alternative to
more traditional forms of regulation requires a fresh look at the
relationship between the regulator and the regulated community,
as well as other key regulatory concepts.3 This section explores
the different responsibilities and risks of emissions trading sys-
tems for both the regulator and the regulated community. 
MONITORING, REPORTING, AND VERIFICATION
Under traditional command-and-control regimes, firms
must follow a relatively strict set of procedures to meet envi-
ronmental standards and are sanctioned when they fail to do so.
By comparison, under emissions trading systems, firms are free
to choose their own compliance strategy – including how much
to emit and how many allowances to trade. For the regulator,
this choice presents a new set of responsibilities. To be able to
sanction firms in which emissions exceed their allowance hold-
ings and provide market participants with timely and accurate
information, the regulator must track both the emissions levels
and the number of allowances each firm possesses at a given
time. As many systems involve self-reported data, the regulator
must consider penalties for firms that falsify information.
Consequently, the regulator’s role is “no longer that of
grandly deciding what is best for firms and individuals, enter-
taining equitable appeals, and enforcing the results.”4 Rather,
the regulator acts more like an accountant or a bank’s credit
department.5 This results in an emissions trading system whose
market efficiency and investor confidence hinge on the MRV
strategies the regulator chooses to implement and enforce in the
pursuit of adequate levels of compliance. 
COMMON INTERESTS IN COMPLIANCE
Unlike command-and-control regimes, participation in an
emissions trading system allows for both the regulator and the
regulated community to share a common interest in pursuing
high levels of compliance. Because allowances are an intangible
asset,6 a firm that invests in allowances to cover some of its
emissions has the same concerns as the regulator over market
integrity and the need for fraud-proof MRV in order to avoid
cheating and other risks that would decrease the value of
allowances and possibly undermine the system altogether. 
Originally, the EU’s interest in market-based systems was
at least in part driven by the EU’s mixed record on uniform
implementation.7 The European Commission and the European
Court of Justice8 could not always ensure adequate implementa-
tion, enforcement, and, by extension, compliance. This is partly
why the European Commission initially preferred a
carbon/energy tax to tackle climate change. It was thought that
member states had an interest in improving on implementation
and enforcement to collect the revenues associated with the tax.
But the tax proposal was eventually abandoned due to lack of
support among EU governments. 
TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION
Transparent regulatory regimes and markets provide the pub-
lic with timely and accurate information based on MRV data as a
means to instill trust and confidence in the market with evidence
of high compliance. Given the importance and sensitivity of MRV
data, it follows that the market participants and the public in gen-
eral are more likely to trust its veracity if the process by which it
is collected and verified is perceived as open and accountable. 
Transparency also helps counter some of the negative mis-
conceptions about emissions trading systems, such as that they
provide polluters with the right to pollute.9 In fact, emissions
trading systems, consistent with the polluter pays principle, help
pass some of the cost of pollution control to the consumer of pol-
lution-intensive products by imposing the costs of environmen-
tal harm on those who cause it and those who benefit from it.10
COMPARING REGULATORY CULTURES
The following section describes the regulatory cultures for
the United States and the EU. The description of the EU regula-
tory culture will concentrate on the EU layer of government and
reference the differences among EU member states when neces-
As more and more
countries accept the need
to address climate change
on a priority basis,
emissions trading will
play an increasingly
significant role as a
governance strategy…
sary. When comparing the two cultures, it is important to keep
in mind two fundamental differences between the United States
and EU. First, the U.S. system has been up and running for the
past decade while the EU ETS began this past year and must still
be considered a “work in progress.” Second, the U.S. programs
operate within a single jurisdiction, while the EU ETS is subject
to a multi-jurisdictional political environment.
U.S. REGULATORY CULTURE
The United States has more than a decade of experience
with operating cap and trade programs, and there are well-estab-
lished procedures for compliance and enforcement. In general,
these programs are operated centrally by U.S. EPA.11 MRV for
the U.S. SO2 and NOx programs is characterized by detailed
rules, electronic reporting and auditing, and a variety of quality
assurance and quality control requirements. Although continu-
ous emissions monitors (“CEMs”) play an important role in
U.S. programs, many sources are permitted to use alternative
methods to measure emissions, such as approaches utilizing fuel
meters and emission factors.12 Finally, although the MRV sys-
tem used in U.S. trading programs has not been used to imple-
ment a carbon dioxide (“CO2”) trading system, it has been used
to collect and verify CO2 emissions data from the electric power
sector.13 This section will focus largely on the regulatory culture
and approach of the U.S. SO2 and NOx programs. Later in the
article, there will be a brief discussion of the issues that would
arise if the United States were to develop a compliance system
for a GHG program.
In the U.S. SO2 and NOx programs, approximately 75 per-
cent of staff resources (75 people, including personnel in region-
al EPA offices and state agencies) are focused on the measure-
ment, verification, and tracking of emissions data. Government
administrators also provide policy guidance on measurement
issues, develop and operate the information systems that track
emissions and allowances, certify monitoring equipment, verify
reported emissions data, and audit facilities.14 However, the
U.S. SO2 and NOx programs are much smaller than the EU ETS.
Combined, the two U.S. schemes cover considerably less than
half of the EU ETS installations. More importantly, an EU
installation could contain multiple sources of emissions, while a
U.S. “unit” is just one boiler.
Although the main organizing principle of program admin-
istrators is maintaining accountability for the system, an impor-
tant secondary goal is providing administrative certainty.
Program administrators have tried to create administrative cer-
tainty by making program operations routine and not subject to
discretion. The routine nature and lack of regulatory discretion
of the U.S. trading programs manifests itself in several ways.
First, the rules for emissions monitoring are detailed and pre-
scriptive, leaving little discretion for either companies or regu-
lators. Second, there is heavy reliance on information technolo-
gies to operate the program and to automate routine procedures.
Finally, excess emissions penalties are nondiscretionary and
automatic. Following is a description of these aspects of the
U.S. model as well as a discussion of the compliance promotion
role played by public access to emissions and allowance data.
Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification
The MRV process begins with facilities choosing their mon-
itoring equipment and sending a monitoring plan to EPA. Under
some circumstances, participants may apply for alternative mon-
itoring methods (e.g. in the SO2 program, gas-fired units may use
fuel flow meters and emissions factors), which must be approved
by EPA. Government authorities review monitoring plans and
provide feedback to industry. Industry next must conduct a series
of certification tests of their monitoring equipment and provide
these test results to government authorities in the form of a cer-
tification application. After certification, facilities begin to mon-
itor emissions and conduct ongoing quality assurance and quali-
ty control (“QA/QC”) testing requirements.
Participants in the programs must report emissions to EPA
electronically every quarter in a standard format. Many partici-
pants use software developed by EPA or others pre-screen their
electronic reports before sending them to EPA. This software
runs many of the same checks as EPA’s computers and is
designed to minimize the numbers of errors in submitted reports.
EPA computers receive the electronic reports, review the
data, and provide feedback to company officials. This electron-
ic feedback is generally of three types. Officials at facilities are
informed that either: (1) their data have been accepted and will
be stored in EPA’s database for the purpose of compliance deter-
minations and public data dissemination; (2) their data have
been rejected because of specified critical errors; or (3) their
data have been accepted, but EPA has identified errors that must
be corrected in later data submissions. If there are problems
with the data, company officials are able to follow-up with EPA
monitoring specialists who are assigned to their facilities.
In addition to this first round of electronic review and pro-
cessing, EPA uses software to audit the data and identify poten-
tial discrepancies or issues to investigate. These audits review
emissions or measured fuel data as well as the results of quality
assurance and quality control tests performed on the measure-
ment equipment. EPA uses these electronic “desk” audits to tar-
get more in-depth field audits. Such field audits may include
observing quality assurance tests, reviewing on-site records,
inspecting measurement equipment, and/or comparing installed
measurement equipment to independent reference methods.
Field audits are usually done in teams together with state and
local environmental agencies. Where possible, regulatory offi-
cials (usually from local agencies) observe QA/QC testing of
emissions measurement equipment. The purpose of the audit is
to verify that the testing is completed according to standard pro-
cedures and accurately represented in the reports to EPA. Field
audits are performed on both random samples of all sources and
on sources identified with potential measurement or data prob-
lems during the electronic desk audits.
Detailed Rules for Emissions Monitoring and Reporting
Monitoring rules are highly detailed in the U.S. SO2 and
NOx programs. The regulations for monitoring cover almost
300 pages and provide thorough standards for installation and
certification of monitors, quality assurance and testing, handling
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of missing data, recordkeeping, and other features. Most of
these rules are now incorporated into software systems at both
the companies and EPA so that the reporting and review of emis-
sions reports are highly standardized.
To a certain extent, the use of CEMs in the U.S. trading sys-
tem has required this more prescriptive approach. However,
even when units use alternative emissions monitoring methods,
the requirements are quite detailed. For example, there are 30
pages of regulations for a monitoring method used by gas-fired
units that utilizes fuel metering and emissions factors.
To provide certainty and ensure consistency, EPA devotes
extensive resources to answering and documenting questions
that arise about monitoring requirements. EPA has an online
policy manual that is largely in a question-and-answer format. It
has been updated more than a dozen times over the life of the
program and is now nearly five hundred pages long. These
detailed monitoring and reporting requirements, though com-
plex, have provided companies with considerable certainty that,
if they follow the procedures, their emissions reports will be
accepted in a timely manner.
Extensive Use of Information Technology
The routine nature of the decisions that regulators make and
the vast amounts of emissions and allowance data that must be
handled have allowed regulators to build the operation of the
trading program largely around information technology.15 For
example, companies are required to report emissions data to
EPA in a standardized electronic format. Once the data are
received, EPA computers run quality assurance tests and give
electronic feedback to companies. Additional software is used to
run electronic audits on emissions reports. Emissions data are
maintained in a database that is accessible via the internet.16
EPA’s allowance registry is similar to an online banking
system, with companies able to manage their allowance
accounts and make transfers without submitting paper forms.
Approximately 80 percent of all transfers of allowances are now
done over the internet by the sources themselves. Similarly, EPA
has implemented a new application that allows companies to log
onto a secure site and perform functions that were previously
done with paper forms. These include changing information
about company officials who are authorized to act for an
allowance account, submitting data about new or retired emis-
sions sources, and determining whether a source is required to
participate in the program.17
Electronic reporting and processing of data have been critical
in meeting the tight timeframes for the annual compliance true-up
period. Companies submit their final quarter’s emissions data by
January 31st and have until March 1st to transfer allowances and
submit final compliance certification forms. EPA then completes
verification of the annual emissions data and compares them elec-
tronically with allowances within the accounts of each unit.
Typically, this process is completed by June.
Finally, through the development of standardized reporting
formats and protocols, EPA and companies have meshed their
data systems. Early in the program, EPA developed and distrib-
uted software to help companies develop their emissions report-
ing systems.18 Software used by companies to track allowances
and emissions incorporates standardized EPA electronic report-
ing formats and allows companies to compare their own records
of allowance holdings with those in the EPA registry.
Compliance interactions between regulators and companies
mainly involve resolving discrepancies over emissions data that
arise in the quality assurance process. As discussed earlier, quar-
terly electronic reporting and feedback give companies adequate
notice of data problems and time to correct these problems
before the annual reconciliation of allowances and emissions
data. Compliance is a largely routine process; allowances are
electronically compared with emissions at each utility unit. 
Penalties and Enforcement Action for Non-Compliance
The certainty that a penalty will be imposed is a critical ele-
ment in providing the correct incentives in an emissions trading
program. The automatic nature of excess emissions penalties in
U.S. trading programs contrasts with the traditional regulatory
approach in the United States, in which sources in violation
negotiate for a regulatory exemption.19 Administrators of the
U.S. trading program argue that the automatic nature of penal-
ties and the certainty of other compliance-related provisions
focus corporate resources and attention on low-cost compliance
strategies, rather than on lobbying or litigating to reduce costs.20
In addition to the automatic excess emissions penalties, there is
the authority to assess both civil and criminal penalties in U.S.
trading programs. With an automatic penalty that is significant-
ly higher than the market price for allowances, and with a liquid
market for allowances, there has been nearly one hundred per-
cent compliance with the SO2 and NOx trading programs.21
Public Access to Data
In the United States, emissions data from the SO2 and NOx
trading programs are available to the public and may be
accessed through the Internet. There are no confidentiality
requirements for this data. The public can also access data on
allowance transfers among different accounts in EPA’s registry.
Information technology has been the key to providing this
transparency in the U.S. emissions trading programs, with all
emissions and allowance data available online.22 Some com-
mentators note that public access to emissions and trading data
builds confidence in the environmental results of the program
and provides an additional safeguard or incentive for compli-
ance.23 Environmental non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) in the United States have used emissions and
allowance data for a variety of purposes, such as assessing the
net environmental impact of emissions trades and analyzing
and comparing emissions profiles of companies. EPA facilitates
transparency of emissions and allowance data by providing it in
user-friendly web-based formats. For example, tools on EPA’s
website allow users to make customized queries of the data that
are of the most interest.24
THE EU REGULATORY CULTURE
While there is little doubt that the EU ETS has strongly
been influenced by the U.S. SO2 trading program and the NOx
Budget Trading Program,25 it differs in several important
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aspects. The principal difference is the high level of decentral-
ization and the significant degree of discretion for member
states in the implementation phase, even if compared to the
NOx Budget Trading Program. For example, under the EU
ETS, it is up to the member states to set policy on compliance
and enforcement strategies as well as allocation, which
includes the level of the cap and the exact methodology to be
applied. The European Commission provides a broad set of
guidelines for compliance and enforcement strategies, which
give considerable flexibility to installations and to member
states to develop specific monitoring procedures without
imposing uniform, mandatory standards for emissions verifica-
tion. The EU ETS also delegates responsibility for emissions
verification to member states; however, the EU ETS requires
this to be verified by a third party. Normally, this would be an
independent third party verifier and only in exceptional cases
the government itself. Additionally, the member states are
responsible for defining competence requirements and the rules
and procedures for verifier accreditation. Initially, the EU ETS
Directive foresees that each member state will have its own
registry,26 although joint registries between member states are
permitted. Consequently, this decentralized approach leaves the
European Commission Monitoring & Reporting Guidelines
(“MRG”) about one-fourth the size of respective guidelines in
the United States and much less detailed.
A decentralized approach is consistent with the makeup of
the EU political system, based on sovereign member states with
their own legal systems, traditions, and languages, where the EU
layer of governance (Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament) agrees on the framework, and member states enjoy
a high level of discretion in implementing in their respective
jurisdictions.27 As there are as many jurisdictions as member
states, one-size-fits-all policies seldom are an option.28
Consistency across member states is sought by so-called
Comitology Committees, consisting of European Commission
and member state officials who are responsible for the harmo-
nization of implementation provisions. The mandate (and hence
the limit) of Comitology Committees are set both by the rele-
vant provisions in the Directive and EU primary, secondary, and
case law such as EC internal and competition law.29 Despite the
fact that the EU exhibits elements of a federal system, one
would miss the very essence of the diversity within the EU if
one would perceive it as a federation. 
The high degree of decentralization is – at least partly – also
the result of consensual decision-making in the EU.30 As the EU
is made up of sovereign states, effective implementation of EU
laws by member states is best ensured if legitimate member
states’ concerns are taken into account during the negotiations in
the Council of Ministers when the laws are formulated. As a
result, initially the EU tends to choose decentralized options,
followed by steps to establish and coordinate a common
approach among member states. In the EU ETS framework, a
common approach relies on using best practices to address
issues jointly and share experiences among member states. But
initial experiences usually feed into a formal review, which in
many cases – including for the EU ETS – is built into the legis-
lation.31 Market solutions have in many instances proven easier
than harmonization across 25 or more national jurisdictions,
which display major differences in legal systems, enforcement
cultures, and administrative capacities. In many cases, EU leg-
islation is initiated by national legislation, reinforcing the ten-
dency towards decentralization.32
The EU MRV Model: Third-Party Verification
Because the EU ETS began this year, it has not yet complet-
ed its first Reporting and Monitoring cycle. The following section
therefore only describes the basics of the EU MRV process as
designed by the Directive and implementation provisions. 
Each installation covered by the EU ETS needs to apply
for a GHG emission permit,33 which inter alia requires moni-
toring and reporting of emissions. Article 14 in the EU ETS
Directive requires the European Commission to adopt the
legally binding MRG of emissions based on Annex IV of the
Directive, which include accuracy, timeliness, and integrity.34
The framework on monitoring and reporting is completed by
verification and a registry. 
Each installation develops a monitoring methodology based
on the interpretation of the MRG; the methodology must be
approved by the competent authority in each member state.
These methodologies are principally based on a combination of
emissions factors, fuel use, and production data.35 The MRG
sets different “tiers” of monitoring methodologies, with the top
tier being the most accurate (and usually the most expensive).
Installations are required to use the top “tier” unless they can
show it is impractical or will result in disproportionate costs. In
these cases, the Competent Authority (“CA”), or responsible
agency in each member state, can waive this obligation and drop
the installation’s methodology to a lower tier.36
With the exception of Germany, member states have agreed
that the installation-specific monitoring methodology should be
part of the permitting procedure.37 Installation-specific method-
ologies are submitted for approval to the CA. The underlying
philosophy is to reduce the possibility of error and instill confi-
dence for both participants and regulators.
Operators at each installation report their emissions accord-
ing to the methodology specified in its permit. Although opera-
tors must ensure its report complies with the applicable method-
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ology, an independent third party must verify all self-reported
emissions. This third party is usually a non-governmental inde-
pendent entity; however, in exceptional and justified cases veri-
fication can be done by a government body.38 The verifier deter-
mines whether emissions have been monitored and reported in
accordance with the validated methodology in the permit. In
some countries (e.g. UK, Germany, and Portugal) verifiers have
also checked baseline emissions.
Government supervision is generally exerted throughout
the accreditation process.39 In order to prove suitability (e.g.
technical qualification, independence from the installation to
verify), verifiers must undergo accreditation in member states.
In most cases, member states use existing accreditation bodies.
Once accredited, verifiers, in principle, have the final word on
an installation’s report. Currently, there is coordination at the
EU level to promote consistency in the accreditation process for
verifiers. But there is not yet a harmonized approach, as compe-
tence requirements for verifiers are still being defined. Because
the verifier has the final say on an installation’s report, particu-
lar importance is attached to ensure that verifiers perform their
task accurately. Accordingly, the CA must ensure that those
accredited as verifiers are qualified and supervised via regular
inspections and sample controls. 
Although verifiers’ tasks are similar to an auditor reviewing
a firm’s financial accounts, their work is distinct from financial
auditors. For example, a verifier’s areas of expertise include a
technical background. Thus, qualified engineers who are famil-
iar with the technical issues of emissions measurement can be
employed as a verifier. 
Similar to the United States, EU member states try to cre-
ate administrative certainty by making program operations
routine. For example, the Netherlands has developed a stan-
dard validation protocol aimed at ensuring that the monitoring
protocols proposed by the operators in their request for a per-
mit would be approved (validated) in a uniform way. This was
to limit discretion in the validation process. A second protocol,
on guidance for accreditation of verifiers was developed in
early 2004. This protocol has been developed in cooperation
with members of states, industry, and the International
Emissions Trading Association (“IETA”) for use by the
European Co-operation for Accreditation (“EA”), a voluntary
cooperative effort of European Accreditation bodies, to devel-
op its Guidance on Verification (“EA 6/03”). A number of
member states have made the use of EA 6/03 obligatory in
their national legislation. Some member states concentrate on
improving national verification procedures, while other mem-
ber states are yet undecided. In the future, it is likely that the
European Commission will provide more guidance in order to
achieve a higher degree of standardization of procedures.
Although there is far less reliance on information technologies
to operate the program and automate routine procedures in
comparison to the United States, some member states such as
Finland, the Netherlands, and the UK have started to progres-
sively standardize electronic formats to make better use of
information technology. 
There is an important similarity between the United States
and the EU in that excess emissions penalties are nondiscre-
tionary and automatic.40 To further strengthen compliance, oper-
ators are not only subject to penalties but also must surrender
allowances in the following period (the importance of non-dis-
criminatory and automatic penalties in the United States is dis-
cussed above). But in line with the far more decentralized polit-
ical environment of the EU, administrative and criminal penal-
ties are to date entirely the responsibility of member states, as
the EU has no competence in this area. However, relevant mem-
ber states provisions need to be communicated to the European
Commission. Additionally, a ruling last year by the European
Court of Justice asserted that the EU has the power to require
member states to lay down criminal penalties for the purpose of
protecting the environment.41
Reported emissions data are collected in a registry that can
be used to measure compliance by comparing the verified emis-
sions of an installation with the number of allowances the instal-
lation holds, which is also known as the tracking of allowances.
The registry amounts to a hub and spokes system consisting of
one European hub in the form of the EU transaction log and 25
different member states registries, which communicate through
standardized protocols and the EU. In the future, it is anticipat-
ed that member states will develop joint registries (see below).
It is interesting to note that the Dutch NOx trading system ini-
tially had no automated registry, but the government decided to
make maximum use of the procedures and structures as defined
in the EU ETS, thus seeking the maximum synergy possible
between the two schemes.
Public Access to Data
Emissions data will be publicly available as of the comple-
tion of the first Monitoring and Reporting Cycle (March 31,
2006). Under Article 17 of the EU ETS Directive, a full emis-
sions report for every single installation needs to be published.
Modalities for this are under discussion by member states, where
making the data available online through a web page for each
national registry has been discussed. Access to information and
transparency in general depend on the degree of user-friendliness
of the published data. Therefore, verified emissions of installa-
tions will be entered into a Verified Emissions Table of a mem-




have moved to the center
of emissions trading
schemes.
ber state registry. On May 15th of each year, the Central
Administrator and each member state registry will display on
their public website the verified emissions figure for each instal-
lation as well as the allowances surrendered for that installation
and whether or not that installation is in compliance with its obli-
gations. The emissions figure for every single installation can be
accessed through the Community Independent Transaction Log
(“CITL”) website. This process should be largely routinized. 
PARTICIPANT PERSPECTIVES ON COMPLIANCE
With emissions trading systems, it is not just the regulator
who is concerned about compliance. The regulated community
and other participants and investors all share a common interest
with regulators in achieving high levels of compliance.
Otherwise, cheating or even the perception of cheating can risk
devaluing allowances, thereby reducing or eliminating the eco-
nomic incentive to cut emissions. To underscore this common
interest in compliance, it is worth examining the different per-
spectives of participants in emissions trading systems. 
Participants in the emissions market require a stable and
predictable environment. At the same time, governments, citi-
zens, and environmental NGOs demand that environmental
objectives are met. By and large, these two priorities. (i.e. sta-
bility and efficacy) are compatible and even mutually depend-
ent. Even if emitters, governments, and environmental NGOs
are likely to hold different views on the severity of the targets,
the “market” prefers credible targets that not only increase liq-
uidity, but also reassure governments and society that the trad-
ing process will lead to credible reductions in GHG emissions.
Consistent and fraud-proof monitoring and verification proce-
dures therefore have moved to the center of emissions trading
schemes. While this debate initially focused on accuracy and
credibility, with progressive implementation the spotlight turns
to costs, notably how to reduce them. 
EU GOVERNMENTS’ PERSPECTIVES
Interest in emissions trading in the EU has been triggered
by a number of different reasons. First were potential economic
merits. Emissions trading promises least-cost abatement and
allows industry a high degree of flexibility in how to meet the
environmental objectives. Second, emissions trading was seen
as particularly well-suited to climate change policy as a means
of translating absolute national targets into sector- and installa-
tion-specific targets. Third, governments were attracted by the
cap, which gives assurance that the environmental objective is
met. It was thought that emissions trading could be a means to
address implementation and enforcement deficits that were
increasingly becoming apparent within the EU and were expect-
ed to widen with enlargement. Finally, after aborted attempts by
the EC to institute a carbon tax and by industry to reach volun-
tary agreements to cut emissions, a market-based system
became the most attractive option for confronting climate
change, especially when compared to the largely unworkable
command-and-control alternatives.
Success with the EU ETS, both in terms of reducing emis-
sions and establishing mandatory trading systems as a useful
regulatory strategy to confront climate change, is essential for
the EU to maintain its credibility in international climate nego-
tiations. While success for the EU ETS depends on a variety of
factors, its MRV strategies will play a large role in its environ-
mental effectiveness, economic efficiency (including establish-
ing a level playing field for businesses throughout the EU and
the world), and political acceptability.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE
Emissions trading has become the policy of choice for leg-
islators and program administrators in the United States to
address regional air pollution. This is both because the programs
have proven effective and because the programs have satisfied a
variety of competing interests.
Without a doubt, the existence of stringent monitoring and
enforcement provisions in the 1990 Clean Air Act gave policy
makers the confidence to experiment with the flexibility of the
cap and trade approach. Most recently, all of the major legisla-
tive proposals in Congress for further reductions of multiple
pollutants featured a cap-and-trade structure. Finally, although
there is still controversy in the United States about the adoption
of a cap on GHGs, emissions trading is generally viewed as the
inevitable approach if the United States adopts a mandatory pol-
icy. 
REGULATED FIRMS, MARKET PARTICIPANTS, AND
INVESTORS
Business and industry have supported the introduction of
emissions trading largely because they have identical motives to
the government, although the weighting of motivations varies.
While business and industry may value least-cost abatement and
flexibility the most, they also can see the additional advantage of
a management focus on cost-effective abatement possibilities.
Managers will try to exploit opportunities through better carbon
management and participation in the trading market. The realiza-
tion of such opportunities requires efficient and effective MRV. 
A majority of firms operating in the EU have made emis-
sions trading and the EU ETS their instruments of choice, given
perceived economic advantages. But the future of the EU ETS
depends on its credibility. Effective MRV strategies play a key
role here by boosting its credibility as well as helping firms
identify overlooked reduction opportunities, as the experience
of BP and others suggest.42
Other participants in the system have a somewhat different
perspective. Industry participants are most interested in estab-
lishing and maintaining a level playing field – that is, that firms
believe their competitors are in compliance and, if not, will be
identified and sanctioned. 
In addition, investors and traders are generally most inter-
ested in determining the degree to which allowances are shel-
tered from the risk of devaluation. In other words: they do not
want to lose money investing in carbon. The two main sources
of risk of devaluation are widespread cheating and uncertainty
brought on by ineffective MRV strategies and a wholesale
change in regulatory policy.
The perspectives of industry and market participants in the
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United States are similar to those in Europe. Svendsen found
that the flexibility of the cap and trade approach, coupled with
increased competition in the electric power sector, is one of the
main reasons the U.S. electric power industry prefers a grandfa-
thered tradable permits market over other regulatory approach-
es.43 One industry representative notes that U.S. trading pro-
grams have worked well because the role of regulators is to “to
get the system up and working, to ensure compliance, and to
report on progress.”44 Swift argues that this focus on emissions
results rather than compliance choices creates less friction
between regulators and companies because it reduces transac-
tion costs and avoids delays inherent in the review of industry
strategies.45 This represents a considerable improvement over
earlier emissions trading programs, in which case-by-case
reviews of trades contributed to delays and uncertainties.46
Similarly, brokers and traders have also supported strong com-
pliance provisions as a prerequisite for the development of the
market. For example, one broker has noted in testimony before
the U.S. Congress:
There is no “natural benefit” for owning a tradable
emissions right. Their only value is compliance with
the law. Consequently, there must be a fate worse than
trading if trading is to succeed. Accordingly, penalties
for non-compliance must be severe when compared to
the costs of trading (including the time and effort to
execute the trades). And, just as importantly, penalties
must be enforced.47
While industry generally supports monitoring and verifica-
tion provisions in the SO2 and NOx Programs, some companies
have expressed concerns about the high monitoring costs and
complexity related to continuous emissions monitors. Ellerman
et al. found that these costs were as much as seven percent of
overall compliance costs during the first phase of the SO2
Program.48 However, they also note that “regulated firms seem
to be unanimous in expressing their preference for this type of
regulation, presumably because the gains in reduced direct com-
pliance costs more than offset whatever compliance costs are
involved in monitoring…”49
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
PUBLIC
In both the United States and Europe, the main attraction
for NGOs has been the environmental certainty as a result of an
absolute cap.50 Such certainty however depends on the credibil-
ity of MRV. Environmental NGOs demand that environmental
objectives are met. Hence, there is convergence between emit-
ters and NGOs, although the devil is in the details. 
COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES
Effective implementation of MRV rules is central to pro-
viding trust in the system as well as to offering a major poten-
tial for efficiency improvements by bringing down costs associ-
ated with MRV and emissions trading in general. This has
notably been demonstrated for U.S. trading schemes such as the
SO2 trading and the NOx Budget Trading Programs.51 Arguably,
for the U.S. acid rain programs and the NOx Budget Trading
Program, measuring and monitoring have been the most com-
plex and costly components of the trading scheme. The EU ETS
is somewhat different as GHG emissions are not actually meas-
ured, but calculated based on energy use or other proxies. This
does not, however, automatically mean that one of the methods
is superior to the other. 
THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE CAP AND TRADE
COMPLIANCE ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
Although compliance procedures for U.S. SO2 and NOx
programs are well established, there is much uncertainty about
the design of any future mandatory program for greenhouse
gases in the United States. There are a number of factors that
could shape the MRV procedures of such a program. Key ques-
tions, which are discussed below, include:
• What will be the scope and point of regulation of
such a program?
• What role will continuous emissions monitors play?
• How will state and regional cap and trade programs
affect a potential national program?
• What will be the impact of voluntary protocols and
registries?
Scope and Point of Regulation
Ultimately, the scope and point of regulation of a potential
trading program could have an impact on the types of MRV sys-
tems developed. To the extent that a program might just cover
the electric power sector, it is likely that the MRV system would
build upon the existing model used in the SO2 and NOx pro-
grams. As noted, most electric power sources already report
their CO2 emissions to EPA. 
The details of a potential MRV system are less certain in
legislative proposals that address sectors beyond electric power.
Specifically, two legislative proposals – the McCain-Lieberman
Bill and a proposal by Senator Bingaman – are for economy-
wide programs that would cover multiple sectors. In the case of
McCain-Lieberman, emissions from the electric power and
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industrial sectors are regulated “downstream” (i.e. at the smoke-
stack) while emissions from the transport sector are regulated
“upstream” based on the emissions potential of fuels processed
by oil refineries. In contrast, under the Bingaman proposal, the
point of regulation is entirely upstream at fuel producers,
processors, or transporters (e.g. natural gas pipelines). Thus,
new protocols for monitoring, verifying, and reporting the emis-
sions potential from upstream sources and the emissions from
some downstream industrial sectors might be necessary.52
Use of CEMs
CEMs are a cornerstone of the emissions monitoring sys-
tem in conventional U.S. pollution trading programs. But what
factors and considerations will determine their use in a poten-
tial greenhouse gas trading program? First, as the discussion
above notes, one important factor will be the point of regula-
tion. For example, if the point of regulation is entirely
upstream, CEMs will not be used at all. CEMs would only be
an option in trading programs where some or all of the point of
regulation is downstream. Second, it is important to note that
the existing CO2 reporting requirement for electric power
facilities does not require CEMs and allows facilities to
choose alternative methods. Approximately 40 percent of units
that report CO2 emissions to EPA use CEMs and 60 percent
use alternative methods. This represents about 87 percent of
CO2 emissions that are measured with CEMs. Most of the
units that use CO2 CEMs are coal-fired units, while oil and
gas-fired units generally use alternative methods. Third, to the
extent that sources already use CEMs (i.e. in the power sec-
tor), there may be a strong incentive to continue to use those
existing systems. For example, Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (“RGGI”) states have proposed using the existing
reporting system for CO2 (i.e. CEMs for some units and alter-
native methods for others). This proposal has received support
from industry stakeholders, who presumably do not want to
develop a new or additional monitoring and reporting sys-
tem.53 In contrast, the motivation to use CEMs may not be as
strong for facilities outside of the power sector, since they are
not currently reporting CO2 emissions to EPA. In addition, for
some sectors with process or fugitive emissions, using CEMs
may not be feasible or practical. 
Impacts of State and Regional Programs
A further uncertainty about the design of future U.S. GHG
trading programs is the impact of state and regional programs
that are now under development. The most advanced of these
efforts is the RGGI, a cap and trade program under development
by nine states in the northeastern and mid-Atlantic United
States. Initially, the program will address CO2 emissions from
the electric power sector. However, the program may be expand-
ed to include additional sectors and GHGs. In general, the RGGI
program has proposed to use compliance and enforcement struc-
tures similar to those used in the U.S. NOx trading program. In
addition, as noted above, the program has proposed using CO2
data currently reported to EPA.
West Coast states may develop a different model for a
cap-and-trade program. Concerns about addressing imports of
power from outside the state have led some stakeholders to
advocate design approaches that focus on the distribution of
electric power rather than generation. For example, an advi-
sory group to the Governor of Oregon has recommended a
tradable carbon content standard for power consumed in the
state, which would take power imports into account.54
California is considering a proposal to allocate allowances to
load-serving entities, which would be required to hold
allowances to cover the emissions of the electric power they
distribute.55 Such a program might require some sort of pro-
gram for monitoring or estimating emissions associated with
power imported from outside the state. How these programs
might address MRV and other compliance and enforcement
issues has not yet been determined. 
Impacts of Voluntary Efforts
A final uncertainty is the impact of voluntary GHG report-
ing protocols and registries on a potential mandatory U.S.
weighting national system. For example, more than ten states
have adopted or are in the process of adopting voluntary reg-
istries for greenhouse gas emissions.56 Most notable is the
California Climate Action Registry Program, which uses a green-
house gas reporting protocol based on the reporting protocol of
the World Resources Institute (“WRI”) and World Business
Council for Sustainable Development (“WBCSD”). There are
also Federal GHG reporting and registry programs. Under the
EPA Climate Leaders Programs, companies develop comprehen-
sive GHG inventories, set corporate emission reduction targets,
and report annually their emissions and progress towards reach-
ing their targets. The program’s reporting protocol is based on
the WRI/WBCSD protocol, and it requires entity-wide reporting.
Under the Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Program,
established by Section 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992,
organizations and individuals who have reduced their emissions
may record their accomplishments and publicize their actions.
This program encourages entity-wide reporting but also provides
flexibility in defining the reporting entity.
Voluntary reporting schemes and registries have a number of
benefits, including helping corporations understand the scope of
their emissions and the possible mitigation measures that they
might take. Voluntary reporting programs may also raise aware-
ness of the climate change issue and highlight the actions of com-
panies who are leaders in reducing their emissions. Ultimately,
voluntary reporting schemes and registries are made for different
purposes than compliance rules of mandatory programs. 
Several aspects of voluntary protocols may require revision
or elaboration to be adequate for mandatory trading programs.
This is because there is an inherent tension in voluntary protocols,
which must balance the desire to encourage participation with the
costs associated with a rigorous emissions reporting program. If
measurement and reporting requirements are too rigorous and
costly, there will be few participants. Conversely, if program
reporting restrictions are too lenient, the resulting emissions data
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may not be an appropriate foundation for a future mandatory pro-
gram. In addition, some voluntary registries and protocols require
reporting at the company-wide level rather than the facility level.
While this is appropriate for a voluntary program that tracks a cor-
porate emissions goal, it is less useful for a sector-wide or econo-
my-wide mandatory trading program, where it is important to
carefully track emissions at the facility level. Existing conven-
tional air pollution control programs require emissions reporting
at the unit or facility level, in part because of the complexity of
tracking shifts in corporate structure.
Nevertheless, experimentation with voluntary protocols by
industry may lead to the development of better emissions esti-
mation methodologies. This may be particularly true for sectors
such as iron and steel, where emissions monitoring or estimation
is less than straightforward. This experience would certainly
inform the development of future U.S. mandatory guidelines for
emissions monitoring. Gradual alignment of voluntary reporting
schemes and registries with compliance rules of mandatory pro-
grams could facilitate transition to a regulated program.
COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES FOR THE EU 
Implementation of important new EU legislation is typical-
ly approached in a “learning by doing” mode in which various
member states experiment with different national responses to
EU framework legislation. In the absence of a central federal
enforcement agency, the European Commission provides guid-
ance while at the same time ensuring compliance with laws.
Non-compliance will result in member states being brought to
the European Courts. Additionally, member states supported by
the European Commission share experiences and eventually
identify best practices. Thus, there are numerous multi-stake-
holder initiatives that attempt to incrementally harmonize pro-
cedures (“soft harmonization”).57
The challenge for the EU and its member states is to trans-
pose the MRV provisions into national legislation, taking into
account the local institutional landscape and legal circumstances
(including established practices), while at the same time ensur-
ing an adequate degree of harmonization across member states.
Additionally, although the EU has looked to the U.S. NOx budg-
et trading program, which is more decentralized than the SO2
program, the EU is largely on its own in developing a decen-
tralized model. 
Principal Challenges 
Within the EU ETS, the major challenge is to ensure con-
sistent implementation of MRV across member states.
Effective implementation of MRV is an integral part of
enforcement and deterrence, which are preconditions for com-
pliance. Achieving consistency – a permanent challenge for
the EU – requires creating similar procedures across member
states. This offers considerable efficiency gains and ensures a
level playing field (i.e. it allows for undistorted competition
within the EU internal market).
Consistency starts with the quality of the member state per-
mit, which includes the incorporation of MRG. Member states’
rules will differ as to the nature, frequency, and depth of inspec-
tions to be carried out. It is also likely that member states will
vary in the rigor with which they enforce national and EU law.
A great number of differences between member states could
affect the level playing field of competing companies and, at the
extreme, may lead to gaming. There is also a risk that, if flexi-
bility leads to inconsistencies within or between member states,
national regulators might extend their intervention.
Another challenge for the EU is to clarify institutional
responsibilities. Currently, responsibilities for MRV in the EU
and its member states lie with the EC, 25 member states, more
than 150 Competent Authorities,58 around 11,500 installations,
and an uncertain number of verifiers and accreditation bodies.
While the EU ETS Directive and subsequent legislation in prin-
ciple have assigned responsibilities, in practice the boundaries
might sometimes be blurred. The critical intersections are
European Commission and member states, Competent
Authorities and companies, verifiers, and accreditation bodies.
The final challenge relates to verification, and notably to
ensuring harmonized rules for accreditation. Major diversity in
stringency of accreditation is likely to affect the credibility of
the EU ETS. To date, there are a number of differences in the
competence requirements between various member states.
These differences are partly fueled by the member states’ fears
of lacking the necessary verifiers. Member states are trying to
find the right balance between qualification requirements and
ensuring the availability of sufficient verifiers.
Initial Responses
Some of the challenges, such as the initial competence
assessment of verifiers and jurisdiction issues for different insti-
tutions, are typical issues for a new and ambitious scheme that
is breaking new ground. They will be addressed during the first
round of compliance through different processes. The Working
Group III sub-committee on the Comitology Committee will
address some of these issues, but its mandate is not to achieve
full harmonization. Rather, it is to ensure that member state
implementation is in line with EU law. There are also comple-
mentary initiatives aiming at voluntary harmonization by mem-
ber states. Such voluntary harmonization initiatives in many
cases seek the active involvement of stakeholders. 
There has already been progress on further harmonization
of verification and accreditation standards and procedures. This
includes the application of the EA’s Guidance for Recognition of
Verification Bodies under EU ETS Directive.59 Many member
states – particularly those that have Accreditation Bodies that
are members of the EA – are looking to use this document as the
basis for setting up accreditation schemes for verification bod-
ies. In addition, member states are currently developing a com-
mon Verification Reference Model, which covers all elements
for an effective control of monitoring, reporting, verification,
and accreditation. The Verification Reference Model can be
used as a model for both GHG verification procedures and the
principal elements of the verification framework by outlining
the respective responsibilities of the CAs and accreditation bod-
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ies. This includes the responsibilities as set out in the Directive,
MRG, and EA 6/03. Additionally, CAs are encouraged to use it
to self-assess their situation. An EU-wide Verification Resource
Centre will assist the Authorities in their verification exercise
focusing on processes, the verification statement, and the quali-
fication profile of verifiers. Also, focus groups with interested
representatives from member states and CAs are about to be
launched on the following issues: mutual recognition of veri-
fiers; exchange of best practices in running ETS verification;
and risk analysis.
Theoretically, the EU could establish a common, or at least
regional, accreditation body that is responsible for accreditation
of verifiers on an EU-wide basis. This would have obvious
advantages related to consistency and uniformity of accreditation
within the EU. The feasibility of creating a common EU accred-
itation body as a real political option is unclear but remains
unlikely unless the European Commission takes a lead on this.
The creation of regional accreditation bodies appears to be more
likely. Another alternative option is that accreditation bodies in
all EU member states follow similar rules for accreditation.
Some member states are already allowing mutual recognition,60
but may require that accreditation bodies (e.g. UKAS) carry out
some form of supervision or surveillance of verification bodies
when they work in another member state for the first time. 
Cost Considerations 
While initial focus of MRV will remain on implementation
and capacity building, more recently, cost considerations have
risen on the agenda. As one of the promises of the EU ETS has
been cost-effectiveness, the EU, member states, and stakehold-
ers monitor costs and identify areas where excessive costs can
be avoided. Potential areas for attention are verification and
small installations. 
As was pointed out above, there are differences in verifica-
tion and accreditation of verifiers not only between the 25 mem-
ber states but within some member states. This can increase
costs for international companies wishing to apply uniform
monitoring and reporting procedures for one verifier throughout
the EU.61 Annual costs for verification are generally estimated
to range between €25 and €30 million per annum.62
It can be argued that the inclusion of small installations into
the EU ETS can lead to high administrative costs for both gov-
ernments and the covered sources. For small installations with
emissions of less than 25,000 tons of CO2, additional costs for
establishing monitoring and reporting can be disproportional to
the environmental benefit.63 Therefore, one of the principal pri-
orities of the revision of the ETS MRG is cost-efficiency;
specifically, to lighten the administrative burden for small
installations.64 This will be part of the MRG review that is
planned to be formalized by spring 2006.
THE ROLE OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT:
MEASURING SUCCESS
As governments continue to experiment with emissions
trading systems, evaluation of the results of these systems will
become increasingly important.65 There has been little explicit
research on how best to measure the success and performance of
enforcement and compliance systems in emissions trading pro-
grams. However, there has been an effort by INECE, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and
several governments to develop compliance and enforcement
indicators for environmental programs in general.66 Work by
these organizations and governments has pointed to several ben-
efits of using performance indicators, including helping pro-
gram managers understand the effectiveness of their programs
and help improve environmental programs over time.67
Traditionally, environmental program administrators have
used output-based indicators such as the number of enforce-
ment cases initiated or penalties assessed because these indica-
tors are easy to measure and are directly tied to compliance and
enforcement efforts. However, these types of metrics pose a
dilemma. In an ideal environmental program, one would expect
high compliance and few penalties assessed. The question is
whether this outcome is the result of good compliance or poor
enforcement? Moreover, these types of measures are often not
a good gauge of the overall success of an environmental pro-
gram. Because of the shortcomings of these types of indicators,
the literature suggests more sophisticated measures are neces-
sary to address the multiple audiences for information on pro-
gram performance. For example, Stahl notes, “A combination
of measures – outputs and outcomes, quantitative and quantita-
tive, statistical and narrative, aggregated and disaggregated,
national and local – is necessary . . .”68
In U.S. trading programs, both output and outcome data is
used to evaluate the performance of compliance and enforce-
ment decisions. For example, examples of indicators include:
• Percent of sources subjected to environmental audits;
• Percent availability of emissions monitors;
• Results of relative accuracy tests for monitors;
• Number of enforcement actions taken and penalties
assessed; and 
• Overall compliance rate of affected sources.
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The programs also use a variety of outcome indicators to
measure the overall effectiveness of the programs, including
emissions and deposition reduced, as well as changes in the
environment attributable to emission reductions. For the most
part, compliance and enforcement measures are viewed as a
component of the overall system, including the overall environ-
mental results, costs and market function. A number of studies
have looked at the compliance results of these programs in the
context of the overall performance of the programs.69
CONCLUSION
The preceding sections have highlighted the differences and
similarities between the United States and EU approaches to
MRV in emissions trading systems. Ultimately, there may be
additional variations on these models, as Canada, Japan, and
other countries begin to adopt domestic emissions trading sys-
tems. Given these differences in approach, what will be the best
way to proceed towards a common currency?
The first step to answering this question is to understand the
extent to which different approaches might lead to different
results. For example, would reported emissions from a facility
be significantly different with U.S. methodologies than EU
methodologies? To what extent are differences procedural rather
than substantive? A more technical analysis of monitoring
methodologies will be necessary to answer these questions.
A second consideration will be a more general need to
understand the MRV issues that arise when different national
trading programs are linked.70 The ultimate laboratory for
understanding these linkage issues will be the first year(s) of
implementation of the EU ETS. As discussed, there is flexibili-
ty among EU Member States in how they implement MRV
guidelines. Understanding the proper balance between flexibili-
ty and consistency in the EU ETS will be very useful as a test
case for linking domestic systems. 
Finally, further dialogue between experts is necessary to
build understanding of the unique features of the EU and U.S.
models. U.S. observers may need more information on how third
party verification actually works in an emissions trading program.
For example, what will be the impacts of third party verification
on the administrative efficiency of the verification process? EU
and Member State officials may need more information on
whether the information technology based system used in the
United States for reporting and verification will be flexible
enough to meet the needs of diverse Member States. In addition,
there may be questions about whether this type of approach could
be applied to the wider universe of sectors and installations in the
EU ETS. Ultimately, sharing detailed information about different
MRV systems will lead to better understanding of the costs and
benefits of different approaches. This may be the best first step
towards a common currency for emissions trading.
1 See generally, MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE &
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Durwood Zaelke, Donald Kaniaru, & Eva
KruÏíková eds., 2005).
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die. For a long period there have been claims by some EU policy makers
that Europeans do not like a situation where people make money with
pollution. During the discussions and negotiations, such opposition was
also heard from some parts of the nongovernmental organization commu-
nities and occasionally from parliamentarians.) 
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international/tools.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
15 J. Kruger, B. McLean, & R. Chen, A tale of two revolutions:
Administration of the SO2 trading program (2000), in EMISSIONS
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technology, the unsung hero of market-based environmental policies,
RESOURCES, Fall/Winter, at 9-12 (2004).
16 M. Husk & L. DeSantis, E-government and the clean air markets divi-
sion, CLEAN AIR MARKETS UPDATE 3 (Winter), at 6 (2002).
17 Id.
ENDNOTES: Confidence Through Compliance Continued on page 63
ENDNOTES: Confidence Through Compliance 
14WINTER 2006 
INTRODUCTION
On November 17-18, 2005, participants from govern-mental, international, and non-governmental organiza-tions from all over the world convened at American
University, Washington College of Law in Washington, DC, to
discuss the future of emissions trading (“ET”) systems. The
workshop, entitled “Confidence Through Compliance in
Emissions Trading Markets,” was convened by the International
Network for Environmental Compliance & Enforcement
(“INECE”). Trading systems are proving to be a successful
means of reducing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, but they
only work to the extent there is effective compliance and
enforcement. Participants focused on ways to implement com-
pliance and enforcement strategies into ET systems.
One of the workshop’s main goals was to promote informa-
tion-sharing among participants, with special emphasis on com-
pliance as well as the possibilities for linking trading systems to
control emissions worldwide. Presenters shared ET experiences
from around the world and explored the role that information
technology and private stakeholders might play in ET schemes.
Through the comparison of experiences between the
European Union’s Emissions Trading System (“EU ETS”) and
the United States’ ET systems for SO2 and NOx, the workshop
sought to: (1) establish a set of best practices and appropriate
policy responses to compliance and enforcement challenges; (2)
emphasize the important role that compliance and enforcement
play in both reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing
stakeholder confidence in the program and market; (3) identify
key elements of an effective trading system; and (4) determine
how best to create a “common currency” to allow for trading
among different international trading systems.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: CONFIDENCE THROUGH
COMPLIANCE
Angelos Pangratis, the Deputy Head of the European
Commission Delegation to the United States, delivered the
keynote address for the opening day of the workshop. He dis-
cussed the EU ETS, the world’s first international, mandatory
emissions trading system, and how its success is instrumental
for future international efforts to achieve the drastic cuts in
GHGs necessary to combat climate change. Because the success
of this system will affect future initiatives, the EU ETS initiative
is too important to fail. For emissions trading systems to meet
their goals effectively and efficiently, though, it is necessary to
have high levels of compliance. Mr. Pangratis concluded his
address with elements for a successful emissions trading system
– public policy initiatives, a credible market system to encour-
age private sector involvement, and the need for developed
countries to lead by example.
OVERVIEW OF WORKSHOP THEMES
CREATION OF VIABLE EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS
Throughout the workshop, a common theme was that vol-
untary market measures alone are not sufficient to drive climate
change policies – public policy that promotes emissions reduc-
tions at both the state and national levels is critical. In order to
achieve large-scale emission reductions on a global level, a
strong regulatory framework that creates a market for carbon
reduction must be created. A viable option is an emissions trad-
ing system that provides economic incentives to reduce emis-
sions. Such a system should then inspire the private sector to
develop new technology and manufacturing processes that lead
to further emission reductions. However, the effectiveness of
such a system relies on the government’s ability to establish an
effective regulatory framework. An effective framework, in
turn, depends on achieving high levels of compliance.
In order for any ET system to work, both the public and pri-
vate sectors must have confidence in the system, which requires
that policies be enforced. Public opinion will play a big role in
building confidence in trading schemes. If an ET system is high-
ly visible in a society, that society might be more willing to par-
ticipate generally in environmental policies, and might place
greater demands on companies. Increased social pressure on the
private sector will also build a greater sense of social and envi-
ronmental responsibility in the public. However, public aware-
ness and responsibility cannot be accomplished through regula-
tion alone. 
ADVANTAGES OF CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEMS
A cap-and-trade system is created when governments
limit emissions in a defined area and then allow trading with-
in that area. The alternative is a command-and-control
approach, in which the government relies solely on penalties
to deter companies from excessive emissions. Workshop pre-
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senters agreed that cap-and-trade systems are more effective
than traditional command-and-control systems for reducing
GHG emissions. With respect to achieving high levels of com-
pliance, a cap-and-trade system offers several advantages.
First, it allows companies to freely choose their own compli-
ance strategies, including how to yield the most economically
efficient and environmentally effective results. Under a com-
mand-and-control system, however, firms are not given an
option of how to reduce their emissions – instead they must
follow set regulatory instructions and may be penalized for
failing to comply. 
Second, a trading approach encourages compliance by
changing the roles of both the regulator and the regulated party
and aligning their interests. Under a command-and-control
approach, both parties might feel as if they are pitted against
each other. Under a trading approach, though, both parties
have a strong interest in maintaining market integrity. For
example, regulated parties do not have an interest in cheating,
because doing so would decrease the tradable value of their
allowances in the system. Thus, when both parties’ interests
are aligned, the prospect of achieving higher levels of compli-
ance is greater.
Finally, a trading approach offers greater transparency
than a command-and-control type regulation, which in turn
encourages public confidence in the system. An emissions
trading system with an effective monitoring, reporting, and
verification program will provide the public with a tangible
means of evaluating the system’s effectiveness. The public
will have greater confidence in the data if the way in which it
is collected is open and allows for obvious accountability.
Additionally, greater transparency allows the public to better
understand the role a trading system plays in emissions reduc-
tion. Under emissions trading systems, some of the cost of pro-
ducing pollution-intensive products is internalized and passed
on to the consumer. As such, transparency in the system can
allow consumers to see the impact of their choices on the envi-
ronment and adjust their purchasing decisions accordingly,
thus increasing levels of compliance.
MONITORING, REPORTING, AND VERIFICATION
The success of an emissions trading system depends on
how well emissions are monitored, reported, and verified, and
these elements in turn are determined by the degree of compli-
ance and enforcement. As such, monitoring, reporting, and ver-
ification (“MRV”) procedures were a key focus of the work-
shop. In particular, workshop participants considered the neces-
sary elements for an effective MRV program, and discussed the
potential for cross-border MRV application.
Lessons Learned for Compliance and Enforcement
The workshop began with a discussion comparing different
methods for compliance and enforcement in emissions trading
systems. Christian Egenhofer, from the Centre for European
Policy Studies, provided an overview of the European Union
emissions trading model. Joe Kruger, from Resources for the
Future at the time of the workshop (now with the National
Commission on Energy Policy), presented the U.S. emissions
trading model. Respondents Leigh Mazany, from Environment
Canada, and Kunihiko Shimada, from the Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies at the time of the workshop (now with
Japan’s Ministry of Environment), provided insight on emerging
trading models in Canada and Japan. 
General lessons and recommendations became evident from
such comparisons. In designing an effective emissions trading
system, methods of achieving compliance and enforcement must
be considered first and foremost. The key regulatory mecha-
nisms for achieving compliance in an ET system are monitoring,
reporting, and verification of emissions. With respect to enforce-
ment policies, a country will also have to determine the kind of
penalties (for example, discretionary or automatic) it wishes to
apply for non-compliance. The presenters noted that compliance
and enforcement policies must be expansive, and have a local,
regional, and national focus. Such policies must also be compre-
hensive in covering both industry and the public. Furthermore,
effective compliance and enforcement programs must ensure
accountability and integrity by thoroughly measuring emissions
and encouraging transparency for the benefit of the public.
Though such a system must inherently be multifaceted, system
designers must ensure that compliance and enforcement pro-
grams are simple to operate and implement. 
Participants also emphasized the importance of information
technology in an emissions trading scheme, particularly with
monitoring. They noted that information technology could pro-
vide greater transparency in data collection and analysis, and
encourage data sharing among program participants. It was also
generally agreed that, when feasible, regulators should take
advantage of technology in order to automate regulation of
emissions. For example, the U.S. model relies heavily on com-
puters and technology in its MRV program. In fact, the U.S. pro-
gram is now generally “paperless,” and much of the trading is
done online. This has greatly contributed to the program’s over-
all efficiency.
Overall, the presenters agreed that a successful MRV pro-
gram would depend on a variety of factors, including: (1) eco-
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nomic incentives for industry involvement; (2) clear roles and
accountabilities for those regulating and enforcing the pro-
gram; (3) transparency and engagement of stakeholders at all
stages of program implementation; and (4) the program’s
cost-effectiveness. 
Factors Affecting MRV in a Future U.S. GHG Trading
Program
Should the United States attempt to limit GHG emissions,
it is likely that they will turn to an emissions trading system. The
United States has already established several successful trading
programs for other emissions, such as SO2 and NOx, which
cause acid rain. Mr. Kruger highlighted certain factors that the
United States should consider when designing this system. 
First, regulators must consider the point, or target, of the
regulation, as this will affect how the system will be designed.
Regulations can be targeted “downstream” at the power sector,
“upstream” at the economy at large, or using a hybrid of both
down- and upstream for greater coverage. 
Second, the United States should consider using continuous
emissions monitors (“CEMs”) to monitor GHG emissions.
CEMs are a more comprehensive method of monitoring emis-
sions, which collect data on each ton of emissions from each
regulated unit. This method is used by the United States to mon-
itor other emissions, but is not mandatory. For an ET system,
reliance on CEMs would depend on the point of regulation and
whether CEMs are already in place. 
Third, the United States will have to determine the impact
of state and regional programs. Several states and regions have
taken initiative in experimenting with cap-and-trade systems.
Building on existing CO2 regulatory programs would make
implementing a large-scale trading system more efficient. 
Finally, the United States should consider experimenting
with voluntary initiatives. Voluntary protocols, however, would
require adaptation for mandatory programs. In particular, this
might create tensions over who bears the burden of the pro-
gram’s costs. Furthermore, the level of reporting required for a
voluntary program would be different than that for a mandatory
program. The regulators would have to consider who would do
the reporting – whether it would be performed internally by the
company or externally by a third party. Experimenting with vol-
untary programs, however, would be useful to inform future
mandatory protocols. 
Linkage Systems
A major focus of the workshop was how different countries’
emissions trading systems could be linked to provide for more
effective and comprehensive emissions control worldwide.
Although linkage will depend on a wide range of factors, work-
shop participants agreed that a truly global ET system would best
function with uniform, or, at least harmonized, MRV require-
ments. A common language and vocabulary would also be neces-
sary to design a comprehensive, multi-national trading scheme.
Linkage would also require strong political will, and would raise
various issues regarding the role of developing countries.
Verification and the Verifiers
Several presentations and working groups focused on the
verification aspects of an emissions trading system. In particular,
who should verify emissions and how should that verification be
performed? In the United States, for example, verification is pri-
marily performed by the government, which relies heavily on
electronic monitoring and occasional site inspections. The EU,
on the other hand, relies on third parties to verify emissions.
However, the EU currently has no uniform standards of verifica-
tion or accreditation for those third party verifiers. As such, one
of the issues addressed at the workshop was whether it would be
possible to develop an EU-wide body that could accredit veri-
fiers, rather than having each Member State oversee its own ver-
ifiers. Such a comprehensive program would result in more uni-
form standards, and thus, more confidence in the results. 
One possibility discussed was hiring professional verifica-
tion and certification firms. Such firms would be competent,
independent, and accredited. An independent firm would pro-
vide consistency in emissions reporting (over time and across
borders), transparency (clear, factual reports that could be repli-
cated), independence (they would be free from bias and conflict
of interest), ethical conduct (with trust, integrity, and confiden-
tiality), fair presentations (which would be truthful and accu-
rate), and due professional care (which would inspire confi-
dence in stakeholders). 
Third party verifiers would provide several benefits, including
avoiding bureaucracy, providing for greater separation of powers,
increasing efficiency, and spreading liability. Furthermore, third
party verifiers could provide a knowledge transfer from the private
sector to the government. Workshop participants also stressed the
importance of accreditation processes for verifiers and penalties –
including criminal sanctions – for dishonest verifiers. The partici-
pants expressed an urgent need for high-quality verifiers in order
to implement its ET system more efficiently. 
WORKING GROUP SESSIONS
Participants divided into small working groups on each day
of the workshop. On the first day, working groups evaluated the
similarities and differences between EU and U.S. MRV models.
On the second day, working groups discussed potential best
practices for international harmonization of trading systems. 
DAY ONE: COMPARISON OF MRV SYSTEMS IN THE EU
AND U.S. MODELS
At the first working group session, participants divided into
four smaller groups that focused on comparing costs between
EU and U.S. emissions trading system approaches, institutional
responsibilities in MRV, the role of information technology in
emissions trading systems, and the role and potential for further
development of third party verification.
Working Group One: Cost Comparison between EU
and U.S. Approaches
This group first identified three major costs for implementing
emissions trading systems. First, the group acknowledged the cost
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of establishing the emissions trading scheme, which typically
falls on the country’s government. Second, there will be specific
process-oriented costs for monitoring, reporting, and verification.
Finally, there will be auxiliary costs. The group questioned
whether such costs would be financially beneficial (as a boost to
alternative industries and technological innovations) or detrimen-
tal to companies (by increasing pressure for reporting at the cost
of confidentiality). The group also commented that these costs
might affect small and large businesses differently. 
Next, the group examined the costs that would fall on the
government. The group observed that the government’s fiscal
reality would have a significant impact on the financial structure
of the trading system. As one participant noted, not all govern-
ments can afford to hire new staff to travel around the country
and conduct verifications. 
The group concluded its session with recommendations for
further analysis of EU and U.S. trading systems to identify
where the costs are and who is currently bearing them. The
group noted that because the EU and U.S. trading systems are so
distinct from one another, a comparison between the two sys-
tems might reveal more efficient cost-sharing strategies.
Overall, the group suggested that countries developing emis-
sions trading schemes must focus on efficiently dividing costs
between the public and private sectors. 
Working Group Two: Institutional Responsibilities in
MRV
This group examined what kinds of rules should govern the
MRV program for an emissions trading system. The group first
noted that strict, formulaic guidelines did not work, and that for
the U.S. system, more prescriptive guidelines were needed. The
group found that there is a great need for flexibility in such
MRV operations, and that in particular, industry desired a
greater degree of certainty. 
The group then proposed a third party verification system,
and compared current programs in the United States and the EU.
The group found that initially, third party verification sounds
very appealing. Third party verification would provide a means
to avoid burdensome bureaucracy, increase the separation of
powers and responsibilities of those involved in the trading sys-
tem, and facilitate appeal procedures. Overall, the group thought
that a third party verification system has potential to dramati-
cally improve a trading system’s efficiency. 
Furthermore, the group found that a third party verification
program could be quite advantageous to a large trading system,
such as the EU, which encompasses 25 different jurisdictions.
Third parties would help a large system develop a uniform tem-
plate for MRV that would provide consistency among the dif-
ferent jurisdictions.
The group also highlighted other advantages of third party
verification. Third party verification would spread liability, for
instance, and allow for an efficient transfer of knowledge and
capacity from the private sector to the government. 
The group warned, however, that more research into defin-
ing the appropriate level of assurance of verification would be
needed to ensure that third party verifiers have universal quali-
fications, and to ensure that conflicts of interest do not arise
between third party verifiers and their clients.
Working Group Three: The Role and Potential of
Information Technology to Automate MRV
The United States has had great success in using informa-
tion technology (“IT”) to monitor, report, and verify emissions.
This group examined whether the EU might also benefit from
shifting to a more automated MRV program. Reliance on IT can
be beneficial to an emissions trading system because it can
reduce costs, improve consistency and efficiency, and contribute
to building greater confidence in compliance.
The group first discussed the role IT plays in the U.S. MRV
program. The U.S. system has been evolving dramatically over
the last decade, including significant improvements in the use of
electronic auditing and quality assurance and quality control
(“QA/QC”) testing requirements. The United States has tried
using automated verification checks with some success.
However, such a system is limited in its application to certain
emission sources, such as those produced by cement plants or
using mixed fuels. 
The IT system in the EU, on the other hand, is in its initial
growth stage. The group noted, however, that there is a signifi-
cant push towards automating the monitoring, reporting, and
verification of emissions data. Currently, there seems to be a
window of opportunity to create a uniform system of MRV
using IT in the EU, but – the group warned – it must be done
before ad-hoc systems develop, which become difficult to
change. The group highlighted the fact that, even with automat-
ed and standardized systems, the opportunity for data exchange
is critical. Otherwise, a significant data entry burden might be
created.
Overall, the group found that the most important element of
an effective IT system is transparency. In the United States,
emissions data is publicly available. In the EU, however, emis-
sions data is treated very differently – it is made confidential for
25 years or more. Transparency is important because it builds
confidence among both market stakeholders and the public. 
The group concluded with recommendations that interested
parties should look for opportunities to share more ideas on cre-
ating an effective IT system. In particular, the group suggested
17 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
When both parties’





that a standard form for submissions be created, although it noted
that this might be difficult to do given varying interpretations of
certain directives. The group also highlighted the need for edu-
cation – of both public and private stakeholders – on the benefits
of an emissions trading system. Furthermore, a push for the cre-
ation of electronic mandatory reporting would force a new way
of looking at the system. This might push all parties to become
involved in creating a more effective system, rather than simply
implementing electronic capabilities within the old system.
The group also noted that because many issues in the EU
are generally left to the Member States to resolve, it might be
beneficial to create a reference MRV model that all the Member
States could refer to when developing their own systems.
Despite the potential lack of political support for such a system,
the group strongly suggested that an MRV system should be
developed that would be “ready to roll out” once the political
will to implement such a system is present. This has been done
in the United States – a reporting and verification system is in
place in the event that political support is granted. The United
States could cooperate with the EU to design a similar system.
Finally, the group emphasized the need for another INECE
workshop in the second half of 2006 on the role of IT in MRV
systems. The workshop would need to focus on addressing the
many issues involved with implementing IT systems – in par-
ticular, how to improve ease of use of such a system, and how
to promote consistency among different systems. The group
suggested designing a hypothetical plant and performing simu-
lations of how U.S. and EU systems would operate at this plant.
Overall, the group found that IT, as a standardized system, could
build confidence, increase compliance, and promote greater cost
effectiveness in an emissions trading system.
Working Group Four: The Role of Third Party
Verification
This group examined the role of third party verification,
and focused on exchanging lessons learned by the UK and
United States. The United States relies heavily on the govern-
ment to verify emissions levels, whereas the UK relies primari-
ly on third party verifiers. The group found that the main differ-
ence between the U.S. and EU verification system was account-
ability – while the United States primarily holds only the source
liable, the UK may hold both the source and verifier liable for
incorrect emissions data collection. In the United States, most
industries report emissions data themselves. Therefore, some-
one in each particular company is responsible for reviewing and
approving emissions data. If the data proves incorrect, that par-
ticular person may be prosecuted. In the UK, in contrast, a third
party company reviews and approves emissions levels. That
third party verifier then signs a statement approving the emis-
sions levels and gives that statement to the environmental
enforcement department. If those calculations are wrong, the
third party verifier may be held liable in addition to the compa-
ny producing the emissions. There is a little tension in the UK
system, though, because typically the operator of the plant pays
the verifier for his or her services. Even though verifiers in the
UK need to meet certain independence requirements, there is
still a suggestive link between the company and verifier,
because of who pays the verifiers’ costs. 
The working group emphasized the importance of compe-
tency requirements in order to have an effective international
verification system, and examined the U.S. and UK accredita-
tion systems for guidance. The UK accreditation process
requires that a verifier show independence from the company he
or she will be verifying. Additionally, the verifier must be com-
petent to collect data, and objective in assessing results. Because
UK industries must pay for verification, accreditation ratings
allow industries to choose the most cost-effective verifier for
their company. Even though this might reduce the financial bur-
den on the government, it has the potential to create a trade-off
between price and quality. 
This group also looked at whether the United States was
considering third party verification, and whether it would be
feasible without a huge shift in philosophy. U.S. government
representatives in the group responded that the United States
was unlikely to shift towards a third party verification approach;
rather there has been an apparent shift in environmental man-
agement to self-auditing processes. One question with which the
United States has recently struggled is whether leniency would
be granted if a company performed a self-audit and identified a
problem. To some degree, the U.S. system fosters third party
verification, but it is not entirely independent. Many industries
will bring in third party companies to help with the monitoring
and reporting, but since these companies work at the request of
the industry, their independence may be diminished. 
The group concluded with some factors to be considered
for establishing an inter-jurisdictional verification program for
the EU. In particular, the group highlighted the need for lan-
guage requirements (verification forms and guidelines should be
in a single universal language, but auditors need to retain the
ability to interpret regulations and documents in local lan-
guages), universal competency requirements, and incorporation
of varying accreditation approaches.
DAY TWO: BEST PRACTICES FOR CROSS-BORDER
HARMONIZATION
At the second working group session, workshop partici-
pants divided into two smaller groups to discuss the role that
Who should verify
emissions and how should
that verification be
performed?
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INECE could play in assisting the development and linkage of
inter-jurisdictional MRV schemes, and how cooperation
between industry and government could help achieve greater
compliance in emissions trading.
Working Group 1: MRV Linkage Issues
This working group focused on the international climate
change enforcement community’s immediate, intermediate, and
long-term needs to facilitate MRV linkage issues. In particular,
the group found that INECE could provide considerable assis-
tance by providing a knowledge base for design, monitoring,
and enforcement strategies, a compilation of “lessons learned”
case studies, and guidance on accreditation and training of emis-
sions verifiers.
The group first focused on the immediate needs of the EU. At
the time of the workshop, there were fewer than one hundred
working days until the first year of the EU’s monitoring system
was completed, and some two hundred days until the verification
of emission reports was to be completed. As such, the group found
that there was an immediate need for IT assistance – particularly
with single-window interfaces, and generally with strategies for
using IT in emissions trading regimes. The group suggested the
need to bring EU regulators in touch with regulators from other
countries that have had some success with these IT models, such
as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).
An overall lack of human resources was another immediate
need highlighted by the group. The lack of trained certifiers posed
significant problems in the short-term, especially for smaller mar-
kets like Australia. The few qualified professionals are primarily
located in countries with larger markets. As a result, the best
experts and technical consultants are often too busy to take on
new clients. One group member pointed out, for example, that the
same consultant worked for both the Canadian government and
the EPA. One solution to this human resource problem might be
a centralized list of qualified technical consultants.
The group next shifted its focus to intermediate needs, and
found a great need for an international information knowledge
base. The group noted that countries are currently in various
stages of implementing emissions trading systems. However,
the group pointed out that often these countries’ long-term goals
are the same, so there is great potential for knowledge sharing. 
The group identified a need to promote best practices for
the design of emissions trading systems. One participant noted
that because emissions are an artificial commodity, their trade
does not happen in a naturally occurring market, and as such,
their market must be specially designed. Australia, for example,
has created a special task force to investigate the feasibility of
creating a conventional cap-and-trade approach. Designers have
discovered that there currently exists no comprehensive
resource that details a decision tree that regulators could use to
help establish such a market. 
There is a need to bring together case studies, best practices,
resources, evaluations, and handbooks. Such resources are or
will be available, but are not located in any centralized location.
For example, the EPA produced a “Tools of the Trade” manual
based on their system. Furthermore, the EU will begin evaluation
of their system early this year, and conclusions and “lessons
learned” analyses might be available as early as summer 2006.
The group also suggested canonizing the fundamental ele-
ments of a carbon-trading regime. Two systems might employ
different monitoring techniques but with the same objective of
having accurate and timely information about emissions levels.
Often systems that look quite different from a technical point of
view are fundamentally quite similar. Reducing various systems
to their fundamental elements might assist in the evaluation of
regional systems. 
The group also found that an important intermediate need is
training. However, there is a lack of adequate training resources.
The group noted that while we might still be several years away
from the first university degree in Emissions Regulation, demand
for qualifiers would remain high, especially in the smaller mar-
kets. The group suggested that INECE could collaborate with
private industry, particularly insurance companies, to develop
accreditation standards for emissions verifiers. The group pro-
posed that eventually such discussions would move from accred-
itation standards to training. As a result, universities could devel-
op curricula to train verifiers and relieve the human resource
shortage. The group also noted that training would be funda-
mental to developing a common parlance in the industry.
In terms of long-term needs, the group found that all imme-
diate and intermediate efforts would ultimately promote more
efficient systems further down the line by promoting common
international parlance for emissions regulation. Common objec-
tives will come from common parlance.
Working Group 2: Potential for Industry and
Government Cooperation
This group discussed what obstacles and opportunities were
available for government and industry to cooperate with each
other in order to achieve more effective compliance in emis-








needed for harmonization of industry and government coopera-
tion. To achieve trust, the group suggested that both sectors
needed to increase integrity and confidence in the program
itself. This could be done by making information available to
the public and developing a system that would effectively
resolve disputes concerning confidentiality. The group noted
that because of the tension between transparency and confiden-
tiality, shaping public perceptions must incorporate strong rule-
making procedures that will allow for regular support and eval-
uation as well as strategic planning and changes. 
The group concluded with a finding that a multidisciplinary
approach was necessary, but that government and industry need-
ed to share common values to encourage emissions trading, and
full cooperation from stakeholders would be critical to the sys-
tem’s success. The group found that industry’s reluctance to
accept trading systems could be alleviated by providing greater
certainty and flexibility (for example, by having coherent, but
flexible, government policy) and by promoting effective com-
munication. Group participants agreed that emissions trading
systems could be encouraged through political interest and pres-
sure, presentation of successful examples, education of small
and medium-sized firms, and assistance in technology and infra-
structure to new EU member states.
CONCLUSION
The workshop concluded with a discussion of what “next
steps” should be taken. Many participants proposed further
areas of needed research regarding emissions trading systems.
Such research suggestions included: (1) examining the role of
the private sector and environmental regulations; (2) analyzing
how to best bring verification, environmental management sys-
tems, information technology, and industry together; and (3)
determining a common currency – comparing technologies on a
technical level and comparing different regulatory cultures. 
Workshop participants unanimously decided that future
meetings were necessary, and that definite timeframes, dead-
lines, and goals should be determined to facilitate effective and
efficient progress in the field of emissions trading.
Power point presentations from the workshop are available on
the INECE website at http://www.inece.org/emissions. 
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INTRODUCTION
For the past decade, while the debate has focused on thescience of climate change and the necessity for action tomitigate potential climate impacts, a growing number of
U.S. companies across industry sectors have voluntarily put in
place greenhouse gas (“GHG”) mitigation strategies. This is evi-
denced by over fifty companies that have set voluntary GHG
reduction goals. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
(“EPA”) Climate Leaders partnership was launched in early
2002 to help companies improve their GHG management prac-
tices by working with companies to set aggressive GHG reduc-
tion targets and track their progress through the provision of an
annual GHG inventory to EPA.1
After four years of program implementation, there are les-
sons that can be learned from voluntary corporate GHG man-
agement “best practices.” This article communicates the knowl-
edge gained by the Climate Leaders program and its Partner
companies in the process of developing successful GHG man-
agement practices. The article defines the components of an
effective and comprehensive strategy, details the benefits of
adopting such a strategy, and using case studies, highlights
GHG management best practices designed and adopted by
Climate Leaders Partner companies. 
BACKGROUND
President Bush’s Climate Change Strategy was announced
in February 2002 with three main focus areas: (1) reduce the
GHG intensity of the U.S. economy by eighteen percent by
2012; (2) establish the Climate Change Science Program and the
Climate Change Technology Program; and (3) engage both
developed and developing countries to establish an efficient and
coordinated response to climate change.2
The President included three key approaches in his
announcement, designed to achieve the eighteen percent goal.
These approaches consist of enhancing the Department of
Energy’s “section 1605(b)” voluntary GHG registry, establish-
ing partnerships with industry sectors through the “Climate
VISION” effort, and challenging individual companies to take
action to reduce their climate footprints.3
While debate may continue over the proper steps for cli-
mate change action, dozens of U.S. companies are currently tak-
ing action, recognizing that climate change is an important
strategic issue. Many leading firms now believe that the oppor-
tunities and risks posed by climate change – including GHG
mandates at the state and international level, shareholder reso-
lutions, litigation against emitters, rising energy costs, and
increased public awareness about climate change – warrant a
strategic response. 
COMPONENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE GHG
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Companies that are beginning to explore possible respons-
es to climate change benefit from several years of voluntary cor-
porate leadership in this area. A consensus is emerging on the
prudent steps that companies can take to mitigate their exposure
to reputation, economic, insurance, and other risks associated
with climate change. To address the risks associated with cli-
mate change, leading companies are developing comprehensive
GHG management strategies composed of three parts: (1) a cor-
porate-wide GHG inventory; (2) an inventory management
plan; and (3) aggressive GHG reduction targets. 
STEP ONE: COMPLETE A CORPORATE GHG INVENTORY
Companies are discovering that the first step in an effective
strategy is to assess the risks associated with company opera-
tions by performing a high-quality corporate GHG inventory,
which defines the quantity of GHGs emitted annually as a result
of the company’s operations. Consensus is emerging that a good
corporate inventory should include the six major GHGs (CO2,
CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6) on a company-wide basis
associated with onsite fuel consumption, process-related emis-
sions (as applicable), refrigeration/air conditioning use, and
indirect emissions from electricity/steam purchases.4
Performing a corporate GHG inventory helps companies
identify the quantity of GHGs emitted from different sources
across the corporation and evaluate the risks of future carbon
liabilities. A GHG inventory can also be useful in responding to
risk disclosure requests from shareholders, environmental
groups, and the financial and insurance communities. 
A corporate-wide GHG inventory is critical, as opposed to
narrowly focusing on individual facilities or single processes,
because it allows a company to discover previously unknown
sources of emissions. A comprehensive inventory may also
challenge preconceptions about the company’s major emissions
sources. For example, several Climate Leaders Partners were
surprised to find that corporate jets and other business travel
were a sizable percentage of their overall GHG footprint. The
inventory also helps a company to identify and target those
facilities that are the largest contributors to corporate emissions. 
Once a company has a comprehensive picture of its climate
impact, it is in a better position to strategically and cost-effec-
tively address its risk. Since the inventory is updated annually,
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it serves as the metric for tracking the success of GHG reduction
efforts. Through the inventory process, companies are discover-
ing the wisdom of the maxim “what is not measured cannot be
managed.” Companies are also discovering that inventory data
has additional value beyond GHG management, as they discov-
er facilities that pay higher-than-expected energy costs or find
new consolidation or energy efficiency opportunities. 
CASE STUDY: NOBLE CORPORATION
Noble Corporation, founded in 1921, is a leading provider
of diversified services for the oil and gas industry worldwide.5
Noble performs contract drilling services for the oil industry.
The company joined Climate Leaders in 2004, and is currently
working to set a corporate-wide GHG reduction goal. 
Noble first performed a pilot GHG inventory in 2002,
employing a consulting company to quantify the annual green-
house gas emissions released by one of Noble’s drilling rigs.
These results showed that diesel-driven electrical generators and
equipment were responsible for the majority of the rig’s emis-
sions and prompted Noble to complete a baseline inventory of
all the rigs in its fleet. The baseline inventory confirmed the
pilot’s findings and focused the corporation’s attention on
reducing emissions from diesel engines. Consequently, Noble
began employing new diesel injection technology, reducing
energy consumption without sacrificing engine response or
power output. As a result of this new rig efficiency program,
fuel consumption has decreased two percent, translating into
dollar savings of $5,000 a year per engine, or about $270,000
total per year.
Performing an inventory thus proved invaluable in helping
Noble identify where it could best focus its GHG reduction
efforts. As one part of its overall corporate efforts to reduce GHG
emissions, Noble continues to focus on identifying new tech-
nologies and methods for improving diesel engine efficiency.
STEP TWO: DEVELOP AN INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
PLAN
While they create their GHG inventory, Climate Leaders
companies are working in parallel to document the process
through the development of an inventory management plan
(“IMP”). The IMP is an internal process for the company to insti-
tutionalize the collection, calculation, and maintenance of GHG
data and the completion of a high quality inventory. The IMP
ensures that an accurate and transparent base-year inventory is
created and then consistently updated and maintained over time. 
Companies may have a single IMP document that addresses
all of the elements that go into developing their corporate inven-
tory, or they might have an equivalent collection of procedures
and other relevant information. The Climate Leaders program
provides an IMP checklist that describes all of the elements that
make up a high quality IMP. An IMP is made up of seven major
sections: (1) partner information; (2) boundary conditions; (3)
emissions quantification; (4) data management; (5) base year; (6)
management tools; and (7) auditing and verification.6
This sort of rigorous management plan maximizes the accu-
racy, consistency, and transparency of the inventory, and proves
to be a critical step towards credible inventory tracking over
time. Development of an IMP can also serve as a preparatory
tool for an independent third party verification. In addition, the
process of documenting how the inventory is developed affords
the opportunity to discover areas for improvement in the system
and to create a clear paper trail. 
When a company begins to contemplate developing a cor-
porate GHG inventory, it often has the perception that it is a
time- and cost-intensive process. This may or may not be true,
depending on the particular company’s situation. Relevant data
may already be collected in the form of utility bills, transport
data, and emissions factors; however, multiple collection sys-
tems may need to be integrated. Completing a GHG inventory
requires the coordination of numerous people at the facility and
corporate level. Some sources of data may need to be tracked for
the first time; a process needs to be created to collect the data
efficiently and calculate the emissions.
Nonetheless, companies are finding that the up-front invest-
ment they are making to produce a detailed IMP can help reduce
the long-term costs associated with GHG management. IMPs
have been shown to improve the efficiency of inventory devel-
opment and adjustments. Often, existing data collection systems
are employed in completing a GHG inventory (e.g. an energy
management system), and a renewed focus on the details of
these data collection and management systems through the IMP
can lead to identifying areas for improvement and opportunities
for efficiency gains (and cost savings). In addition, companies
are seeing that a documented, institutionalized process mini-
mizes disruptions from employee turnover and facilitates neces-
sary modifications to the inventory that stem from, for example,
changes in the company profile, availability of new or improved
data, or acquisitions and divestitures. 
A thorough IMP thus ensures consistency among differ-
ent facilities, provides for accurate tracking over time,
improves reliability of emissions and reductions estimates,
and helps to ensure the credibility of the data when disclosed
to interested stakeholders. 
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STEP THREE: SET A CORPORATE GHG REDUCTION
GOAL
Once a high-quality base-year inventory and IMP are com-
pleted, companies can begin to address their risks by setting a
GHG reduction goal and formulating a reduction strategy.
Climate Leaders Partners have seen the critical importance of
setting a goal in engaging management and stakeholders and in
selling the overall GHG management strategy. 
There are many considerations to take into account when a
company is developing a GHG reduction goal. Implementing a
reduction target is likely to necessitate changes in behavior and
decision-making throughout the organization, and requires
establishing an internal accountability and incentive system, as
well as adequate resources. 
Next, a company must decide on the target type (absolute
vs. intensity). An absolute target is expressed in terms of a
reduction over time in a specified quantity of GHG emissions to
the atmosphere (i.e. tons of CO2-equivalents), whereas an inten-
sity target is expressed as a reduction in the ratio of GHG emis-
sions relative to another business metric (i.e. tons of CO2-equiv-
alents per ton of product, per kilowatt-hour, ton-mileage, etc.) or
some other metric such as sales, revenues, or office space. 
Other considerations include setting the target boundaries,
choosing the target base year, and defining the target time peri-
od. Additional factors include understanding key drivers affect-
ing GHG emissions, developing reductions strategies, looking at
the future of the company, factoring relevant growth factors,
evaluating existing environmental plans or energy plans that
will affect GHG emissions, and benchmarking GHG emissions
with similar organizations.
Finally, corporate GHG goals will need to be tailored to
each company’s situation, as each company has a unique set of
GHG emissions sources and reduction opportunities.
However, as more companies announce greenhouse gas emis-
sions reduction goals, consensus is beginning to emerge that to
be considered aggressive, a company’s goal must be: (1) cor-
porate-wide; (2) based on the most recent base year for which
data are available; (3) achieved over a longer time frame (five
to ten years typically); (4) expressed as an absolute GHG
reduction or as a decrease in GHG intensity; and (5) aggres-
sive compared to the projected GHG performance for the
Partner’s sector.7
Experience shows that the cornerstone of an effective cor-
porate GHG management strategy is an aggressive GHG reduc-
tion goal. Goal-setting is often the driver to reduce emissions
and helps to ensure the overall success of a company’s GHG
management strategy, particularly in the eyes of interested
stakeholders. Many companies have been working on energy
efficiency and other emissions reduction projects for several
years. However, rolling these efforts into an overall GHG reduc-
tion strategy with an aggressive goal as the centerpiece helps
identify additional cost-effective opportunities for reductions,
gain executive-level management attention, secure funding for
these types of reduction projects, and galvanize stakeholder sup-
port for GHG reduction efforts.
CASE STUDY: BALL CORPORATION
Ball Corporation is one of the world’s largest suppliers of
metal and plastic packaging to the beverage and food indus-
tries.8 Ball joined Climate Leaders in 2002 and has pledged to
reduce U.S. GHG emissions by sixteen percent per production
index from 2002 to 2012. 
After completing a baseline inventory and developing an
IMP, Ball embarked on the task of setting a corporate-wide
GHG reduction goal for its U.S. facilities. Desiring its goal to be
achievable while still credible, the corporation developed a
goal-setting strategy that considered several factors such as
implementation cost; collateral benefits to the company, envi-
ronment, and community; time to implement; return on invest-
ment; core business contribution; brand image contribution; and
obstacles to implementation.
Ball realized that many of the ideas and knowledge needed
to explore reduction opportunities could be found at the level of
individual business units, motivating Ball to develop a “bottom-
up” approach to setting its goal. The company surveyed facili-
ties for potential opportunities, met with its engineering group
regarding new technologies, and held discussions with business
leaders to understand strategic considerations for their industry
sector. The goal task force then summarized GHG reduction
opportunities by both facility and operational group and includ-
ed an uncertainty analysis. 
This bottom-up approach resulted in benefits for Ball above
and beyond setting a reduction goal; the approach served to pro-
mote program awareness and buy-in as well as management
accountability for the success of the program. The goal-setting
process elevated Ball’s GHG reduction efforts to a top priority
and garnered support along the way from employees across the
company. This greatly increased the company’s chances for suc-
cess in its reduction efforts.
Aggressive corporate GHG reduction goals serve to rally
staff around a common goal and encourage innovation. Climate




of the maxim “what is
not measured cannot be
managed.” 
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reduction strategies result in positive employee morale and may
help in employee recruiting and retention. For example, Roche
Nutley implemented a hybrid vehicle pilot program for a num-
ber of marketing employees and saw such a positive response
that the company plans to equip an entire sales team with hybrid
vehicles.9
Finally, and most important to the bottom line, implemen-
tation of GHG goals frequently leads to cost savings. For exam-
ple, Climate Leader IBM Corporation, which avoided GHG
emissions of 1.28 million tons from 1998 to 2005, saved $115
million dollars in reduced energy costs in the process.10 SC
Johnson also estimates it has saved $2.6 million a year, a pro-
jected overall return on its investment of twenty percent, by
installing a turbine system to produce heat and power from land-
fill gas at one of its facilities.11 The project proved so successful
financially and environmentally that the company began opera-
tion of a second turbine that will run on natural gas and landfill
gas at the same facility this fall.
CONCLUSION
This article serves as an overview of the key steps that lead-
ing companies are taking to understand and address their cli-
mate change risk. Companies are demonstrating that they can
take prudent steps to address their climate change impact by
performing corporate-wide GHG inventories, establishing
inventory management plans, and setting aggressive company
GHG reduction goals. Further, a number of companies have
found that as they better understand emissions and energy data,
they are finding new, and sometimes unexpected, opportunities
to increase their bottom line through energy efficiency or other
improvements. 
For more information about EPA’s Climate Leaders pro-
gram, including a list of Partner companies, program require-
ments, and other case studies, please visit http://www.epa.gov/
climateleaders. 
1 See Partner Resources, United States Environmental Protection Agency
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The “Confidence Through Compliance in EmissionsTrading Markets” workshop brought together expertsfrom all over the world for two days. The emissions
trading sector is rapidly developing in some areas of the world
and relatively new in others. A common theme throughout the
conference was the importance of disseminating knowledge
and learning from the mistakes and successes of others. Many
participants reached consensus that it is the exchange of unique
perspectives and experiences from across the world that will
make emissions trading a success.
This article outlines the perspectives of a handful of par-
ticipants at the conference regarding the importance of com-
pliance in making emissions trading work, the need for cross-
border harmonization, and the challenges of bringing countries
into a regulatory program. The views expressed by experts in
this article are personal and do not necessarily reflect the insti-
tutions with which they are affiliated.
Mr. Chris Dekkers
According to Mr. Chris Dekkers, Coordinator for the
Emissions Trading program in the Ministry of Housing, Spatial
Planning, and the Environment, Netherlands, emissions trading is
about creating new currency. Its success depends on trust within
a society. As with other forms of trade, partners must develop
procedures in order to generate confidence in the operation of the
market. There are, however, significant differences between soci-
eties and the degree markets require compliance measures to
function properly. Some societies are organized in a way where
corporate citizens are more willing to comply voluntarily, such as
in countries where there is a greater focus on consumer interests.
In other societies, corporate citizens are under constant market
pressure to create shareholder value, as a result of which they are
more tempted to cheat if they are not closely monitored. In that
sense, compliance measures are more important in competitive
societies where corporate citizens may be tempted to seek ways
to cheat, although strong compliance measures are necessary in
every emissions trading system. Cross-border harmonization of
compliance measures is another challenge. For instance, even in
the case where there is a common basic law, as in the EU with the
directive on emissions trading, translating this directive into
national law may easily become a major obstacle in harmoniza-
tion. Since words are poor instruments for conveying thought,
information technology may be used as an additional tool for
clarifying and harmonizing the various requirements, and thus
help to connect emissions trading on a global scale. Despite the
challenges, though, we must move forward in bringing countries
into harmonized regulatory programs.
Ms. Jill Duggan
Compliance is important in emissions trading because if
you are linking different schemes, you must have confidence in
the accuracy of the verifications in each of the schemes. Ms.
Jill Duggan of the National Climate Change Policy Division of
the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs in
the United Kingdom, expresses that without confidence in the
chosen emissions trading scheme, the system will break down.
Ms. Duggan stressed that due to the reality that European
nations have adopted emissions trading regulations very quick-
ly, there will be numerous upcoming matters that will need to
be coordinated. Countries can learn from every new scheme
that is created around the world, and we must accept that we
may need to make improvements as systems and trading
become established. 
Mr. Reid Harvey
According to Mr. Reid Harvey of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, the whole point of these systems is to
achieve greater environmental certainty in emissions reduc-
tions. The United States is currently looking at the feasibility,
not the desirability, of linking sulfur dioxide and nitrogen
oxide emissions control programs with Canada. While the two
countries might harmonize measures of emissions, compliance
requirements, and penalties, they will continue to differ in how
they distribute allowances. But so long as there is a set cap on
emissions in both countries, the environmental outcome will
be the same regardless of the measures taken by each country.
Mr. Harvey believes that developing countries have also
shown they have the capability to create emissions trading pro-
grams. The problems we have seen in establishing emissions
trading systems are related to the larger problems of societies.
For instance, the remnants of the command-and-control
economies in post-Soviet countries have reduced capacity,
such as staff size, training, and available resources, making it
more difficult to create trading systems. No matter the country
or regulatory system, a successful emissions trading program
requires a strong compliance regime.
Mr. Kunihiko Shimada
Mr. Kunihiko Shimada, a researcher for the Climate
Policy Project of the Institute for Global Environmental
Strategies at the time of the conference (now currently serv-
ing as Chief Administrator of the Office of International
Strategy on Climate Change of Japan’s Ministry of
Environment), shares his personal views that credibility for
investors is key for the future of emissions trading. Japan is
currently considering steps towards cross-border harmoniza-
tion by modifying rules to become consistent with the EU
emissions trading system. However, harmonization will be
difficult because of countries’ vastly different legal systems,
cultures, and backgrounds. Japan’s diplomatic strategy is
“global” in the sense that it centers around the United
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INTRODUCTION
This article examines several of the emissions trading sys-tems currently in place around the world and how theyconduct their monitoring and verification processes. By
comparing the systems, and studying their experiences, we can
distill best practices for implementing an effective monitoring
and verification protocol.
Compliance is required in both a command-and-control
system and a trading system; but a trading system has the addi-
tional demands of transparency and confidence in the scheme.
Verification is critical because it promotes compliance, which in
turn is needed to foster trust and stability in the market.
Emissions disclosure must be universally trusted in order to be
tradable. Trust in disclosure requires clear and uniform defini-
tions, requirements, and rules for verification.1
All existing and proposed emissions reduction programs
involve some kind of verification or certification of self-report-
ed data. The differences appear in the implementation of the ver-
ification processes. Which party makes up the verifying body is
the primary issue. It may either be a government / regulatory
body or a third-party organization that is in some way qualified
to perform the data assessment. A centralized verification and
enforcement center in the regulator allows for consistency and
standardization; however, it requires specialized resources and
can pose a heavy monetary burden depending on the number of
program participants. Using a third-party verification system
allows the costs to be spread among the program participants. If
the accreditation system is robust, it can foster the same consis-
tency and standardization as the centralized method. 
COMPARING CURRENT EMISSIONS
REDUCTION PROGRAMS
U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM
The goal of the U.S. Acid Rain Program is to significant-
ly reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) and nitrogen
oxide (“NOx”), which are the primary causes of acid rain.2
The SO2 Program utilizes an allowance trading system, where-
as the NOx Program does not. Both programs require an
accounting of the total emissions from every regulated unit;
reported emissions cannot exceed the allowance held for that
unit for it to be in compliance.3
The U.S. model has a centralized structure with a regulat-
ing body, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”),
serving as the verifier. According to the EPA, “[a]pproximately
75 percent of administrative resources in the U.S. SO2
Allowance Trading Program are devoted to measuring, tracking
and quality assuring emissions.”4 Once the facility monitoring
plan is certified, the facility must adhere to ongoing quality
assurance and quality control testing requirements.
The organizing principles for measurement, reporting, and
validation are maintaining accountability and providing admin-
istrative certainty.5 Administrative certainty is created by mak-
ing processes routine and minimizing regulatory discretion.
Government resources are focused on measurement and infor-
mation systems for standardized reporting and simplified audit-
ing procedures. The regulator in the U.S. systems is the EPA in
conjunction with state and local officials. The key features of
the U.S. model are: detailed rules for measurement and report-
ing; extensive use of information technology (“IT”); automatic
and non-discretionary penalties; and public access to data.6
Industry and the government have integrated their IT sys-
tems for emissions reporting, auditing, allowance transfers, and
other administrative functions. In all programs, regulated
sources must report all emissions as measured by continuous
emissions monitors. Standard reporting procedures and software
have been issued by the EPA for such reporting. Emissions are
submitted to the Emissions Tracking System using “ETS-FTP”
software.7 Companies can use this software to check their data
prior to submitting it, allowing mistakes to be corrected before
an audit.8 Automatic penalties focus corporate efforts on reduc-
tion strategies rather than politicking for waivers. Discretionary
civil and criminal penalties are also available in addition to the
automatic fine; the fines are fixed such that they far exceed the
market price of an allowance certificate, providing a further
incentive for compliance with the system.9
U.S. CLIMATE LEADERS PROGRAM
The Climate Leaders Program is a voluntary partnership
between industry and the EPA to develop comprehensive climate
change strategies. Program participants develop corporate green-
house gas (“GHG”) reduction goals and measure their progress
by inventorying their emissions.10 Participants must report their
inventory to the EPA annually. In exchange for their participa-
tion, the EPA provides recognition through press releases and
conferences, technical assistance to develop a GHG inventory,
and credibility through a transparent GHG reporting system.11
The Climate Leaders Program requires that participants
document emissions from the six major GHGs12 on a company-
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wide basis, which includes at a minimum all domestic facilities
associated with onsite fuel consumption, process-related emis-
sions (as applicable), refrigeration and air conditioning use, and
indirect emissions from electricity/steam purchases.13 The
reporting requirements for the Climate Leaders Program consist
of three major components: an Inventory Management Plan
(“IMP”), the Annual GHG Inventory Summary and Goal
Tracking Form, and the review process. The IMP describes the
company’s process for completing the corporate GHG invento-
ry, and the company uses the IMP to “institutionalize a process
for collecting, calculating, and maintaining GHG data.”14 EPA
has provided guidance documentation for developing a corpo-
rate GHG inventory and inventory management plan and setting
a GHG reduction goal.15
The GHG Inventory Summary and Goal Tracking Form is
submitted annually using a standardized form.16 The form
describes total carbon dioxide
(“CO2”)-equivalent emissions and
offsets for both domestic and inter-
national sources. Historical totals
and performance indicators are also
included to track the progress
toward a reduction goal.17
The final reporting requirement
is a review. The EPA performs a
desktop review of the company’s
IMP and corporate GHG inventory
data and also conducts a site visit to
ensure the accuracy of the facility-
level implementation of the IMP.
Facility-level GHG data reviews are
also available for interested compa-
nies. Some companies have found that these facility-level reviews
help to improve the quality of their inventory.18 The Climate
Leaders Program also has a reporting option for using third-party
verification for reporting GHG inventories as an alternative to the
primary reporting option.19
EU EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM
The EU Emissions Trading System (“EU ETS”) encom-
passes over 11,500 installations in 25 countries.20 During the
first phase of the program, spanning from 2005 to 2007, the ETS
will cover only CO2 emissions from large emitters in the power
and heat generation industry and in selected energy-intensive
industrial divisions.21 This will include emitters such as com-
bustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants,
and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp,
and paper.22
The development of the EU ETS has been largely influenced
by the U.S. SO2 program; however, the primary difference
between the two programs is the level of decentralization of the
EU ETS, which is the result of the EU political structure.23 The
EU established the ETS framework but implementation, compli-
ance, and enforcement strategies are left to the discretion of the
Member States. Additionally, emission-verification policy deter-
minations are delegated to the Member States, such as whether
verification would occur through a government authority or a
third-party, along with defining the rules and procedures for ver-
ifier accreditation.24 However, because consistency is desirable,
Implementation Committees are engaged in the harmonization of
implementation provisions across Member States.25
The European Commission is required to adopt binding
Guidelines for Monitoring and Reporting (“MRG”) by the EU
ETS Directive. Member States must ensure that the provisions of
the guidelines are applied in the monitoring and annual reporting
of greenhouse gas emissions of each of the installations covered
by the EU ETS.26 The MRG defines monitoring methodology as
“the methodology used for the determination of emissions,
including the choice between calculation and measurement, and
the choice of tiers [of levels of assurance].”27 The monitoring
methodology specifies how an operator of an installation will
carry out the monitoring and reporting of CO2-emissions for that
specific installation. Approval of
the monitoring methodology is part
of the permit granting process.28
Installation operators are re-
quired to ensure that their report are
compliant with the applicable moni-
toring methodology; additionally, in-
dependent third-party verification is
required for all self-reported emis-
sions.29 As stated above, the verifier
can either be a government body or
an accredited verifier, depending on
the state’s verification policy. A
guidance document prepared under
the European Cooperation for Ac-
creditation Certification Committee
details a harmonized approach to the recognition of verification
bodies under the EU ETS Directive and the MRG.30
NEW SOUTH WALES GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT
SCHEME
The New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme
(“NSW GGAS”) is a state-based mandatory emissions reduction
program in Australia. The NSW GGAS targets the electricity
sector, which is responsible for 39 percent of the state’s emis-
sions.31 Electricity retailers and large end-users are required to
meet mandatory emissions targets by reducing their GHG emis-
sions or participating in off-set activities such as purchasing
NSW greenhouse gas abatement certificates (“NGACs”) from
accredited abatement certificate providers.32
The regulatory body administering the NSW GGAS is the
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW (“IPART”).
IPART is the Compliance Regulator and Scheme Administrator
responsible for managing the creation and transfer of NGACs. A
participant is in compliance with the NSW GGAS if its attributa-
ble emissions are less than or equal to its GHG benchmark; excess
emissions are subject to a penalty per metric ton of CO2.33
Accredited NGAC providers produce NGACs through
project-based GHG abatement activities like demand-side-
abatement, carbon-sequestration projects, and implementation




turn is needed to foster
trust and stability in
the market.
of new low-emission generation within NSW.34 Renewable
energy certificates can also be used to off-set emissions exceed-
ing the benchmark level in limited circumstances. NSW GGAS
participants must surrender certificates equivalent to the GHG
emissions above the benchmark level.35
The primary reporting requirement for benchmark partici-
pants is the Annual Greenhouse Gas Benchmark Statement
(“Benchmark Statement”), which details the participant’s elec-
tricity sales or purchases, GHG benchmark, and abatement cer-
tificates surrendered.36 However, prior to submission, the
Benchmark Statement must be audited for data accuracy and
record-keeping system quality. According to the GGAS website,
“The role of the auditor is important in bringing an appropriate
level of assurance, integrity and transparency to the Scheme.”37
IPART has established an audit panel in order to maintain a
qualified pool of auditors to support the objectives and effec-
tiveness of the Scheme. Audit
activity associated with the
NSW GGAS can only be per-
formed by approved auditors.38
VERIFICATION BEST
PRACTICES
The common challenge for
all countries is to develop verifi-
cation structures and processes
that are credible and efficient.39
The key principles for a credible
verification system are consis-
tency, transparency, independ-
ence, ethical conduct, truthful
disclosure, and due professional
care.40 Each of the programs described above provide examples
of best practices relating to emissions reporting and verification,
particularly the role of third-party verification. 
One primary reason for using third-party verification is to
avoid creating extensive new bureaucratic institutions. Rather
than creating a “greenhouse gas accounting firm,” the govern-
ment may focus its resources on certifying or accrediting private
organizations. Private organizations are better positioned to
develop efficient ways to meet verification requirements in order
to achieve their targeted bottom line. Best practices developed by
individual organizations will eventually evolve into industry
standards, particularly where private companies participate in
efforts by international organizations that represent a broad
cross-section of industry, government, and non-governmental
organizations. For example, the Greenhouse Gas Protocol
Initiative seeks to produce uniform GHG accounting and report-
ing standards so that they are consistent across different trading
schemes.41 Uniformity and consistency have the potential of
evolving naturally, despite different implementation strategies,
where a general consensus was reached on the standards. 
As shown by the NSW GGAS, creating a comprehensive
verification protocol that adheres to these principles requires an
intense development process. GGAS took approximately nine
months to go from a blank sheet to registered projects and certifi-
cates. The development process required trial assessments, guid-
ance development, audit guidelines and training, and setting mon-
itoring and compliance criteria.42 Even in a system that formally
includes third-party verification in its monitoring and compliance
processes required extensive documentation of the accreditation
and oversight responsibilities of the governing body. 
Creating a viable third-party verification scheme in a decen-
tralized system such as the EU ETS is difficult since all imple-
mentation processes and regulations are delegated to the individ-
ual participating countries. However, a guidance document pre-
pared under the European Cooperation for Accreditation
Certification Committee details a harmonized approach to the
recognition of verification bodies under the EU ETS Directive and
the MRG. Using this guidance would enable states to confirm that
the proposed verifying organization has the necessary organiza-
tional controls, safeguards to pre-
vent conflicts of interest, and
competent individuals able to
conduct in-depth verification of
reported emissions. 43 The EU
ETS is composed of 40 different
accreditations in 25 countries,
with different accreditation
requirements and at least three
sets of deadlines.44 A standard-
ized approach to certifying veri-
fiers would resolve many of
these issues currently facing ver-
ification companies.
The use of IT for emis-
sions reporting and verification
provides a wide range of benefits including increased accura-
cy and speed, reduced administrative costs, and enhanced data
analysis and comparability.45 Electronic reporting contains
standardized data requirements and enables for quality assur-
ance and quality control checks (“QA/QC”) in real time for
missing data, mathematical and methodology checks, and sta-
tistical analyses.46 These QA/QC checks enable routine desk
audits and allow for selective use of in-depth reviews depend-
ing on risk assessment or other factors. The United States has
implemented IT very successfully into its SO2 and NOx pro-
grams. The detailed nature of the regulation structure and the
vast amount of data that must be handled allowed the opera-
tion of the trading programs to be built around IT systems.47
Feedback provided to company officials facilitates improved
data quality and compliance with regulations. IT systems also
promote transparency to foster credibility and public accept-
ance of emissions trading programs. Public access to the data
is a further incentive for compliance, since annual compliance
reports are published, and have been used by non-governmen-
tal organizations and other organizations for a variety of pur-
poses such as assessing the impacts of trades and comparing
company emission profiles.48 Regardless of whether continu-




reported data … provides
credibility and a level of
assurance in the validity
of the reported data. 
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ing emissions are used, developing IT systems for reporting
and verification processes will facilitate verification for com-
pliance and enforcement. 
CONCLUSION
Even in the absence of mandatory limits on GHG emis-
sions, corporations are increasingly expected by their stake-
holders to disclose their emissions footprint and associated mit-
igation strategies. An independent verification of self-reported
data, either within or outside of a regulated reporting structure,
provides credibility and a level of assurance in the validity of
the reported data. Involving an independent third-party in the
verification process allows both companies and government to
benefit from their experience and expertise, and also their
external perspective. 
The references of the U.S. programs with SO2 and NOx
programs are small centralized systems with the government
assuming the role of the verifier. Third-party verification has
increasingly become the preferred method of compliance audit-
ing as new trading systems have come online – in both central-
ized systems, as in New South Wales, and decentralized sys-
tems, such as the EU ETS. All of these trading protocols are rel-
atively young, and questions still remain regarding how verifi-
cation should be conducted and who should conduct it.
Questions such as these must be resolved before we can hope to
create a viable global emissions trading system.
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INTRODUCTION
Seventeen years ago, researchers at the World ResourcesInstitute (“WRI”) put together the first additionality andbaseline analysis for a greenhouse gas (“GHG”) mitiga-
tion project. The project was the CARE Agroforestry Project in
Guatemala, funded by AES Corporation in 1989 as the first cor-
porate carbon offset project.1 There was little question that the
CARE Agroforestry Project happened only because of AES
Corporation’s concerns about climate change. AES would not
have pursued the project otherwise; in other words, it was clear-
ly “additional.” Such clarity of action cannot be seen in all the
carbon-offset projects that have followed. Indeed, “additionali-
ty” remains the single most contentious issue in the develop-
ment of today’s voluntary and compliance-based carbon offset
programs and GHG markets. 
What is there about differentiating between “non-addition-
al” and “additional” projects that has vexed offset-based emis-
sions trading efforts for so many years? Why are so many ele-
ments of today’s additionality debate basically unchanged from
the debates of five or ten years ago? Is additionality even that
important? Is it key to today’s offset-based emissions trading
programs, as some observers argue, or should we simply drop it
in favor of “getting things done,” as others argue? If it is key, is
there a viable path through the additionality conundrum, or do
we need to scale back expectations for offset-based emissions
reduction programs? 
To help the search for a viable path, this article takes a step
back from the day-to-day additionality debates taking place in
today’s voluntary and compliance-based GHG markets. Instead,
the article looks at additionality through the lens of statistical
hypothesis testing – i.e. the task of controlling for “phantom
reductions” (“false positives”) and “lost opportunities” (“false
negatives”) when testing a hypothesis – and explores how a sta-
tistical approach to additionality might be practically applied to
the design of environmentally sound markets for offset-based
emissions reductions. 
This article addresses four key areas. The first section
defines additionality and differentiates between the concept of
additionality and its application in practice. The second section
presents ways in which the elements of statistical hypothesis
testing can be meaningfully applied to additionality testing for
climate change mitigation purposes. The third section discusses
what the statistical basis of additionality testing means for the
environmental integrity of the supply of offset credits entering
the market. The final section presents policy recommendations
related to the design of offset-based GHG credit markets. 
Some of the analysis and recommendations presented in
this article are directly applicable to the ongoing additionality
debate surrounding the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism (“CDM”). The analysis applies equally well to off-
set-based emissions trading at any level, whether state-specific
(e.g. design of a California trading system), region-specific (e.g.
design of a trading system under the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative), country-specific (e.g. design of Canada’s offset sys-
tem), or internationally (e.g. the CDM). The conceptual chal-
lenges facing offset-based emissions trading are basically the
same, regardless of the specific trading system involved or what
kinds of offsets are being considered.2
A STATISTICALLY-DRIVEN APPROACH TO OFFSET-
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Additionality: Never has so much
been said about a topic by so
many, without ever agreeing on a
common vocabulary, and the
goals of the conversation.
– Dr. Mark C. Trexler, presentation
at Additionality Side Event, 
COP-10 in Buenos Aires (2004).
ADDITIONALITY: CONCEPT VS. APPLICATION
Carbon offsets allow GHG emitters to continue to emit
GHGs in one place by procuring GHG “credits” from some-
where else (whether next door or around the world), thus meet-
ing either voluntary or mandatory emissions reduction targets.
In strictly conceptual terms, the need
for carbon offsets to be “additional” is
easy to understand. Emissions trading
systems are premised on capping over-
all emissions from a certain set of
sources at an absolute level. An “offset
credit” allows emissions from these
capped sources to increase with the
understanding that this increase is
“offset” by a reduction from a source
whose emissions are not capped, leav-
ing net emissions unchanged. To
accomplish this objective, the reduc-
tion from the uncapped source must be
a response to the presence of the offset
crediting mechanism. If emissions
reductions would have happened
regardless of any offset credits, then
issuing credits for them would allow
global emissions to rise beyond what
was intended under the cap. Credited
reductions must therefore be addition-
al to reductions that would have
occurred in the absence of the trading
system.3
For offset-based trading addition-
ality, this boils down to why a given
project is being undertaken. There are
many potential reasons for implement-
ing emissions-reducing projects. For
additionality purposes,4 the question is
whether the availability of offset cred-
its is a decisive reason (although not
necessarily the only reason) for pursu-
ing the emissions reduction project.
The question boils down to a kind of
thought experiment: holding every-
thing else constant, would a project
have happened in the absence of the
offset crediting mechanism (i.e. if it
and all other projects were not eligible
for offset credits)?5 If yes, then the
project is not additional; if no, then the
project is additional.6
Unfortunately, it is impossible to
definitively answer this thought exper-
iment. Even if we could read the
minds of project developers, they
themselves may not know what they
would have done under different cir-
cumstances. It is not even a “hypothetical” question, since a
hypothesis can be empirically tested. We are forced to seek a
second-best solution, namely designing questions that are
answerable. For additionality, these questions have taken the
form of what are generally called “additionality tests.” A variety
of tests have been developed; including mechanisms designed to
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TABLE 1 ILLUSTRATIVE* ADDITIONALITY “TESTS”
Additionality Test General Description of the Test as It Is Commonly Formulated
Legal, Regulatory, or
Institutional Test 
The offset project must reduce GHG emissions below the level required by any official
policies, regulations, guidance, or industry standards. If it does not reduce emissions
beyond these levels, the assumption is that the only real reason for pursuing the project
is compliance; the project, therefore, is not additional. Under some versions of this test,
the converse is true – if the project reduces emissions beyond required levels, it is
assumed that the only real reason for pursuing the project is to earn credits, and the proj-
ect is therefore additional. 
Technology Test The offset project and its associated GHG reductions are considered additional if the off-
set project involves a technology specified as not being “business as usual.” The default
assumption is that for these “additional” technologies, GHG reductions are a decisive
reason (if not the only reason) for using the technology in a particular project. 
Investment Test The most common version of this test (often termed financial additionality) assumes an
offset project to be additional if it can be demonstrated that it would have a lower than
acceptable rate of return without revenue from GHG reductions. The underlying
assumption is that GHG reductions must be a decisive reason for implementing a proj-
ect that is not an attractive investment absent revenues associated with those reductions.
Under some versions of this test, an offset project with a high or competitive rate of
return could still be additional, but must demonstrate additionality through other means. 
Barriers Test Under some versions of this test, an offset project is assumed to be additional if it faces
significant implementation barriers (e.g. local resistance to new technologies, institu-
tional constraints, etc.). Under other versions of the test, it must further be shown that at
least one alternative (e.g. the business as usual alternative) to the offset project does not
face these barriers. The underlying assumption is that GHG reductions are a decisive
reason that a project is able to overcome the identified barriers (particularly if realistic
alternatives do not face these barriers).
Common 
Practice Test
The offset project must reduce GHG emissions below levels produced by “common
practice” technologies that produce the same products and services as the offset project.
If it does not, the assumption is that GHG reductions are not a decisive reason for pur-
suing the project (or conversely, that the only real reason is to conform to common prac-
tice for the same reasons as other actors in the same market). Therefore, “common prac-
tice” technologies are not considered to be additional.
Timing Test The offset project must have been initiated after a certain date (e.g. the date of initiation
of a GHG trading program) to be considered additional. The assumption is that any proj-
ect started before that date must have had motivations other than GHG reductions.
Under most versions of this test, offset projects started after the required date must also
establish additionality through a second test.
Performance
Benchmark Test 
The offset project must demonstrate an emissions rate that is lower than a predetermined
benchmark emissions rate for the particular technology or practice. This test is premised
on the assumption that most, if not all, projects that beat the specified benchmark are
ones in which climate change mitigation is a decisive factor in the decision to exceed the
benchmark. The benchmark may also be used to calculate baseline emissions. 
Project In, Project
Out Test
The offset project must have lower GHG emissions than a scenario in which the project
had not been implemented. If GHG emissions associated with the project are lower, then
it is assumed that reducing emissions was a decisive reason for the project and that the
project is additional.
* This table is a summary and an introduction to the variety of additionality tests that have been circulated over
the past decade. It is not an exhaustive list of additionality tests, nor is it intended to provide precise definitions
of the different tests.
measure environmental additionality, financial additionality,
regulatory additionality, technology additionality, and others
(see Table 1). At their root, these tests all are trying to answer
the same question: would a project have occurred regardless of
the existence of drivers created by the trading system, or not?
In practice, it has proven extremely difficult for stakehold-
ers to agree on what tests to apply, as well as the circumstances
in which particular tests are appropriate. In part, this is because
people disagree about how well different tests perform with
respect to the underlying objective of the tests, i.e. judging
whether the project would have happened in the absence of an
offset crediting mechanism (or more generally, without concern
for climate change mitigation). As we shall show, however, it is
also because they disagree on the practical importance of getting
the answer to this question right or wrong when designing a
working market for offset-based GHG emissions reductions.
“PHANTOM REDUCTIONS” AND “LOST
OPPORTUNITIES”: A STATISTICAL PERSPECTIVE
ON ADDITIONALITY TESTING
This section presents several concepts from the field of sta-
tistical hypothesis testing and explains their relevance to thinking
about additionality testing. Our premise is that it is possible – and
necessary – to think about additionality tests in the same way one
thinks about tests in any other area of science or public policy. 
STATISTICAL CONCEPT #1 
There is no such thing as a perfect test in statistics. Any test
in almost any field – whether home pregnancy kits or eligibility
screening for social welfare programs – will, in addition to “cor-
rect” results, yield false positive and false negative results.7
How well a particular test works depends on how frequently it
correctly returns a positive result (its “true positive” rate) and
how frequently it correctly returns a negative result (its “true
negative” rate).8
Likewise, additionality tests are not perfect. They sometimes
will falsely indicate that a project is additional when the project
would have happened regardless of concerns about climate
change (i.e. a false positive). Emissions reductions from such a
project are effectively illusory, or “phantom reductions.”
Alternatively, an additionality test may indicate that a proposed
project is not additional when in fact it is (i.e. a false negative).
The potential reductions from such rejected projects can be
thought of as “lost opportunities.” As in statistical hypothesis test-
ing, any given additionality test will produce both types of errors
(see Figure 1). Additionality tests can thus be thought of as hav-
ing “true positive” and “true negative” rates, although empirical-
ly and precisely determining these values may be impossible. The
likely performance of different tests against key evaluative crite-
ria, however, can be qualitatively evaluated (see Table 2).
STATISTICAL CONCEPT #2
The relative proportions of false positives, false negatives,
and true results can vary widely depending on how a test is con-
structed and the nature of what is being tested. The proportions of
false positives and false negatives produced by a test will depend
on its rate of identifying “true positives” and “true negatives,” as
well as the relative proportion of true positives and negatives in
the real world. For example, a profiling test used to catch crimi-
nals might falsely implicate an innocent person one out of one
thousand times; one would say that it has a “true positive” rate of
99.9 percent. Nevertheless, if only one out of every million peo-
ple profiled is actually a criminal, then on average about one thou-
sand innocent people would be tagged as criminals for every true
criminal profiled.9 In other words, because criminals are so rare,
the proportion of false positives to true positives can be enor-
mous, despite the test’s high “true positive” rate. 
The relative proportions of “phantom reductions” and “lost
opportunities” making up the final credit pool will depend not
only on which additionality tests are employed (and how they are
designed), but also on how many non-additional projects exist rel-
ative to additional projects in the underlying population. It is
impossible to know empirically what these proportions are.
Nevertheless, projects that reduce emissions relative to historical
levels occur all the time and for many reasons without regard for
climate change mitigation, and the relative number of these proj-
ects can be quite high (see Figure 2). Under these circumstances,
even additionality tests that almost always correctly identify non-
additional projects could still result in a lot of “phantom reduc-
tions” in relative terms, since many non-additional projects are
slipping through – especially if the tests are not particularly good
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* This column characterizes how likely it is that a truly additional reduction will generate a “yes” result when the additionality test is applied to it. This rating, however, should not be looked
at in isolation. The “true negative” rate is also very important, since a low “true negative” rate means a lot of “false positives” are slipping into the credit pool.
** This column characterizes how likely it is that a truly non-additional reduction will generate a “no” result when the additionality test is applied to it. This rating, however, should not be
looked at in isolation. The “true positive” rate is also very important, since a low “true positive” rate means a lot of “false negatives” are being excluded from the credit pool. 
TABLE 2 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OFADDITIONALITY TESTS’ CHARACTERISTICS






vant legal requirements are
identified, reviewing projects
against them is generally
straightforward. 
Transaction costs are low.
High, though not perfect. Most addi-
tional projects will have lower emis-
sions than required by law. However,
not all legal requirements are enforced;
a project with emissions that are no bet-
ter than required could be additional.
This test would reject such a project.
Moderate/Low. Many non-additional
projects may also reduce emissions
below legal requirements.




likely to be additional.
Easy. Usually simply a mat-
ter of checking whether a
project is on the list of speci-
fied technologies.
Transaction costs are low.
Low. Depends on which technologies
are included, but many additional proj-
ects could use technologies not on the
recognized list.
Low/Moderate to Very High.
Depends on which technologies are
included. 
Investment Test Easy. The real work
under this test is left
to its application. 
Moderate to Difficult. Can
require detailed financial
analyses and possible disclo-
sure of confidential informa-
tion. Test results are often
subjective, and easily manip-
ulated. Transaction costs can
be high.
High in theory, Moderate to Unknown
in practice. In theory, additional projects
will be uneconomical without consider-
ing the benefit of an emissions trading
system. However, some economically
attractive projects can be additional (e.g.
because they face non-financial barri-
ers). It can also be difficult to objective-
ly define and ascertain a project’s eco-
nomic viability – e.g. the definition of
“economically attractive” can differ dra-
matically from company to company –
leading to uncertain outcomes. 
High to Moderate in theory, Moderate
to Unknown in practice. Again, non-
additional projects are in theory proj-
ects that are economical without car-
bon credit revenues. However, some
uneconomical projects may also be
non-additional ( e.g. because they are
required by law). Finally, in practice,
determination of non-additionality
using investment analysis is fraught
with subjectivity and uncertainties.
Project developers can establish radi-
cally different risk-adjusted hurdle
rates for projects in similar contexts. 
Barriers Test Easy. The real work




to substantiate the existence
of barriers and convincingly
argue their significance. Test
results are often subjective.
Transaction costs can be high.
Moderate to High, depending on how
test is formulated. Additional projects
are likely to face barriers, but not all
barriers are easily identified. Barrier
tests can have burdensome evidentiary
requirements; some additional projects
may be excluded automatically. 
Moderate to Low, depending on how
test is formulated. Many (if not most)
non-additional projects will also face
some barriers. A project that faces
significantly greater barriers than its
alternatives may be non-additional if











mon practice” is defined, it
is generally straightforward
to compare projects to the
definition. Transaction costs
can vary. 
High theoretically, Moderate in practice.
If “common practice” is perfectly
defined, most additional projects will not
be common practice. But specifying
common practice across all sectors and
regions is almost impossible. Even
“common practice” projects might be
additional in certain contexts, particular-
ly if common practice is defined at the
international, regional, or national levels. 
High to Moderate. Many non-addi-
tional projects will correspond to
common practice. However, depend-
ing on the technologies, generally
there will be some non-additional
projects that are beyond common
practice.
Timing Test Easy. Setting the date
is relatively arbitrary.
Easy. Requires knowing only
when the project was, or will
be, implemented.
Transaction costs very low.
High. If a project is truly additional, it is
likely to be under development or only
recently implemented. This may not be
true for all additional projects, however.
And many non-additional projects will
also have started after any given date.









Easy. Once a benchmark is
defined, it is easy to compare
to the project emission rate.
Transaction costs low. 
Variable, depending on how benchmark is
set. Sensitivity will be high for a lenient
benchmark, since most additional projects
will have lower than average emission
rates. A stringent benchmark could effec-
tively exclude many additional projects.
Variable, depending on how benchmark
is set. Specificity will be low for lenient
benchmarks, and relatively high for
stringent ones. Even a stringent bench-
mark will probably recognize some
non-additional projects as additional.
Project In, Project
Out Test
Easy. Easy to Moderate. Usually
requires only comparing
project emissions to histori-
cal emissions. Transaction
costs vary.
Very High (Perfect). Practically all
additional offset projects will have
lower emissions than what would have
occurred in their absence. 
Very Low (Zero). All non-additional
offset projects would pass this test.
Only projects that do not ostensibly
reduce emissions would be excluded,
but these would not be candidates for
offset projects.
at correctly identifying the additional projects. The implication is
that we could easily face relatively large proportions of phantom
reductions or lost opportunities when applying specific addition-
ality tests, depending on the true proportions of additional and
non-additional projects that are being tested. 
STATISTICAL CONCEPT #3
False positives and false negatives can never be fully elim-
inated. Generally, as one tries to eliminate one error by modify-
ing a test or testing procedures, one will increase the magnitude
of the other error (see Figures 3(a) and 3(b)). In other words, if
you’re most concerned about minimizing the number of false
positives coming out of a test, be prepared for more false nega-
tives. 
With GHG additionality, we should expect efforts to
squeeze down “phantom reductions” to lead to more “lost oppor-
tunities.” Using an additionality test (or a combination of such
tests) to rule out all non-additional projects would lead to many
truly additional projects being excluded from the credit pool.10
An extreme example would be a “technology test” that allows
only projects involving practices that have no conceivable pur-
pose besides climate change mitigation (e.g. flaring coalmine
methane at an abandoned mine). Such a test would ensure that
recognized projects are additional, but would exclude a whole
universe of truly additional projects in other technology sectors. 
STATISTICAL CONCEPT #4
Arriving at an acceptable balance of false positives and neg-
atives is a key part of designing and choosing a particular test.
There is no “one size fits all,” partially because the relative
importance of false positives or false negatives can vary widely
for different testing situations. In the criminal profile test
described earlier, for example, whether one thousand false posi-
tives for every true criminal is acceptable or not could depend on
whether the “criminals” are petty thieves or terrorists carrying
nuclear bombs. Defining the appropriate balance can be thought
of as a policy decision more than a technical determination,
although technical data should obviously inform the process.
GHG additionality testing is no different. Defining the
acceptable balance between “phantom reductions” and “lost
opportunities” in the context of additionality testing is ultimate-
ly a policy rather than a technical decision. The appropriate bal-
ance will depend on weighing competing objectives, including
cost-effectiveness and the priorities of getting a trading system
into operation vs. near-term environmental integrity, among oth-
ers. Nevertheless, the four statistical testing concepts presented
here are not commonly discussed when debating additionality
standards. There is a common but misplaced notion that there is
a technical solution to the additionality conundrum. There is
almost no discussion of false positives and false negatives,
much less of their inevitability and the need to balance them.
There is even less discussion of the fact that this balancing must
ultimately fall to policymakers in determining the objectives of
the additionality testing in the first place. 
Critical to our arguments in this article is the assumption that
one can reliably project the market outcomes of particular addi-
tionality standards and choices. We believe that one can make
such projections with the right data and analysis.11 Although
many GHG market observers have expressed surprise at how the
Kyoto Protocol’s CDM has been evolving, in particular with
respect to small-scale and sustainable development projects, this
outcome could have been predicted – and, indeed, was predicted
– years ago as the framework of the CDM began to firm.
Before worrying too much about how to address the chal-
lenge of additionality in designing offset-based emissions trad-
ing systems, it is useful to answer the fundamental question of
whether additionality testing really matters in advancing climate
change mitigation objectives.12 The following section takes a
quantitative approach to looking at this question.
DOES ADDITIONALITY MATTER IN TODAY’S
INTERNATIONAL GHG MITIGATION MARKET?
Many business and even some environmental observers
have argued that additionality simply is not the most important
factor at this stage in the development of offset-based emissions
trading mechanisms. They point to the importance of getting
emissions trading frameworks into place for the future, noting
that near-term emissions reduction targets and trading are only a
first step toward long-term climate policy. These observers
don’t want to see the near-term gridlock on additionality impede
establishment of an emissions trading frameworks and are will-
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ing to trade off near-term environmental integrity in favor of
getting a trading system into place. 
Evaluating the relative importance of different objectives in
the design of an offset-based trading system is a policy judg-
ment. Technical analysis of GHG market fundamentals, howev-
er, can identify the implications of different design decisions.
This section will review some of these GHG market fundamen-
tals with this goal in mind.
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #1
The universe of potential offset-based emissions reductions
is enormous. It is not difficult to identify many gigatons of
potential offset-based reductions; the volume of these reduc-
tions rises over time (see Figures 4 and 5 for project-based sup-
ply curves). These projects include many non-additional reduc-
tions that are occurring as fuel sources change for power gener-
ation, energy supply, and demand technologies become more
efficient, and fossil fuel prices rise. 
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #2
Alternative additionality standards could dramatically
affect the supply curve available to the GHG market. Figures 4
and 5 show that the supply curve for the global GHG market
looks very different depending on the strictness of the addition-
ality standard.13 Supply curves this different would have signif-
icant impacts on the market-clearing price for reductions as
market demand rises.
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #3
Sources of offset credits differ radically in their additional-
ity “profiles” and in how they advance particular policy objec-
tives for the ultimate credit pool. For example, some potential
mitigation sectors are likely to prove almost entirely additional
in today’s market context (e.g. coal-mine methane flaring at
abandoned mines); others will be almost entirely non-addition-
al (e.g. existing nuclear power installations). Many sectors will
be characterized by a more diverse range of additionality out-
comes, making it difficult to differentiate between “true posi-
tive” and “false positive,” as well as “true negative” and “false
negative” reductions. In addition, sectors vary widely in costs,
contribution to sustainable development objectives, and other
characteristics. 
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #4
In an overall supply curve for GHG reductions, the distri-
bution of additional and non-additional reductions will not be
random. All else being equal, non-additional reductions will
tend to cluster towards the low end of the potential supply
curve; i.e. they will tend to be low cost and the easiest to get to
market quickly. If one thinks of non-additional projects as those
that are already going to happen without a trading system, then
there is no incremental economic cost for them to “produce”
GHG reductions beyond the transaction costs associated with
documenting and selling the reductions. 
GHG emissions reduction projects face significant uncer-
tainties in the market. Uncertainty about post-2012 targets, and
about different countries’ reliance on domestic policy and meas-
ures, is creating uncertainty about overall offset-based demand.
Uncertainty about the disposition of “hot air” and functioning of
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One reason additionality
continues to be so hotly
debated is that the Kyoto
Protocol’s flexibility
mechanisms were
originally designed for a
market that included U.S.
demand.
Note: “Severe” stringency would equate with minimizing non-addition-
al “phantom reductions” while allowing a large proportion of additional
reductions to go unrecognized (“lost opportunities”). “Low” stringency
would equate with recognizing many ostensible emissions reductions
without regard to additionality.
the CDM is creating uncertainty about overall offset-based sup-
ply. The combination of these factors creates considerable
uncertainty about credit prices, and makes it more difficult for
project developers to evaluate the business case for investing in
truly additional emissions reduction projects. This makes it
abundantly clear that non-additional projects – if they are able
to get credited – offer both the lowest risk and lowest cost
sources of credits for the market. Moreover, even where non-
additional projects have GHG reduction costs (including trans-
action costs) comparable to additional projects,14 the non-addi-
tional projects are likely to be brought to market faster because
the GHG returns represent an upside potential, rather than being
key to a project’s underlying viability.
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #5
Demand in today’s international GHG market is not what
we had anticipated in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was nego-
tiated. Without the United States, the primary source of antici-
pated market demand is absent, yet most of the supply is still
available to the market. Figure 6 illustrates a representative bal-
ance between supply and demand anticipated in 1997 and the
situation today. The graph shows that absence of the United
States has resulted in a much smaller demand today than the two
gigatons of GHG reductions per year that were expected for the
first commitment period. It has not, however, resulted in a
smaller potential supply (except for supply that would have
come directly from the United States), conservatively estimated
here at five gigatons of GHG reductions per year. One reason
additionality continues to be so hotly debated is that the Kyoto
Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms were originally designed for a
market that included U.S. demand. The reality, however, is that
the current GHG market does not include U.S. demand. In effect
we are developing additionality standards for a multi-gigaton
GHG market, while current demand is a fraction of that amount.
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #6
When you combine the potentially radical imbalance of
supply and demand in today’s market, with an understanding of
the distribution of non-additional reductions in the supply curve,
it becomes clear that a large fraction of the projects whose
reductions are offered to the market could be non-additional. In
fact, the total number of available reductions from such projects
could conceivably swamp demand.
Whether they do swamp demand, of course, depends on
how effectively additionality tests are used to keep “phantom
reductions” out of the market. The proportion of “phantom
reductions” in implementing additionality tests becomes para-
mount. Even a ten percent false positive rate in a market where
five gigatons of non-additional reductions are available could
result in 500 million tons of “phantom reductions.” With
demand on the order of 700 million tons, this level of “phantom
reductions” could severely undermine the market’s effective-
ness in keeping total emissions within the cap agreed to by
industrialized countries. 
GHG MARKET FUNDAMENTAL #7
A different problem would occur if demand were much
higher. If annual market demand exceeded five gigatons, 500
million tons of “phantom reductions” might be acceptable, and
the focus of policy makers might switch to reducing “lost oppor-
tunities.” Compliance costs are a major issue when emissions
targets are ambitious and demand is high. Every additional proj-
ect that is erroneously rejected by an additionality test means
higher costs as buyers have to move further up the supply curve.
Thus, while the rate of “phantom reductions” for additionality
tests is paramount when demand is low, the rate of “lost oppor-
tunities” becomes important when demand is high.
In today’s market, potential credit suppliers overwhelming-
ly focus on ensuring that the rules allow their project into the
market. There is little understanding that this ultimately is like-
ly to magnify the supply and reduce market-clearing prices. The
result could be that participating in the market would be of rel-
atively little interest to anyone. Ironically, the only people ben-
efiting from the market under these circumstances are those sup-
plying “phantom reductions.” With a low market-clearing price,
project proponents will not be able to justify pursuing projects
that are additional. 
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At their root, these
[additionality] tests all
are trying to answer the
same question: would a
project have occurred
regardless of the existence
of drivers created by the
trading system, or not?
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In fact, potential credit suppliers have significantly varying
market interests. Developers with truly additional project oppor-
tunities should be advocating stricter additionality standards,
which will tend to raise market-clearing prices sufficiently for
them to participate. Instead, even project developers with clear-
ly additional projects argue for weaker additionality standards
or for abandoning additionality standards altogether because
they want to “get going.” They don’t understand that this is a
self-defeating outcome.
Additionality is pivotal to the environmental outcomes asso-
ciated with GHG emissions trading programs that incorporate
offsets from uncapped sectors or countries. Given market funda-
mentals, flooding the GHG market with non-additional reduc-
tions would be virtually inevitable if additionality were simply
ignored in the design of the emissions trading system. It may be
that getting an emissions trading system into place is more
important to policymakers than ensuring the market’s near-term
environmental integrity. But if that is the approach policymakers
wish to take, it should be made transparently clear, so that in-
depth debates over additionality rules can be largely avoided. 
More significantly, any suggestion that additionality should
be ignored must grapple with at least two key questions: (1) is
environmental integrity a necessary tradeoff in getting a trading
system up and running; and (2) is it realistic to expect, once a
trading system is up and running, that it will be possible to
retroactively fix the system to reinstate environmental integrity?
We do not believe that environmental integrity is a necessary
tradeoff, as discussed in the next section of this article. Also, we
question policymakers’ political and institutional ability to suc-
cessfully implement such a retroactive change. 
FROM ADDITIONALITY FACTS TO
ADDITIONALITY POLICY
This analysis shows that there is no “correct” additionali-
ty objective or additionality test. Additionality testing, howev-
er, will play a crucial role in determining every aspect of mar-
ket supply (i.e. the supply of recognized reductions or GHG
credits), including:
• The magnitude of the supply pool available to the
market (by specifying what can count);
• The cost curve associated with that supply pool
(based on the costs of potentially qualifying offsets);
• The magnitude and proportion of “phantom reduc-
tions” in the final supply pool;
• The magnitude of “lost opportunities” being kept out
of the supply pool and the opportunity costs associat-
ed with their exclusion from the market.
If participants in the GHG market and in the development
of offset-based emissions trading strategies accept this analysis,
it could radically change the nature of today’s additionality
debate. Instead of talking past each other about what the perfect
additionality test is, we could move to the concrete step of ask-
ing how to prioritize different policy objectives inherent in
establishing emissions trading programs. We could move to the
action step of thinking about how to pursue an effective addi-
tionality policy that accomplishes these objectives. This section
profiles how a better understanding of the underlying principles
of additionality testing can guide the development of addition-
ality policy.
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #1
The objectives of an additionality policy need to be identi-
fied in order to guide the development and use of additionality
testing. Policymakers cannot bypass this obligation by simply
directing a technical body to design additionality standards. Key
design questions include:
• How important are the physical reductions associated
with the offset-based trading system as opposed to
other objectives, e.g. simply establishing a trading
system and/or creating incentives for climate-friend-
ly technologies and practices without concern for the
integrity of an emissions cap? 
• What is politically acceptable, particularly with
respect to the cost of credits under the trading sys-
tem? Additionality tests, by affecting the available
supply, can radically affect the resulting credit mar-
ket-clearing price.
• How big a pool of offset-based credits is needed? The
size of the pool has implications for additionality test
design. Too strict an additionality screen against a
given level of demand can lead to a constrained sup-
ply curve and much higher prices. Too weak an addi-
tionality screen against a given level of demand can
lead to an unacceptably high pool of “phantom reduc-
tions” available to meet that demand. 
• Is the goal to develop a standard for the near-term
GHG markets with limited demand or to develop an
additionality standard for a future, larger GHG mar-
ket? What tradeoffs are we willing to accept during
the transitional phase?
• Should the emissions trading system favor certain
sectors and projects?
Once these questions are answered, it becomes possible to
develop additionality standards that will advance the chosen
policy decisions. Not everyone will be happy with those stan-
dards at any given time; there will be winners and losers in
terms of who can play in the market on the supply side, and
what it will cost participants to satisfy their demand for reduc-
tions. We believe that most market players would be happy with
a functioning GHG market that delivers cost-effective reduc-
tions and satisfies environmental integrity objectives, without
agonizing over each project developer’s motivations.
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #2
In order to understand whether offset-based emissions trad-
ing programs are supporting the integrity of the overall emis-
sions reduction targets, it is necessary to understand the relative
proportions of “phantom reductions” and “lost opportunities” to
real reductions making it into the credit supply pool. As such,
the analysis necessary for such an understanding has to be
planned and budgeted as part of the development of the emis-
sions trading system. 
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #3
Additionality rules need to be adapted to market circum-
stances on an ongoing basis. In the face of significant changes
in market supply or demand, static additionality tests cannot
effectively balance the policy objectives of acceptably small
magnitudes of “phantom reductions” and “lost opportunities,”
and the cost-effectiveness of the overall credit pool. 
Delivering a cost-effective pool of truly additional reduc-
tions in a 300 million-ton trading market is an entirely different
challenge than delivering a cost-effective pool of additional
reductions in a five gigaton market. Additionality rules designed
for a large market (or designed without attention to market size
at all) can result in little or no environmental integrity during the
“small market stage.” Strict additionality tests could limit
“phantom reductions” in a small market, but the price of credits
could rapidly rise as demand rises (due to a shortage of supply).
A single static additionality standard will not be appropriate for
every level of demand.
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #4
The ideal goal is to pursue an additionality standard that
gets us as close as possible to both a low “phantom reduction”
risk and low “lost opportunity” risk. When offset-based credit
demand is relatively low, this is politically easier to do given the
existence of “low-hanging fruit” opportunities. As demand
increases and these opportunities disappear, it becomes much
harder to keep both sources of error low because pressure will
increase to ease rules that minimize “phantom reductions” and
promote those that minimize “lost opportunities.” 
A good first step in this direction is to identify specific sec-
tors that can form the backbone of an offset-based credit supply.
A relatively simple way to “evolve” additionality standards with
the size of the market is through a “technology test” that initial-
ly focuses on a limited number of carefully selected sectors. As
the market expands, the number of sectors allowed into the mar-
ket can be increased. This could allow creation of a cost-effec-
tive credit pool that grows as demand grows, while effectively
balancing false positives and false negatives. This approach
would avoid the complexity, if not the impossibility, of attempt-
ing to develop additionality standards that are intended to apply
to all sectors. It is simply not possible to design such a system
in a way that satisfies the objectives being pursued through
additionality testing; the lower the demand, the harder it gets.
The potential supply becomes too large very quickly, and non-
additional credits threaten to swamp the market.
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #5
There is no true commodity market for GHG credits in an
offset-based trading system. GHG credits are not a convention-
al commodity; the supply and demand for GHG credits depends
more on policy decisions than on physical fundamentals.
Policymakers have three choices: they need to either choose the
additionality standards they want and accept the resulting
prices; determine the prices they are willing to accept15 and
design the additionality standards accordingly; or choose a com-
bination of these two approaches. This is illustrated in Figure 8,
which shows that what comes out of flexibility mechanisms
depends largely on what is allowed into the supply pool. Figure
8 portrays the easiest potential portfolio outcomes, namely cre-
ation of a low-cost, low-additionality pool, or a high-cost, high-
additionality pool. Generating these two kinds of portfolios is
easy. It will be harder, however, to generate credit pools with
more complicated (and desirable) characteristics. For example,
a low-cost, high-additionality credit pool requires careful pre-
selection of sectors that will tend to deliver low-cost and highly
additional reductions. As one adds objectives, including for
example the promotion of sustainable development objectives,
the complexity of the process increases. 
ADDITIONALITY POLICY DESIGN PRINCIPLE #6
Well-designed additionality standards can avoid the mis-
placed urge to address additionality concerns through proxy
measures. Several such proxies are already in widespread use:
Proxy A
Making additionality tests more and more complex: With
gigatons of potential market supply, and relatively limited near-
term demand, even complicated rules are unlikely to prove
effective in balancing competing objectives. An excessive num-
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ber of “phantom reductions” are still likely to make it into the
market, in proportion to the limited demand, while the magni-
tude of “lost opportunities” grows rapidly as the complexity of
additionality rules increases. 
Table 2 suggests that it is possible to choose additionality
tests that are relatively easy to apply at the project evaluation
stage. Such tests can also effectively control for “phantom
reductions” or “lost opportunities.” When applied to individual
projects, most of these tests require simple “yes or no” answers
to clearly defined questions. A technology test can be restrictive,
for example, but it is relatively easy to determine whether a
project is “on or off” the list. Within specific technology sectors,
a well-defined “common practice” test can eliminate many
remaining “phantom reductions.” Where “lost opportunities”
are a concern, different combinations, perhaps involving legal
or timing tests, might effectively balance this concern with envi-
ronmental integrity. The most versatile kind of test is a per-
formance benchmark. In principle, a benchmark can easily be
adjusted to meet different policy objectives; it has the added
benefit of automatically setting baseline emissions for multiple
projects. Alone or in combination with other “yes or no” tests,
benchmarks could radically reduce the transaction costs associ-
ated with current approaches to additionality testing.
Designing these tests in the first place, however, would
require substantially more effort than the current system of proj-
ect-by-project additionality testing, where the burden falls on
the project developer. They also could be politically problemat-
ic, since they automatically exclude certain sectors or segments
of the market. Over time, however, these tests would prove
preferable to the requirements of barriers and investments tests
for extended weighing and interpretation of evidence for each
and every project.
Proxy B
Making the credit quantification process more and more
conservative: Such conservatisms can reduce the number of
“phantom reductions” from individual projects entering the cred-
it pool, but if a lot of false positive projects are making it through
the additionality tests, “phantom reductions” may still dominate
the pool. This is partially because those same conservative
assumptions, applied to the truly additional projects, can signifi-
cantly increase the proportion of “lost opportunities” and prevent
many truly additional projects from making it to the market. 
Proxy C
Too aggressively shortening the crediting period for proj-
ects and sectors: What we call “baseline creep” can be illustrat-
ed by a situation in which a few projects are approved under a
given additionality test, but then the additionality hurdle is sig-
nificantly (and prematurely) raised for future projects of the
same type. Policymakers will face pressure to reduce the num-
ber of credits generated at a later date if the market remains
small. Current CDM rules limit project crediting to three renew-
able seven-year periods or a single ten-year period; these rules
will encourage baseline creep by giving decision-makers the
ability to stop crediting a project when its baseline comes up for
renewal. Most project developers recognize this problem;
review of CDM project applications shows that developers are
more likely to choose a single ten-year crediting period, rather
than trying for renewable seven-year periods. Baseline creep is
one way to address “phantom reductions,” but like other solu-
tions to the problem of “phantom reductions,” it could easily
have the unintended and adverse effect of substantially amplify-
ing “lost opportunities.”
Last in terms of our discussion of how to apply additional-
ity facts to additionality policy, it is worthwhile to briefly
address the question of policy and sectoral baselines, since they
are being actively discussed in the context of the Kyoto
Protocol’s CDM. The authors do not see the adoption of policy
or sector baselines as being “good” or “bad.” Much of the dis-
cussion around “sectoral” and “policy” baselines for the CDM,
however, either fails to address additionality at all, or suggests
that there is something fundamentally easier about addressing
additionality at the “sectoral” or “policy” levels than at the
“project” level. The statistical testing concepts we have
described, however, apply equally to “project,” “sectoral,” and
“policy” additionality. The same issues of “phantom reductions”
and “lost opportunities” need balancing and resolution, particu-
larly given that the magnitude of “phantom reductions” entering
the supply pool could be much larger under “sectoral” and “pol-
icy” additionality standards unless those standards are very
carefully developed. 
CONCLUSION
In today’s polarized debate over additionality, it is difficult to
map a path forward. Most participants (observers, analysts, and
agencies involved in development of additionality policy) often
do not seem to acknowledge the basic statistical principles we
present in this article. The CDM Executive Board is not charged
with making the kinds of policy decisions called for here; more-
over, it does not have the resources to implement the analysis that
would allow “phantom reductions” and “lost opportunities” to be
estimated in order to appropriately balance policy objectives. 
We are not alone in calling for a reevaluation of our
approach to additionality. Many participants in today’s CDM
debates are in effect calling for the same kind of reevaluation,
including aggressive calls for streamlining the CDM’s addition-
ality and project-review processes. Unfortunately, simply
streamlining these processes, without consideration of the
implications of changes for the environmental integrity of the
trading system, could put such market mechanisms at even more
risk of losing their political credibility.
Without a dramatic change in direction, the additionality
wars will continue, as they have for the last decade, with rela-
tively predictable implications: 
• Continuing efforts to make additionality tests for par-
ticular sectors more and more complex to trim down
supply sources that key interest groups dislike;
• Continuing efforts to streamline additionality tests to
allow more projects into the credit pool, particularly
from sectors that key interest groups do like;
• Continuing industry efforts to abandon additionality
standards altogether;
• Continuing environmental concerns that the environ-
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1 M.C. TREXLER, P. FAETH, AND J. KRAMER, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE,
FORESTRY AS A GLOBAL WARMING MITIGATION STRATEGY: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE GUATEMALA CARBON SEQUESTRATION FORESTRY PROJECT (1989).
2 Most additionality thinking takes place within the context of offset-
based emissions trading systems. However, some experts increasingly
advocate sector- and policy-based emissions reductions crediting as a
means to expand credit supply in today’s GHG emissions trading pro-
grams. The statistical principles presented in this article apply just as
much to sector- and policy-based crediting as to offset-based crediting.
Indeed, the potential for large-scale approval of “false positive” credits
may well be greater under the former crediting mechanisms. 
3 Additionality is not a problem in all environmental commodity markets.
In the U.S. sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) market, for example, all emissions are
included within the national emissions cap. In setting a national emis-
sions reduction target, environmental regulators don’t need to care about
the “additionality” of individual reductions. They need only assess
whether the national target is achieved at the end of the year, since that
should accomplish the intended environmental gain. In the GHG arena,
however, we are crediting emissions reductions from non-capped emis-
sions sources and countries, and allowing them to count against regulato-
ry mandates somewhere else. 
4 People often speak of additionality with respect to emission reductions,
as opposed to projects. This may be a distinction without a difference.
Conceptually speaking, for emissions reductions to be additional they
must result from projects that are additional. 
5 In a voluntary context, where no offset credits are generated, the ques-
tion can be reformulated in terms of considerations about climate change
mitigation: would a project have happened in the absence of voluntary
concerns about climate change?
6 Non-additional projects are often referred to as “business as usual”
(“BAU”). This term is useful if it is properly understood to mean projects
that would have happened in the absence of an offset crediting mecha-
nism. However, “business as usual” can be interpreted in many different
ways, some of which do not comport well with the basic concept of addi-
tionality. We use the term “non-additional” instead of “business as usual”
to avoid confusion. 
7 False positives commonly are referred to as Type One error; false nega-
tives are referred to as Type Two error. 
8 In statistics, the “true positive” rate is referred to as the test’s
sensitivity. The “true negative” rate is referred to as the test’s specificity.
9 That is, if the test has perfect sensitivity. With lower sensitivity, even more
innocent people might be falsely implicated for every true criminal caught!
10 This fact could make many market participants unhappy, particularly
those wishing to pursue projects that may fall into an expanding “lost
opportunities” pool as efforts to control “phantom reductions” become
stricter.
11 The literature evaluating the implications of different approaches to
additionality and baselines is extensive. See, e.g. Carolyn Fischer,
Project-Based Mechanisms for Emissions Reductions: Balancing
Tradeoffs with Baselines, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 1807-23 (2005).
12 Some observers argue that it’s enough to simply use a “with project”
and “without project” approach to quantifying GHG emissions reductions.
If a factory replaces a boiler, give project proponents credit for any result-
ing emissions reductions. If a company builds a gas-fired power plant in a
coal-dominated region, give it credit for displacing coal-fired CO2 emis-
sions. As Figure 2 demonstrated, however, many things are happening that
tend to reduce emissions based on a simple “before and after” analysis.
13 Where “strictness” corresponds to minimizing phantom reductions and
allowing more lost opportunities. In Figures 4 and 5, strictness is mod-
eled approximately using the TC+ES Supply Tool, without explicit refer-
ence to specific tests. 
14 This could happen, for example, if a non-additional project were
smaller and therefore had higher per-ton transaction costs.
15 Given today’s European Union Emissions Trading System (“EU
ETS”) prices, it might seem that additionality standards are the least of
the problems facing the GHG market. However, today’s EU ETS prices
are a result of supply constraints applied to the first phase of the EU ETS
(e.g. limitations on the sectors able to generate reductions within the EU),
and market variables (e.g. the difficulty of getting Certified Emissions
Reductions into the market within the first phase of the ETS). Demand
has changed significantly from original expectations, based on the results
of the National Allocation Plan process. The first phase of the EU ETS
has few implications for how markets will behave during the first Kyoto
Protocol commitment period. 
16 Hot air, representing excess allowances awarded primarily to Russia and
Ukraine as part of the political compromise leading to the Kyoto Protocol, is
basically a zero-cost resource; given the absence of U.S. demand, theoreti-
cally “hot air” credits could supply the Kyoto Protocol market out to 2012.
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mental integrity of trading systems is not being main-
tained; and
• Aggressive and inappropriate use of proxies as an
alternative to effective additionality standards. 
These outcomes undercut the objective of credible offset-
based trading mechanisms. A successful GHG market should
advance environmental integrity and cost-effectiveness. It is vital
that stakeholders with an interest in this objective step back and
revisit the additionality issue in light of the considerations we have
reviewed. Appropriate additionality standards can be designed for
the GHG market – but only if participants properly understand the
market’s fundamental challenges and act accordingly.
This analysis is structured around the international GHG
market; however, the principles are applicable to any offset-based
emissions trading system, whether sub-national, national, or inter-
national. Additionality standards can reflect and accomplish key
policy objectives for the offset-based GHG market, but doing so
will always represent a balancing act. This can only be done effec-
tively if the objectives are specified upfront. Additionality per se
is not the objective; it is a means to an objective. 
We do recognize that the GHG market faces significant
challenges beyond those posed by debates over additionality.
Given the uncertainties over post-2012 emissions reduction tar-
gets, project developers do not know what value the CDM’s
Certified Emissions Reductions (“CERs”) will have post-2012.
There is also considerable uncertainty over the role “hot air” will
play in GHG markets,16 contributing to uncertainty for project
developers of what value their CERs will have pre-2012 either.
These factors make it difficult to build a solid GHG market and
create strong incentives to get non-additional and low-risk reduc-
tions into the market. Nevertheless, these larger market uncer-
tainties do not alter our fundamental conclusion that additionali-
ty policy, if it is to advance the cause of credible GHG trading
markets, needs to be based on a solid analytical foundation.
We believe the approach in this article yields insights and
implications for future offset-based additionality policy. We are
not taking a stand in this article as to whether such policy can be
successfully implemented in the face of political and institu-
tional challenges. We are simply trying to make a statistically
well-founded point that additionality can be operationalized if
one recognizes and accepts that no test will ever be perfect, and
then adapts the process accordingly. 
INTRODUCTION
As the eyes of the environmental community turned toMontreal last November in the expectation, or perhapsfaint hope, of a stronger Kyoto Protocol (“Protocol”)
capable of addressing climate change beyond 2012, the ques-
tion again arose as to whether a system with stronger econom-
ic enforcement mechanisms would be legally viable under the
current international economic system. Although the Protocol
has yet to conflict with the international rules of the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”), critics note that such disputes
may be inevitable.1
This article seeks to address one possible domestic step that
State Parties to the Kyoto Protocol may take to reduce emis-
sions, the additional measure which must be taken to address the
international competitiveness of the effected industries, and the
compatibility of these measures with WTO obligations. In par-
ticular, the article will address the use of a tax based on the
amount of carbon or energy used during the production process.
While such a tax may effectively reduce harmful emissions, it
will also increase costs for domestic industry, thereby reducing
international competitiveness. Therefore, governments may
seek to implement a border tax adjustment in order to maintain
the international competitiveness of domestic industry. Both
measures, however, present potential conflicts with the obliga-
tions of WTO members to maintain free and non-discriminato-
ry international trade. While the WTO case law regarding these
issues provides only minimal guidance, such conflicts will
inevitably be placed before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement
Body. The outcome of such conflicts will have enormous rami-
fications for national and international climate change policy. As
such, this article will focus on the challenges of implementing
an energy or carbon tax in light of WTO regulations, and will
argue that a multilateral tax agreement between Member States
may provide a more stable foundation for environmentally con-
scious measures implicating WTO obligations. 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND
THE WTO
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement on cli-
mate change, whereby industrialized nations and nations with
economies in transition (together called “Annex I” countries),
have agreed to reduce or restrict their greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions. Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol calls on Annex I
States to implement policies, including those concerned with tax
structures, which will address sustainable development and
GHG emissions.2 State Parties should implement such policies
in a manner which will minimize adverse effects on the econo-
my and international trade.3 The Protocol, therefore, addresses
both the reduction of GHG emissions and the sustained health
of the international economy. 
The WTO is an international economic organization com-
prised of 150 member governments that addresses trade rules
and disputes between member nations. The WTO is responsi-
ble for administering various trade agreements, including the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), a multi-
lateral agreement to encourage free trade among nations by
reducing trade barriers.
The Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the WTO calls
for an expansion of global trade “in accordance with the objective
of sustainable development” as well as the protection and preser-
vation of the environment.4 Despite this rhetorical recognition of
environmental objectives, such measures have consistently been
found to violate the principles of free and non-discriminatory
trade. Fundamentally, Article I of the GATT requires that any
trade opportunities extended to one Member State must be
extended to all Member States.5 This Most Favored Nation
(“MFN”) requirement governs the relationships between all
Member States. Article II of the GATT provides that parties have
the right to impose a charge on any product “from which the
imported product has been manufactured in whole or in part” if
the tax is consistent with other articles.6 Article III of the GATT,
or the national treatment provision, further requires that Member
States afford equal treatment to domestic and imported products.7
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Environmental regulations imposed by a Member State of
the WTO are often challenged under the MFN or national treat-
ment provisions.8 Article XX of the GATT provides exceptions
to these obligations by allowing for the implementation of
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health” or “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”9
WTO panels and Appellate Bodies have, however, interpreted
the General Exceptions of Article XX extremely narrowly and
have ruled that the great majority of domestic measures are not
acceptable under this Article.
ENERGY TAXES AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS:
THE HYPOTHETICAL EUROPEAN UNION
EXPERIENCE
THE HYPOTHETICAL MEASURE
The European Union, in an attempt to meet more stringent
post-Kyoto reductions that could not be achieved through less
controversial measures, implements a significant energy tax on
all domestic industries. The domestic tax is complemented by an
additional border tax, intended to protect the environmental
aims of the domestic tax on all products that are similarly pro-
duced in the EU and imported from industrial states.10
ENERGY TAXES AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS
GENERALLY
The implementation of an energy tax by the EU will facili-
tate emissions reductions by increasing the cost of energy need-
ed to manufacture products.11 Increased costs will result in
decreased competitiveness for European producers as they will
either internalize the costs or pass them on to consumers.12 These
producers will be effectively shut out from foreign markets, such
as the United States, where no such tax exists, and will be under-
cut in their home market by imported products.13 European pro-
ducers will thus have an incentive to employ more efficient prac-
tices that will, in turn, reduce the overall emission of GHGs. 
Numerous European countries currently employ energy or
carbon taxes that have greatly increased energy prices for
European countries in relation to the prices found in the United
States.14 These same countries, however, have exempted energy
intensive industries from these taxes in order to maintain inter-
national competitiveness.15 Although these exemptions thwart
domestic emissions reductions, price differentials in tax and
non-tax countries may result in an industry migration to non-tax
states with no actual emissions reductions.16
Such exemptions sacrifice the goals of these taxes and also
place higher costs on individual consumers instead of the large
producers which account for far greater proportions of emis-
sions.17 As Kyoto or post-Kyoto agreements become more strin-
gent, governments will inevitably revisit energy taxes as a nec-
essary means of emissions reductions. However, these govern-
ments will continue to face stiff opposition from domestic
industries and will be forced to develop measures that ensure the
competitiveness of these industries. 
BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS AS A VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE
Border tax adjustments (“BTAs”) are one viable option for
implementation in conjunction with the hypothetical EU ener-
gy tax.18 A BTA attempts to rectify domestic price differentials
by taxing imported products at the same level as those pro-
duced domestically. In the event that these products are export-
ed, the tax placed on the products would be refunded to the pro-
ducer. The international economic community has sought to
address the issues raised by BTAs and formed a Working Party
on Border Tax Adjustments in 1968.19 The Working Party cre-
ated the following definition for BTAs, which has also been
adopted by the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment:20
[A]ny fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole
or in part, the destination principle (i.e. which enable
exported products to be relieved of some or all of the
taxed charged in the exporting country in respect of
similar domestic products sold to consumers on the
home market and which enable imported products sold
to consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax
charged in the importing country in respect of similar
domestic products).21
POSSIBLE ISSUES BETWEEN BTAS AND GATT
ARTICLES I, II, AND III 
The MFN and national treatment obligations of the WTO
represent two of the most litigated and fundamental hurdles for
any domestic measure affecting international trade. These hur-
dles would be seemingly sidestepped if the BTA was equally
applied both to imported products from all industrialized
Member States and to domestic and imported goods.
Unfortunately, the current interpretation of WTO obligations is
unclear as to whether such a tax is acceptable. 
As noted above, Article II concerns the rights of Member
States to impose internal taxes that satisfy the national treatment
requirement while targeting materials from which the imported
product was manufactured. However, this Article provides no
information as to whether nations may tax materials that are not
found in the final product, such as the energy or carbon con-
sumed during production.22 The 1970 Working Party on Border








but was unable to find a consensus on the acceptability of such
measures in terms of border tax adjustments.23
The case law regarding process-based taxes is similarly
murky and incomplete. In 1986, the United States implemented
a tax on certain chemicals used in the processing of other chem-
ical products.24 The Panel found that border taxes on imported
“like” products may take “chemicals used as materials in the
manufacturing or production of the imported substances” into
account.25 The Panel’s findings did not address the issue of
whether the chemicals used must be physically incorporated
into the final product or simply used to make the product, as is
the case for fuel and expended carbon.
The distinction between measures concerning products and
those concerning processes was further discussed in the
Tuna/Dolphin26 and Shrimp/Turtle cases.27 Although the meas-
ures at issue in these cases were process-based regulations and
not process-based taxes, the cases serve to establish the fairly
firm principle that processed-based regulations on trade are
prima facie violations of other WTO obligations. Commentators
have often noted that, while the Shrimp/Turtle decision may
have relaxed the prohibition on trade restrictive measures
founded on process standards,28 the product-process doctrine
has generally held firm for process regulations.29 However, the
WTO has never ruled on whether process-based taxes, such as
an energy tax, are also prima facie violations.30
POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING AN ENERGY
TAX AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT IN LIGHT OF
GATT OBLIGATIONS
In the event that process-based taxes are acceptable under
WTO obligations, the EU would inevitably be forced to defend
its measure against claims that the tax discriminates between
domestic and imported goods. For example, consider a situation
where EU producers of plastic containers are able to adopt pro-
duction methods that are less energy intensive. While such tech-
nology may initially result in higher costs for domestic produc-
ers, the costs will presumably decrease in the future as energy
efficient technology advances and becomes more available. In
such a scenario, U.S. producers of plastic containers using ener-
gy intensive methods would continue to be taxed according to
the energy used, regardless of the cost of production in the EU.
Although such a tax may not initially benefit domestic producers
of plastic containers because of the cost associated with adopting
new technology, EU producers may be able to bring cheaper
products to the market in the future. Therefore, while this energy
tax and BTA serve the climate change goals of the EU, it may,
however, also directly violate Article III of the GATT.
In the event that U.S. producers of plastic containers con-
vince the United States to file a claim with the WTO concerning
the BTA, the EU would be forced to defend the measure. The
BTA raises a number of complex issues that have not been clear-
ly decided. First, the EU must argue that plastic containers pro-
duced in an energy efficient manner are not sufficiently “like”
those which are produced in an energy intensive manner.
According to previous WTO decisions, the EU may find that dis-
tinguishing the products for the purposes of Article. III is difficult. 
In a case concerning French restrictions on cancer-causing
forms of asbestos, a WTO Appellate Body determined that
asbestos containing carcinogenic materials and asbestos that did
not containing such materials were not “like” products for the
purposes of Article III and could therefore be regulated different-
ly.31 The decision noted that differences in the physical character-
istics, end use, consumer preferences, and tariff classifications of
the products were important factors for determining “likeness.”
While EU consumers may show a significant preference for
energy efficient goods, the actual physical characteristics of
such goods will generally be the same. Therefore, the EU may
be forced to argue that, due to disparate processes through
which these goods are produced, they are not “like” products.
However, this argument again encounters the problematic prod-
uct-process doctrine. Given the current interpretation of WTO
law regarding this doctrine, it is unlikely that differences in pro-
duction methods would be sufficient to provide room for dis-
parate regulatory treatment.32
If, as expected, the WTO found that the EU BTA discrimi-
nates against imported goods, or that such process-based taxes
are not allowed under Articles II and III, the EU may still argue
that the tax is acceptable as an Article XX(g) exception. In doing
so, the EU must initially show that the measures are “primarily
aimed at” the “conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”33
Given the broad international recognition of climate change
issues as expressed in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), it is likely that
the EU would be able to satisfy the threshold requirements of an
Article XX exception.34 WTO jurisprudence has also estab-
lished three additional requirements for Article XX concerning
the discriminatory effects of a narrowly construed measure that
impacts trade.35 It is possible, however, that the EU measure
might be implemented in a manner that sufficiently minimizes
discrimination so as to satisfy Article. XX.
A finding that the EU’s energy tax and BTA are accepted
under Article XX will require the EU to establish a formal and
flexible process to provide for the potentially different circum-
stances in affected states. This is critical as the WTO is often
wary of domestic regulations that extend beyond the borders of
the implementing Member State.36
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Despite the current reluctance to acknowledge the legitima-
cy of environmental regulations under Article XX, the EU may
find a more receptive audience in a WTO Panel or Appellate
Body due to the international nature of climate change regula-
tions and the fact that the United States has previously recog-
nized the issue and signed the UNFCCC.37
CONCLUSION
Although the discussion above is useful in understanding the
current relationship between WTO and Kyoto obligations, the
larger question is whether the WTO is properly equipped to han-
dle such issues and whether Member States would be best served
by an EU victory in this hypothetical.38 The WTO is a body
charged with ensuring the stability and expansion of free trade
between Member States. Environmental regulations aimed at
stemming climate change will inevitably affect international eco-
nomic activity. While the WTO is firmly established and sup-
ported by the industrialized world, the issue of climate change
and the measures necessary to address it are highly charged and
controversial. Member States such as the United States and
China, both of whom are reluctant to implement domestic cli-
mate change measures, will vigorously resist the use of the WTO
to attain environmental objectives. Considering the current influ-
ence and significance of the U.S. economy, along with the fore-
casted clout of the Chinese economy, it will be difficult for the
WTO to evolve against the will of these states. In the worst-case
scenario, the current protectionist tendencies found on Capitol
Hill may find an ally in the industry executives who are unwill-
ing or unable to conform to climate-focused policies.39
Conversely, economic growth is, in large part, dependent on
environmental stability both because natural resources are vital
for all economies and because increased understanding of envi-
ronmental issues by consumers influences consumer choice.
The Kyoto Protocol represents an initial step by some Member
States to address climate change issues and the Protocol will
inevitably be followed by stronger action. If the WTO continues
to stifle domestic implementation of environmental measures
pursuant to international agreements, the WTO may find that
other important players in the Organization are unwilling to par-
ticipate in a purely economic organization. Such states may
demand the flexibility noted in the Kyoto Protocol to address
those issues mentioned in the WTO Charter. 
The WTO must actively pursue, through international
negotiations but not necessarily international consensus, an
understanding providing room for domestic action that does not
directly violate the MFN or national treatment obligations.
Energy taxes and companion BTAs will inevitably create certain
trade obstacles, such as higher costs or increased regulation, but
may be implemented in such a way as to impose these costs
equally on domestic and foreign producers. The current use of
the product-process distinction and the strict interpretation of
Article XX effectively prohibit the use of such measures that are
best suited to address climate change regardless of whether
implementation frustrates or advances the goals of the WTO.
Further, international negotiations will serve several impor-
tant functions. First, measures developed through such negotia-
tions are far more likely to satisfy the WTO’s consistent demand
for multilateral solutions to environmental issues.40 This multi-
lateral solution will also serve to harmonize process-based tax
systems.41 Without such harmonization, the proliferation of uni-
lateral action will effectively cripple the WTO by allowing
Member States to condition access to their markets on require-
ments that may differ from those in other Member States.42 A
multilateral agreement allowing for environmentally related
measures that do not establish discriminatory trade practices
will ensure both the stability of the WTO as well as the pursuit
of climate change policies. 
1 Steve Charnovitz, Trade and Climate: Potential Conflicts and
Synergies, in BEYOND KYOTO: ADVANCING THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT
AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE, Pew Center on Global Climate Change (Dec,
2003), at 142, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
Beyond%20Kyoto.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
2 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”) (1997), art. 2(1)(a)(v), available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
3 Kyoto Protocol, art. 2(3); see also, Zhong Xiang Zhang & Lucas
Assuncao, Domestic Climate Policies and the WTO (Dec. 2001) at 4,
FEEM Working Paper No. 91, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=288273 (last visited Jan. 4, 2006) [here-
inafter Zhong Xiang Zhang]. This sentiment previously appeared in the
UNFCCC, id. at art. 3.5 (requiring that “[m]easures taken to combat cli-
mate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade”), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/con-
veng.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2006). This language further resembles lan-
guage found in the WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R
(adopted Nov. 6, 1998), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/
No1/sr4.rtf (last visited Jan. 4, 2006) [hereinafter WTO Shrimp/Turtle].
4 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994), Preamble, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.doc (last visited
Jan. 4, 2006).
5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) (1947), art. I
[GATT 1947], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
gatt47_01_e.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2006). There are, however, signifi-
cant exceptions to this rule, including provisions recognizing the different
situations for developing countries and the need to ensure the national
security of Member States.
6 GATT, id. at art. II(2)(a).
7 GATT, id. at art. III(1).
8 Many environmental measures are also challenged under Article XI.
This article, however, is not significant for this discussion as the measure
at issue involves a tax, not a regulation as such, and Article XI applies
only to regulations.
9 GATT, supra note 5, at art. XX(b), art. XX(g).
10 The idea that a BTA may discriminate between industrialized and
developing nations reflects the notion of common but differentiated
responsibilities noted in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
ENDNOTES: Climate Change and the WTO 
ENDNOTES: Climate Change and the WTO Continued on page 65
45 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
The Eleventh Conference of the Parties (“COP 11”) tothe United Nations Framework Convention onClimate Change (“UNFCCC”) took place in Montreal
from November 29 to December 6, 2005, drawing more than
9,000 participants from governments, UN bodies and agen-
cies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations,
and the media.1
The COP is an annual event under the UNFCCC, which
was negotiated in the two years leading up to the Rio de
Janeiro United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (or Earth Summit) in 1992. It entered into force
in 1994 and has been ratified by 188 countries, making it one
of the most universally supported international agreements and
the world’s major treaty regime dealing with climate change.2
Each year, Parties to the Convention (i.e. those states that have
ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to the treaty) meet at
the COP to foster and monitor its implementation and contin-
ue negotiations on how best to combat climate change.3
This year’s COP enjoyed the added significance of being
the site for the first Conference of the Parties serving as the
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (“COP/MOP 1”).
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was negotiated in 1997
and has endured a controversial and troubled existence since
the United States withdrew its support in 2001. The Protocol
could only enter into force if at least 55 Parties to the
Convention had ratified it, including enough industrialized
countries to cover 55 percent of that group’s greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions (as of 1990). Ratification by the Russian
Federation in November 2004 allowed the Protocol to enter
into force 90 days later on February 16, 2005.4
The Protocol places legally binding limits on GHG emis-
sions by Annex I countries, which are industrialized countries
that were members of the Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development (“OECD”) in 1992 and countries with
economies in transition (the “EIT Parties”), which includes the
Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and
Eastern European states.5 If fully implemented and enforced,
the Protocol will reduce GHG emissions by 5.2 percent of
1990 levels by 2012.
The most important development at the COP 11 was the
agreement by all parties (except the United States and
Australia) to continue to negotiate future binding limits on
GHG emissions after the Protocol expires in 2012. The United
States initially opposed any future commitments on GHG
emissions, but eventually withdrew its objection on the con-
ference’s final day of negotiations.6 This cleared the way for
the parties to move forward with post-Kyoto plans. 
The United States can still hinder these efforts, given that
as the world’s leading GHG emitter, meaningful action on cli-
mate change hinges on its full participation. But with only
seven years remaining under the Protocol, moving forward
with post-Kyoto talks at this year’s climate conference was
seen as critical, with concern growing that any further delay
would allow the United States to argue that there would not be
enough time to negotiate new emissions targets.7 The United
States could then call for an abandonment of mandatory cuts
and instead focus on its preferred solution to climate change:
technology transfer.8
It is not yet clear what the extent of the post-Kyoto emis-
sions limits will be, but in order to have a chance at staving off
the worst impacts of climate change by 2100, the cuts must be
significantly more than the Protocol’s 5.2 percent reduction. 
The original standard for action to combat climate change
is found in the UNFCCC’s Article 2, which calls for the “sta-
bilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system.”9
Although “dangerous anthropogenic interference” lends
itself to a variety of interpretations, there are several frequent-
ly offered targets that, if achieved, may avoid the worst effects
of climate change. Targets are most commonly expressed in
terms of GHG emission reductions, temperature changes, and
atmospheric carbon dioxide (“CO2”) concentrations. Each type
of target relies on complex climate science and mathematical
calculations and at best can only offer a probable outcome. 
One commonly used benchmark is to limit global average
temperature increase to two degrees Celsius above pre-indus-
trial averages (circa 1750s).10 The corresponding reductions in
GHG emissions and limits on atmospheric carbon concentra-
tion to achieve this target depend on a series of factors, many
of which can only be estimated within a certain range. One
estimate, in a July 2005 report released by Allianz Group and
the World Wildlife Fund, suggested that limiting global aver-
age surface temperature increase to two degrees Celsius would
require a reduction in GHG emissions of 60 to 80 percent from
current levels by 2050 (from almost seven billion tons of car-
bon emissions per year to under 2.5 billion per year).11
One of the main criticisms of the Protocol is that binding
limits on GHG emissions, even its modest 5.2 percent reduc-
tion, will be too costly. But the Protocol’s true value is its reg-
ulatory mechanisms that will make future limits on GHG emis-
sions economically feasible.
This is why the second-most significant accomplishment
at the COP 11 was the implementation of the Marrakech
Accords, a set of technical guidelines and regulations on the
Protocol’s key regulatory mechanisms – International
Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation (“JI”), and the Clean
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Development Mechanism (“CDM”). The Marrakech Accords
were negotiated at the COP 7 in 2001 and are sometimes
referred to as the “Kyoto Rule Book.” In effect, they render the
Protocol fully operational. 
International emissions trading provides for portions of
Annex I countries’ emissions allowances to be traded on an
international carbon market in order to achieve emissions
reductions in the most cost-effective manner. JI allows Annex
I countries to receive credit for emissions reductions from
investments in other Annex I countries. And the CDM works
in a manner similar to Joint Implementation, except that it
applies to investments in all non-Annex I countries (e.g. devel-
oping countries).
The Protocol’s regulatory mechanisms are essential to
achieving its emissions targets because, as market-based regu-
latory tools, they enable countries to achieve their targets in the
most cost-effective manner possible.
The advantage of binding emissions targets and market-
based mechanisms is that identify the most cost-effective
emissions reductions. For example, the European Union’s
Emissions Trading System (“EU ETS”) entered into force in
January 2005 in order to allow EU Member States to meet
their projected obligations under the Protocol. The goal of the
EU ETS is to reduce GHG emissions by about eight percent
of 1990 levels by 2012. The European Commission has
reported that the costs to industry will range between €2.9 –
€3.7 billion, which is less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic
product in the EU.12 By contrast, achieving the same reduc-
tion without an emissions trading system is estimated to cost
approximately twice as much.
This is in part because market-based mechanisms take
advantage of the “Porter Hypothesis” advanced by Michael
Porter and Claas van der Linde – where the application of strict
but flexible environmental standards fosters innovations in
technology whose value meets or exceeds the costs of compli-
ance.13 In using emissions trading, JI, and CDM, the Protocol
creates economic incentives to invest in new technologies that
cut emissions.
These economic incentives are sometimes described as
a technology “pull,” where the regulatory limits on emis-
sions create a commercial demand for new technology. This
is in contrast to a technology “push,” which is simply the
outcome of research and development (“R&D”). Traditional
R&D has already yielded a series of technologies that, if
applied, can drastically lower emissions. For example, an
influential article by Princeton researchers Stephen Pacala
and Robert Socolow argues that a portfolio of technologies
now exists to meet the world’s energy needs over the next
fifty years while still limiting atmospheric CO2 to a trajecto-
ry that avoids a doubling of the preindustrial concentra-
tion.14 Although no “wedge” (that is, a type of new technol-
ogy) is a credible candidate for doing the entire job (or even
half the job) by itself, the portfolio as a whole is large
enough that not every wedge has to be used. The wedges
range from improved energy efficiency and conservation,
such as higher fuel economy standards and the use of hybrid
vehicles, to sequestering CO2 emissions in depleted under-
ground oil and gas reservoirs.
Thus the technology is already here. What is needed are
international legal regimes to create a market “pull” that encour-
ages their wider application. The importance of Kyoto, there-
fore, is its ability to help policymakers better understand the
relationship between regulation and innovation and how market-
based mechanisms like emissions trading, JI, and CDM spur
profitable methods of reducing emissions. After all, it seems
clear that to achieve emissions reductions as drastic as 60 to 80
percent by mid-century, the most attractive policy response is to
develop ways to make these reductions profitable.
The business community is already catching on, with
numerous Fortune 500 companies pledging to reduce emis-
sions and invest in environmentally-friendly technologies. BP,
for instance, found that it was able to reach its internal target
of reducing emissions by ten percent below its 1990 levels
without cost. Indeed, the company added around $650 million
of shareholder value because the bulk of the reductions came
from the elimination of leaks and waste.15 Dozens of other
major companies have announced GHG reduction targets and
have undertaken new initiatives to combat climate change.16
Additionally, many have called on the Bush Administration to
take stronger action on climate change and begin to regulate
GHG emissions.17
Significant obstacles to tackling climate change still
remain, but the progress made at the COP 11 in Montreal
appears to be a meaningful step in the right direction. 
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INTRODUCTION
At the United Nations climate change meetings inMontreal in December 2005, the U.S. Governmentreaffirmed its commitment to a voluntary, technology-
based approach to reducing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emis-
sions.1 The United States stood behind this approach even as
157 parties to the Kyoto Protocol voted to take steps to extend
the Protocol’s mandatory emissions reductions beyond 2012.2
The United States’ faith in a noncompulsory approach comes at
a time when voluntary programs have been struggling. The
power sector is the largest single U.S. contributor to GHG emis-
sions; this article considers the progress that sector has made
with voluntary programs, the structural difficulties it has
encountered, and the prospects of voluntary programs going for-
ward. The picture is not promising.
Announced in 2002, President Bush’s “Climate VISION
Program” seeks to achieve an eighteen percent reduction in car-
bon intensity across the U.S. economy by 2012 through volun-
tary actions.3 In December 2004, after almost two years of nego-
tiations, the Administration and the electric power industry
announced “Power Partners.” This agreement commits U.S.
power industry trade associations to work with their members
and the Department of Energy (“DOE”) to reduce the carbon
intensity of the power sector—but only by three to five percent
over ten years.4
If this modest level of emissions reductions is the most to
which the largest contributors to GHG emissions can commit,
the prospects for voluntary emissions reduction programs are
dismal. This is particularly so given that, in a significant and rap-
idly growing number of states, utilities face mandates to provide
up to twenty percent of their electricity from renewable resources
by 2020. Twenty states and the District of Columbia now impose
a variety of renewable portfolio requirements. Two other states,
Illinois and New Hampshire, have established renewable energy
goals. The renewable resource requirement in Maine is 30 per-
cent, reflecting that state’s abundant supply of hydropower.5
Because electricity generation is such a large source of
GHGs, no program to reduce GHG emissions can succeed with-
out a substantial contribution from the power sector. Yet, as
discussed below, there are important reasons why the power
industry has not more aggressively responded to the issue of
global climate change through voluntary actions. While some of
those reasons may be unique to the power sector, others can be
generalized to other industrial sectors that are major emitters of
GHGs. At the same time, large emitters also increasingly recog-
nize the need to respond meaningfully to the risks of global cli-
mate change. Thus, some of the nation’s largest utilities have
begun to publicly recognize the need for a mandatory GHG
emissions reduction program. FPL Group, Cinergy, and Exelon
have been among the clearest in their acknowledgement that it
is time for a national program to limit GHG emissions.6
THE HISTORY OF VOLUNTARY UTILITY GHG
REDUCTION EFFORTS
The federal government has been exhorting U.S. utilities to
reduce carbon emissions through voluntary programs for more
than a decade. The predecessor to Power Partners was called
“Climate Challenge.” Begun in 1994, Climate Challenge com-
mitted electric power trade associations and DOE to work togeth-
er on policies to help reduce GHG emissions. Individual utilities
committed to take particular actions to reduce their emissions.7
The agreement came after the United Nation’s Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) but before the
Kyoto Protocol. At the time, voluntary measures were the pre-
vailing approach to addressing climate change internationally.
While the U.S. government had no legal leverage in negotiating
those agreements, many were optimistic that industry would “step
up to the plate and do the right thing.” At that time, the electric
power sector accounted for roughly 35 percent of carbon dioxide
(“CO2”) emissions from energy use in the United States.8
In fact, dozens of utilities undertook projects to reduce GHG
emissions under Climate Challenge agreements. Then, as now,
industry members knew that because they account for such a
large share of total GHG emissions, they would be on the “bleed-
ing edge” of any regulatory initiative. Industry members thus
sought to make the voluntary program a success, and, by some
measures, it has been. Each year since then, Climate Challenge
utilities have undertaken projects that have reduced GHG emis-
sions by hundreds of tons. For several of the last ten years, the
majority of all reporters to DOE’s 1605(b) voluntary registry of
GHG emissions and emissions reductions have been utilities.9
Nevertheless, since 1990, total GHG emissions from the
power sector are up 27.5 percent compared with a 17.6 percent
increase for the economy as a whole.10 Total power generation is
also substantially greater, therefore, the industry’s CO2 intensity
is down, but not by much. Moreover, the decline in carbon inten-
sity is largely a function of the increase over the last decade in
the use of natural gas for power generation, a trend that is now
starting to reverse as a result of increases in natural gas prices.
Notwithstanding the emerging consensus about the need to
reduce GHG emissions, coal – the most CO2 intensive fuel
source – is once again the fuel of choice for the new power gen-
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eration. A recent survey by the National Energy Technology
Laboratory (“NETL”) reported that 129 new coal plants, repre-
senting a capacity of 87 gigawatts, may be built over the next
twenty years.11 Allowing that many of these plants probably will
not be built, the emissions from those that do go from the draw-
ing board to operations will swallow up the small progress of
the last decade. With many executives in the power industry cer-
tain that the sector’s future will be a carbon-constrained one,
this reliance on coal seems paradoxical. What accounts for this
interest in coal? What does it mean for the future of voluntary
emissions reduction programs?
Four factors provide the answer: (1) the economic regulato-
ry structure of the power industry; (2) the financial struggles of
the competitive sector of the industry; (3) the relatively modest
resources available to the government for incentive programs;
and finally (4) uncertainty about the direction of future public
policy, with respect to both the outcome of the Clean Air Act
“wars” that have stymied the development of policy for tradi-
tional “criteria pollutants” and to the regulation of GHGs. Taken
together, these four factors will likely mean that Climate
VISION and other voluntary efforts to reduce GHG emissions
in the power sector achieve very little. They also help to explain
the recent bipartisan movement in Congress to mandate a reduc-
tion in CO2 emissions. On June 22, 2005, the Senate supported
mandatory limits on greenhouse gases by a vote of 53-44.12
ECONOMIC REGULATION OF THE
POWER INDUSTRY
More than 65 percent of electricity today is generated by
traditional utilities.13 These companies need approval from state
economic regulators both to add to their capacity and to under-
take significant improvements in existing physical plants. State
economic regulators are primarily concerned with energy costs
and the utility’s “duty to serve.” Their principal statutory mis-
sion is to ensure that the companies they regulate reliably meet
the need for power for all customers in the utility’s service area
at the lowest price to the consumer.
It is no coincidence that 75 percent of the coal burned to
generate electricity today is used by traditional, cost-of-service
utilities.14 Under most scenarios, coal is the cheapest option.
The coal supply is domestic, plentiful, and highly reliable. It can
be burned in large, baseload plants using proven technology.
To be sure, most utility statutes give their state commissions
authority to address environmental considerations, but those
authorities tend to be quite specific, focusing on demand-side
management, efficiency measures, and, increasingly, renewable
energy mandates. While all of those measures tend to reduce the
GHG emissions of utilities indirectly, utility commissions have
no specific mandate to regulate emissions from power generation
or promote innovative and environmentally promising technolo-
gies. Their focus on cost-saving and reliability tends to run
counter to support for reduced carbon emissions technologies (as
with wind, solar, and nuclear technologies). Utilities seeking to
build new facilities have always had to propose plans that com-
ply with all applicable requirements of law, but because environ-
mental protection has typically been accomplished through
mandatory programs, the utility commissions’ emphasis on cost
and reliability over environmental considerations has never been
a matter of much debate. Similarly, when a power plant needs to
upgrade its environmental controls to meet new mandatory stan-
dards, there is little room for debate that the expenditure is nec-
essary and that the utility should be able to cover the cost of the
new equipment with a rate hike. When a program is voluntary,
however, it is less clear that associated expenditures are “pru-
dent” and serve the “public convenience and necessity,” the tra-
ditional watchwords for assuring cost recovery in rates.
Wisconsin Energy Corporation (“WEC”) offers an interest-
ing case study of the difficulty voluntary efforts face. In need of
significant new baseload capacity, WEC concluded that coal was
the most cost-effective resource. Perhaps because it correctly
anticipated that there would be a public outcry at the prospect of
major new coal plants, WEC devoted considerable effort to eval-
uating integrated gasification combined cycle (“IGCC”) technol-
ogy, and it decided to propose that one of the two new plants it
was seeking regulatory approval for should be an IGCC plant.15
IGCC has extremely low emissions of criteria pollutants, along
with lower carbon emissions than other coal burning technolo-
gies by virtue of its increased efficiency. Most importantly, how-
ever, for purposes of the climate change debate, IGCC lends
itself readily to the addition of carbon capture technology once it
becomes economically and technically feasible.16
There are no baseload IGCC plants operating in the United
States today – just a pair of demonstration projects built during
the 1990s in part with DOE Clean Coal Program funds. Part of
the reason for this is that capital costs are a bit higher for
IGCC,17 and reliability is a bit lower than that of pulverized coal
plants.18 Those two considerations led the Wisconsin Public
Service Commission (“PSC”) to deny the WEC proposal out of
hand, treating the question in a single paragraph of a 72-page
decision, with no mention at all of the potential environmental
benefits IGCC offered.19 Any power generator subject to tradi-
tional cost-of-service regulation considering voluntary invest-
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ments in GHG-reducing technologies would be wise to consid-
er the implications of the WEC decision.20
COMPETITIVE POWER CONSIDERATIONS
In those industries that have been resistant to voluntary
GHG-reduction efforts, individual companies have blamed their
failure to assume the additional costs of reducing emissions on
competitive pressures; they have no assurance that their direct
competitors in the marketplace will take equivalent steps. That
same argument applies to those electric power companies that
participate in restructured markets, i.e. they sell their power at
market rates in competition with other suppliers. Indeed, the
competitive market for electricity (to the extent it exists today)
was created on the premise that it could provide lower cost
power than the regulated sector. Independent generators may be
able to provide an environmentally superior product, i.e., power
with lower emissions, but at a higher cost. They may then find
it difficult, however, to market their greener (but more expen-
sive) product to their regulated customers in what are often
highly competitive markets. The public utility commissions may
also wonder whether the local utility has made a “prudent,” i.e.
low-cost purchase. 
A portion of the independent power sector has very suc-
cessfully devoted itself to producing renewable energy, which is
increasingly being purchased by utilities to meet their renewable
portfolio requirements. For example, FPL Energy, the deregu-
lated affiliate of the regulated Florida Power & Light, has
become one of the world’s largest producers of wind power.
However, the independent power producers holding themselves
out as providing baseload supply that is dispatchable on demand
most often compete on price alone.21
Competitive power producers also face other barriers to
investing in GHG-reducing technologies. Following the
California electricity crisis, the downfall of Enron, and the sharp
rise in the price of natural gas – the fuel source for most of the
plants the independents have built – independent producers have
faced considerable risk premiums in capital markets. Indeed,
several of the largest competitive power suppliers have under-
gone bankruptcies or other major reorganizations. Many indus-
try executives have concluded that, in the current business envi-
ronment, new generating capacity should be built in the eco-
nomically safer cost-of-service, rate-recovery era.22 Plainly,
those who cannot raise the capital for expansion of their basic
business are unlikely to have funds to invest in significant new
voluntary projects for reductions.
MODEST GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES
As part of its climate change program, DOE has proposed
FutureGen, a coal-fired power plant that would have near zero
emissions, sequester carbon, and produce hydrogen. It is an ambi-
tious vision, and DOE has projected spending one billion dollars a
year over ten years for the development effort.23 That sounds gen-
erous, until it is compared to the cost of building a single baseload
plant, which itself could cost in excess of one billion dollars.
Moreover, even the promised federal funding is highly uncertain.24
Although some repudiate new nuclear power plants as an
inappropriate response to climate change, nuclear power is the
only emissions-free source of baseload generation reasonably
available in the short-term. Regulatory risk and high capital costs
have been the largest perceived stumbling blocks to new nuclear
generation. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct 2005”)25
includes new incentive programs to address those concerns with
the expectation that they will ultimately promote the develop-
ment of more climate-friendly power generation. Unfortunately,
the incentives are limited and funding is uncertain.
For example, EPAct 2005 authorizes a form of regulatory
risk insurance for up to six new nuclear power plants, covering
certain kinds of delay costs up to $500 million for the first two
plants and up to $250 million for the next four.26 EPAct 2005 also
authorizes federal loan guarantees for innovative power plant
technologies that avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or
GHG emissions.27 Both nuclear power plants based on advanced
reactor designs and IGCC plants are eligible for these loan guar-
antees. However, absent generous federal appropriations to sup-
port the loan guarantees, which seem unlikely, the value of those
guarantees is unclear.28 These new federal incentives are likely
not sufficient to eliminate the concerns about cost and technology
that prompted the Wisconsin PSC to reject IGCC technology.29
The federal government’s principal economic challenge in
this decade is quite likely to be reining in the deficit. Major dis-
cretionary spending programs will have to be starved to do that,
and it is unlikely that the government will ever fund incentives
to the utility industry to address climate change at levels suffi-
cient to make a real difference in this sector’s GHG emissions.
The government’s technology research and development invest-
ments and incentive programs will hopefully help to point the
way to lower GHG emissions from power generation, but they
will not pay the way.
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FUTURE POLICY DIRECTION
Delays in resolving the debates under the Clean Air Act and
doubts about the future direction of GHG regulation further
undermine voluntary programs. Whether framed in terms of
“New Source Review” enforcement actions, “Clear Skies” legis-
lation, or the “Clean Air Interstate Rule,” there can be little debate
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that the Nation’s policy, with respect to traditional pollutant emis-
sions standards for power plants, has been at a stalemate for far
too long. As a result, industry is uncertain what standards it will
be required to meet in the future, new construction is delayed,
and, in the meantime, old, dirty plants are allowed to limp along.
Simply by virtue of improved efficiency, new coal burning plants
should be able to reduce emissions by ten percent or more. While
new plants are being built to meet new demand, those result in
incremental emissions. GHG emissions reductions can only be
achieved when old and inefficient plants are retired.30
In the 1994 Climate Challenge negotiations, utility partici-
pants wanted DOE to promise that, whatever voluntary reduc-
tion or mitigation actions they took would be credited in the
event of a future mandatory program. Mindful of its lack of
authority to bind any Congress that might, at some distant date,
impose a mandatory GHG emissions reduction program, DOE
demurred. DOE pointed hopefully to the UNFCCC. Its 1990
baseline minimum standard for GHG emissions levels suggest-
ed that there was a good chance that participating companies
would get credit for meeting or exceeding these standards
through voluntary actions. Those in the industry who were will-
ing to make real reductions were concerned that they would not
be rewarded for their efforts when it came time to meet subse-
quent additional mandatory standards.
The same debate was repeated in 2003 and 2004. Indeed,
reaching an agreement on the Power Partners framework was
slowed over that contentious issue. This time around, the con-
cern seems particularly well-founded. There is a growing inter-
national consensus that the Kyoto Protocol will have to be mod-
ified to bring the United States and large developing countries
into the fold. What shape any new regime for GHG emissions
reduction might take is highly speculative, but it is unlikely to
be based on a 1990 baseline. 
As noted above, utility emissions of GHGs have grown by
27.5 percent since 1990. A 1990 baseline is unlikely to be attain-
able for decades to come, and therefore it is an unlikely choice as
the baseline for any mandatory U.S. program. Indeed, when DOE
proposed enhanced 1605(b) guidelines for GHG emissions
reporting, it limited reportable reductions to those occurring in
2002 or later.31 When the National Commission on Energy Policy
(“NCEP”) recently proposed its framework for GHG reduction
mandates, it called for stabilizing emissions between 2010 and
2019.32 Those who step forward and take bold action now may
well find themselves at a significant disadvantage in meeting any
mandatory standard that is set in the future. In an industry that has
rarely been rewarded for taking risks, this is not an auspicious
environment in which to encourage individual companies to vol-
unteer to “step up to the plate, and do the right thing.” 
CONCLUSION
Given all the barriers and the arguments against voluntary
action, it is nevertheless true that there are sound economic rea-
sons for U.S. utilities to begin down the road of significant
emissions reductions. Most obviously, there is a growing con-
sensus that a mandatory program is not far away. Those who
have found cost-effective ways to reduce emissions will be at an
advantage when that day comes. In addition, when a utility
decides to build a power plant that is expected to serve for 40 or
50 years, prudence would suggest that the utility weigh the like-
ly direction of future policy with respect to climate change, the
opinion of the Wisconsin PSC notwithstanding. Even without a
dictate such as that imposed by the California PUC to assign a
GHG adder to the projected cost of new fossil fuel plants, many
utilities are already doing just that – to ensure that their invest-
ments in new generation will stand the test of time.33
There are more immediate pressures as well. Shareholder
resolutions on climate issues have become commonplace at util-
ity company annual meetings, and insurance companies have
spoken out clearly about the risk global warming represents.34
Can shareholder lawsuits and risk premiums in capital markets
be far behind?
A recent court of appeals decision held only that the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) had discretion not to
regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act, not that it lacked the
authority.35 Thus, under a new EPA Administrator, the current
view could be reversed without new legislation. Several utilities
have been forced to defend lawsuits initiated by states and citi-
zens groups premised on the theory that coal-fired generation
represents a public nuisance because of its contribution to glob-
al climate change.36 The plaintiffs in those suits had their claims
dismissed, but they have already filed an appeal.37
Two recent articles in Nature suggest that the science and
economics of the impacts of climate change are evolving to the
point where attributing legal blame for extreme climate events
may become feasible.38 One need not agree with these authors
or the plaintiffs in the recent litigation to begin to worry about
the day when a damages lawsuit arising out of global warming
could survive a motion to dismiss. More likely than a judgment,
at least in the near-term, is the potential burden of responding to
multiple class actions. The tobacco litigation is over. The
California electricity crisis lawsuits are beginning to wind
down. Global warming may look like a ripe target to the plain-
tiffs’ bar, which filed many unsuccessful tobacco lawsuits
before their theories took hold. 
1 Pamela Najor, U.N. Conference Sets Process for Further Emissions Cut,
GREENWIRE, (Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire
/searcharchive/test_search-display.cgi?q=Conference+Sets+Process+for+
Further+Emissions+Cuts&file=%2FGreenwire%2Fsearcharchive%2FNewsline
%2F2005%2FDecember12%2F12120501.htm (subscription required) (last vis-
ited Jan. 12, 2006).
2 Najor, id.
3 Climate VISION, Program Mission, http://www.climatevision.gov/
mission.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
4 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Power Sector Sign MOU on
Voluntary Efforts to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, (Dec. 13, 2004)
available at http://www.energy.gov/print/1553.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
50WINTER 2006 
ENDNOTES: GHGs in the Electricity Sector continued on page 66
ENDNOTES: 
GHGS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR
51 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange (“UNFCCC” or “Convention”)1 and the KyotoProtocol2 were the first binding international laws to
address global warming and control manmade greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions. The UNFCCC went into effect on March
21, 1994. The Kyoto Protocol, an update to the UNFCCC treaty,
officially became law on February 16, 2005. 
Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, like many
international agreements, limit participation in negotiations and
ratification to “States.” After the General Assembly of the
United Nations recognized the People’s Republic of China
(“PRC”) as the only representative of China in 1971,3 most
States severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan.4 As it is not
recognized as a “State” pursuant to international treaty defini-
tions, Taiwan faces a tremendous obstacle to participating in
international organizations. For instance, it is typically excluded
from negotiations and discussion in all meetings concerning
multilateral environmental agreements. 
The international laws and regulations of the UNFCCC and
the Kyoto Protocol affect and limit every nation in the world,
especially because the impacts of global warming are massive in
scale and transboundary in nature. Even though Taiwan is
excluded from the Convention, it still needs to plan strategies to
prepare for the impacts of global warming on its people and
society. This article will review the provisions that limit the par-
ticipation of Taiwan in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
and will discuss possible means for Taiwan to take part in the
Kyoto mechanisms. Taiwan has the potential to link itself to
international climate strategies in a way that is unique to its par-
ticular situation.
PROHIBITIONS PREVENTING TAIWAN FROM
PARTICIPATING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
REGIME
Article 20 of the UNFCCC excludes Taiwan from eligibili-
ty as a signatory to the Convention. This provision limits quali-
fied signatories to the Convention to: (1) the State Members of
the UN; (2) specialized agencies of the UN; (3) parties to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice; and (4) regional
economic integration organizations (“REIOs”).3
Taiwan is neither a member of the UN nor a member of the
International Court of Justice. In the UNFCCC, the European
Union group (also called the European Union “bubble”) is the
only example of an REIO signing the agreement. Taiwan,
though, is not a member of an REIO. Furthermore, Taiwan’s
political status bars it from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, since
Article 24 of the Kyoto Protocol stipulates, “This Protocol shall
be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval by States and regional economic integration organiza-
tions which are Parties to the UNFCCC.”5 Since Taiwan is not a
politically recognized “State” in the UN, it is not permitted to
negotiate for its interests and is even prohibited from participat-
ing as an observer in those meetings. 
LIMITATIONS ON TAIWAN UNDER THE UNFCCC
AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
TAIWAN’S ECONOMY CONTRIBUTES SIGNIFICANTLY TO
GLOBAL EMISSIONS
As a developing country in Asia, Taiwan’s economic
growth relies on international trade and imported fossil fuels,
particularly coal and crude oil, 80 percent of which is imported.
Taiwan’s total carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions were
218,488.86 thousand metric tons in 2001,6 and its total GHG
emission levels ranked 22nd in the world and constituted about
one percent of the world’s total emissions.7
Because Taiwan is the fifteenth largest trading economy in
the world,8 and a specific “custom territory” under the World
Trade Organization, 9 UNFCCC members have not yet resolved
whether to define Taiwan as a “developing country” or a “coun-
try in economic transition.” Taiwan is an island with limited
energy resources. Almost 80 percent of the country’s energy
consumption comes from imported fossil fusels. Even still, eco-
nomic growth in Taiwan produced annual CO2 emissions per
capita of 9.83 tons and led to an average growth rate in CO2
emissions of 6.3 percent between 1990 and 2000.10 According
to a report by the Taiwan Environmental Protection
Administration (“TEPA”), if the international community forced
Taiwan to accept the same responsibilities as Annex I countries
under the Kyoto Protocol, Taiwan would have to “reduce [its]
GHGs emissions by 227 percent … in 2010, against [a] 1990
baseline.”11 Based on this calculation, the five year dramatic
GHG reductions might force all coal-firing power plants to
cease operation, thus limiting electricity access across the
island. Many of the major industries might close or move out of
Taiwan, dramatically increasing unemployment. 
Although the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol regulations
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exclude the island from joining the mechanisms and compli-
ance process, the Taiwanese government still unilaterally
announced its status as a “developing country” and its intention
to abide by those international treaties even though such inter-
national law is not binding on Taiwan.12 In contrast, the inter-
national community has not yet determined the obligations of
Taiwan as a non-signatory government voluntarily complying
with the UNFCCC objectives.
Taiwan is a trading economy, and most Taiwanese companies
are engaged as original equipment manufacturers or original
design manufacturers for value-added resellers in developed coun-
tries. Because of Taiwan’s unique economy, the country is put at a
significant disadvantage when it comes to allocating global GHG
emissions. For instance, there is a risk that many developed coun-
tries will decide to reduce their domestic GHG emissions by trans-
ferring their emissions liabilities to developing countries. This
would result in the shifting of all reduction responsibilities to man-
ufacturing countries, such as Taiwan, while the developed coun-
tries concentrate on related services that produce lower GHG
emissions.13 This scenario would cause a disadvantage to the com-
petitiveness of Taiwanese companies, because under the concepts
of controlling cost and maximizing profit, most manufacturers will
move their factories to a place with cheaper labor costs and less
environmental regulation. This same phenomenon, for instance,
led to massive investment by Taiwanese companies in China after
1999. As a result, it is necessary that both the Taiwanese govern-
ment and private sector prepare adoption strategies to reduce the
negative effects of UNFCCC emission reduction allocations on
their development. 
TAIWAN CANNOT MEET REDUCTION LEVELS WITHOUT
PARTICIPATION IN THE UNFCCC
Article 3 of the UNFCCC requires that all Parties shall take
“common but differentiated responsibilities” in protecting the
climate system for current and future generations, and further
requires that the “developed country Parties should take the lead
in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” 14
The UNFCCC also stipulates that each Party shall take “precau-
tionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of
climate change and mitigate its adverse effect,” despite any “lack
of full scientific certainty.”15 Additionally, all Parties must enact
regulations to “develop, periodically update, [and] publish”16 the
communication of information related to implementation.17
At the same time, the UNFCCC also recognizes that devel-
oping countries have “special circumstances” affecting their abil-
ities to immediately reduce fossil fuel consumption.18 Hence,
developed countries, including the developed countries listed in
Annex II of the UNFCCC, committed to provide “new and addi-
tional financial resources to developing countries” to address their
climate change policies or measures.19 Such financial resources
include the transfer of environmentally sound technologies and
knowledge.20 Developed countries also agreed to use the financial
mechanism defined in Article 11 to provide “full incremental
costs of implementing measures”21 to developing countries to
develop national communication reports and policies.22
Due to its status as a developing country and its unique
political position, Taiwan lacks administrative capacity and eco-
nomic resources, especially those required to develop and
implement domestic and foreign environmental policies.23
According to a model developed at the National Energy
Conference in 1998,24 if Taiwan planned to reduce CO2 emis-
sions by ten tons per capita by the year 2020, the marginal
reduction cost for each ton of CO2, absent emissions trading,
would be $207.25 In comparison, the marginal reduction costs of
the United States, without trading, for the year 2010 would be
$153.26 Even ten years later, the reduction costs for Taiwan
would still be much higher than those of the United States.
However, according to the records of the UN Environment
Programme (“UNEP”), the marginal reduction costs for China
by the year 2020 would only be $32.27 Overall, the model
showed that emissions trading would be an effective and low-
cost mechanism for most countries to achieve their reduction
goals. However, for Taiwan, the model also showed that the
country would have to spend more to reduce its GHG emissions.
According to the model, Taiwan would further require special
assistance from developed countries in order to achieve the
goals of the Kyoto Protocol, especially since UNFCCC mem-
bership limitations prohibit Taiwan from participating in exist-
ing international emissions trading schemes.
Because it is barred from membership in the UNFCCC,
Taiwan’s ability to obtain financial support from developed
countries is limited. For instance, under Article 12(4),28
developing countries can submit to the Secretariat of
Conferences of Parties (“COPs”) requests for financial or
technical assistance from developed countries. However,
since Taiwan is not a member of the UNFCCC, it cannot uti-
lize the Secretariat as a resource for obtaining financial and
technical support. Instead, Taiwan can only procure the nec-
essary technologies, techniques, and equipment through its
own public or private sector. This means that the costs for
Taiwan to achieve GHGs emission reductions would be much
Even though Taiwan is
excluded from the
Convention, it still needs
to plan strategies to
prepare for the impacts of
global warming on its
people and society.
higher than for other developing countries, thus going against
the UNFCCC’s equity principles.29
LIMITATIONS ON INFORMATION SHARING
Articles 9 and 10 of the UNFCCC provide two subsidiary
bodies for technical and scientific advising and implementation,
composed of climate change experts and government represen-
tatives. These bodies assist COPs in accessing and reviewing the
effective implementation of the Convention for each Party. The
subsidiary bodies also provide scientific knowledge and infor-
mation to the COPs and give advice to members in developing
country on capacity building projects and research strategies.30
The representatives and experts of the subsidiary bodies serve as
connections between the international organizations and indi-
vidual States. The governments in developing countries can then
use this assistance to build their own teams with expertise on
climate change. These team members have the potential to be a
very helpful resource for the public and academics who wish to
collect information on GHG reductions and educate their com-
munities. Team members could increase communication and
create information exchanges. For example, capacity building
projects could be reviewed and advised by foreign experts. Such
communications and idea exchanges would be valuable for
improving administrative capacities and developing national
environmental clauses and policies.31
However, under the limitations of Article 20, the Taiwan
government cannot submit a National Communication Report to
the Secretariat of the COPs. Even if the Secretariat received the
report, it has no obligation to have subsidiary bodies review and
provide advice to Taiwan’s proposal. Furthermore, Taiwan can-
not have its government representatives and experts join the
subsidiary bodies. 
The membership limitation also restricts Taiwan’s access to
information, not only diminishing the abilities of academic
research, but also reducing the chances to educate the people of
Taiwan. Taiwan is the only developing country ignored by cli-
mate change experts in the subsidiary bodies and as such,
experts will never have the opportunity to review Taiwan’s
GHG inventory records or provide advice for capacity building
or research. Although Taiwan will take unilateral action and
adopt volunteer reduction activities, the government has few
chances to improve its administrative capacity through commu-
nication with foreign experts. At the same time, Taiwan also
loses the opportunity to develop national and foreign environ-
mental clauses and policies.
Information transparency is one of the best ways to pro-
mote compliance with international environment policies;32
however, Taiwan is limited in its access to international infor-
mation and research institutions. The prohibition on partici-
pation in international information sharing bodies creates a
vicious cycle preventing the improvement of national envi-
ronmental policies and administrative capacities. When there
is less research conducted in Taiwan, this leads to a weaker
understanding of the rest of the world in Taiwan. The barriers
preventing Taiwan from submitting various data and statistics
to international organizations lead to difficulties in acquiring
reviews and research by UN related projects on, inter alia,
water, toxics, persistent organic pollutants, biodiversity pro-
tection, and coastal zone management. Furthermore, the lack
of information transparency has caused delays in the improve-
ment of Taiwan’s administrative capacity, because the gov-
ernment cannot access advice from international experts to
build capacity. At the same time, without the necessary data,
analyses of Taiwan will not truly reflect the current circum-
stances on the island. This, in turn, will be a disincentive to
continued improvements in the work of academics, as well as
regional economic development. In the future, if COPs decide
to place responsibilities on Taiwan, it will be difficult to
determine the appropriate levels of responsibility, e.g. calcu-
lating targets and baselines, without allowing further investi-
gation and research projects in Taiwan to develop more nec-
essary and accurate data. 
DENIED ACCESS TO UNFCCC FINANCIAL
MECHANISMS
In Article 4.3, developed countries agree to provide “new
and additional financial resources”33 to developing countries to
meet their different commitments under this Convention. The
UNFCCC defines a financial mechanism in Article 11 that pro-
vides financial assistance and technology transfer to be granted
by subsidiary bodies.34 Moreover, there are two institutions
under the COPs: (1) Articles 21(2) and 9 provide for the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), which
conducts scientific-technical analysis of adaptation and technical
advice for State members to the “Subsidiary Body for Scientific
And Technological Advice;” (2) Articles 11 and Article 21(3)
launched the Global Environment Facility (“GEF”) in 1991 and
assigned the World Bank (the “Bank”), the United Nations
Development Programme (“UNDP”), and UNEP to be its imple-
menting agencies.35 The GEF serves as a trustee for those devel-
oping countries searching for financial support from the COPs
and monitors the operating of the entities. In the Marrakech
Accords, the Annex of Decision 1, Section A also stipulates that
capacity building “shall be served by the GEF as an operating
entity of the financial mechanism”36 to provide grants and con-
cession funds to developing countries. GEF projects focus on
international environmental issues, including climate change,
biodiversity, land degradation, persistent organic pollutants,
depletion of the ozone layer, and international water concerns.37
After funds are granted, the seven executing agencies contribute
to the management and execution of GEF projects.38 However,
only developing country members or countries with transitioning
economies39 that ratified the UNFCCC are eligible to propose
climate change projects, borrow from the Bank, or receive tech-
nical assistance from the UNDP.40 In these projects, the Bank
acts as a trustee and provides grants to cover the difference or
“increment” while developing economies adopt more environ-
mentally friendly options.41
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As neither a member of the Bank nor a UNFCCC Party,
Taiwan is not permitted to propose projects to the COPs or
donate funds to the GEF. The eligibility limitations force Taiwan
to obtain technical information and knowledge by itself and to
adopt costly environmental options without assistance from
developed countries or experts in the Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice. Taiwan does not have
much technology or experience in GHG reductions or in the
improvement of energy efficiency. Without the financial and
technical assistance of developed countries and access to shared
knowledge on similar experiences, the process for reducing
emissions takes longer and is more costly. This not only wastes
money, but also slows the development of domestic environ-
mental policies and strategies. 
For instance, the Bank created and administers the
Prototype Carbon Fund (hereinafter “Fund”) as a trustee to
finance Joint Implementation (“JI”) and Clean Development
Mechanism (“CDM”) projects designed to reduce GHG emis-
sions in developing countries. Contributors or participants can
receive pro rata shares of emission reductions that are verified
and certified pursuant to an agreement with the country hosting
the project.42 One of the objectives of the Fund is “knowledge
dissemination to provide the Parties to the UNFCCC, the private
sector, and other interested parties with an opportunity to ‘learn-
by-doing’ in the development of policies, rules, and business
processes for the achievement of Emission Reductions under
CDM and [JI].”43 Under the membership requirement, though,
neither the public nor private sector of Taiwan may create a
Trust Fund under the Bank or participate in the operation of the
Fund to collect shares from the Bank. Taiwan also loses the
opportunity to learn from the experiences of the Fund and its
participants, including learning related guidelines, modalities,
knowledge, and procedures.44
According to the rules of the Fund, private entities with the
required capital are allowed to participate in the investment.
However, even though private entities might participate in the
Fund, they might not have any incentive to bring their experi-
ences and knowledge back to Taiwan, due to the lack of demand
for similar trading schemes in Taiwan. Thus, a private entity
would probably prefer to use the experiences as internal risk
control, rather than share with others. Without the participation
of the public sector, the objectives of the Fund might never be
realized in Taiwan. Furthermore, since Taiwan is not a member
of the Convention and Protocol, the GHG offset projects would
not generate certified emission reductions (“CERs”). Therefore,
the management team of the Fund might never invest in Taiwan.
Lack of access to these financing mechanisms forces Taiwan to
take costly measures to achieve its reduction obligations. As
such, Taiwan shares the “common” GHG emission reduction
responsibilities but suffers “differentiated” cost of implementa-
tion compared to other developing countries. 
LIMITATIONS ON TRADING EMISSIONS
Article 6.1 of the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that only Annex
I Parties can acquire or transfer emission reduction units
(“ERUs”). Article 3.10 also stipulates that “any emission reduc-
tion units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party
acquires from another Party in accordance with the provisions
of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be added to the assigned
amount for the acquiring Party.”45 Hence, the JI project and the
ERUs can only be proposed or transferred between Annex I
Parties, which excludes Taiwan.46 Similarly, as a public entity,
Taiwan is neither qualified to participate or launch CDM proj-
ects because of the limitations of Articles 6 and 12.47
The CDM is defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.
The objectives of this mechanism are to help Annex I Parties
achieve compliance with Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol and
assist non-Annex I Parties (i.e. developing countries) in achiev-
ing sustainable development.48 The CDM allows Annex I coun-
tries to invest in GHG reduction projects launched in develop-
ing countries and exchange CERs. The CERs can be used to
“assist in achieving compliance in the first commitment peri-
od.”49 Article 12(9) allows both public and private entities in
industrialized countries to participate in the CDM projects.
Under the CDM criteria announced by the UNDP, “the
project activity must be undertaken in a non-Annex I country
that is a Party to the Kyoto Protocol.”50 Kyoto Parties will not
undertake CDM projects in Taiwan since such projects cannot
be registered with the CDM Executive Board (the “Board”), and
the emission reductions generated would not be recognized by
the Board as CERs, but only as emission reductions (“ERs”).
Thus, ERs generated from projects in Taiwan cannot be traded
in emission markets between the Parties. Even if the ERs were
generated from a project in Taiwan without CDM Executive
Board registration, the price of the ERs might be much lower
than in other markets, because the risk of the ERs would be
higher.51 Fortunately, Article 12.10 also allows private entities
to submit CDM project applications to the Board,52 so it is pos-
sible that Taiwan’s private entities could use their overseas sub-
Although Taiwan has been
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sidiaries, located in the Kyoto Protocol member countries, to
participate in CDM projects in non-Annex I countries and
obtain CERs. 
POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES TO PARTICIPATE
The opportunities to link Taiwan with the international cli-
mate change regime are limited because of Taiwan’s small mar-
ket and amount of emissions. In the future, the global commu-
nity might succumb to the pressure of the “one China policy”
and force Taiwan to report its GHG inventory to the PRC and
adopt its commitment targets. Taiwan would not accept this sce-
nario, because it means that Taiwan would disproportionately
share responsibility for PRC’s emissions. Hence, Taiwan should
begin pursuing climate change strategies and attempt to link
with other climate regimes.
Although Taiwan has been blocked from participation in
the international climate change regime, it might still face emis-
sions reduction pressures from its trading partners. In anticipa-
tion of this, Taiwan unilaterally announced it would obey the
Protocol. The Taiwan government also tried to adopt possible
measures to help its private sector and people understand the
potential impacts of global warming. On December 11, 2002,
the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China53 passed the
“Environment Basic Act,” Article 21 of which announced,
“Every level of Administrations shall enthusiastically adopt
[CO2] emission reduction measures and formulate related plans
to prevent the greenhouse effect.”54 This Article commits to the
reduction of CO2, but not of other GHGs controlled by the
Kyoto Protocol. In addition, this Act provides neither a baseline
nor commitment target for Taiwan. The TEPA also issued the
“UNFCCC National Communication of the Republic of China
(Taiwan),”55 and introduced GHG inventories in Taiwan even
though TEPA understood the reports could not be sent to the
Secretary of the COPs. However, the document neither states a
reduction target for Taiwan, nor the baseline, nor other commit-
ments.56 In fact, Taiwan needs more assistance from the global
community in order to draw a framework and baselines for its
policymaking. With this assistance, capacity studies and base-
lines might become priorities for the Taiwanese government as
it determines the most cost-efficient measures for its society and
for future policymaking. 
Because Taiwan cannot issue CERs to investors in devel-
oped countries, these investors do not have the opportunity to
gain credits from the GHG reduction activities on the island. As
an alternative, then, Taiwan should have parallel strategies for
domestic policies and pursue linkages with other climate change
regimes. Additionally, the Protocol encourages the participation
of the private sector.57 Although Taiwan’s public sector might be
obstructed by the rules, its private investors might participate in
CDM activities hosted by other Parties and gain CERs from
those projects for foreign registered offices or subsidiaries. 
Taiwan’s public sector also might pursue agreements with
non-Kyoto ratifying countries, such as the United States and
Australia, to improve the GHG offset projects by investing
among themselves. The non-Kyoto ratifying countries might
also design temporary “credits” until the Kyoto Parties recog-
nize them in future negotiations. Thus Taiwanese multinational
companies might be able to open CER transaction accounts in
member states through their registered offices in those jurisdic-
tions. They could use those entities to enroll in CDM projects
hosted in other non-Annex I Parties. This could help the private
sector’s flexibility and reduce operation risks. In its linkage
strategies with other climate change regimes, Taiwan might also
coordinate with small developing countries in South East Asia
and create joint policies for investment in CDM activities. 
Furthermore, there is also a possibility that Taiwan could
participate in emissions trading. Pursuant to Article 17,58 the
Parties listed in Annex B are participants in the emission trading
system that signed the UNFCCC but did not ratify the Kyoto
Protocol,59 such as Australia, the United States, and Monaco.60
Taiwan’s public sector cannot enter into emission trading
between Parties in the first commitment period, from 2008 to
2012. However, non-Kyoto ratifying countries are still encour-
aged to sell their surplus emissions, and they could participate
in other trading systems, especially since Article 17 does not
prohibit non-ratifying countries from buying or collecting ERUs
or CERs from ratified countries. Hence, Taiwan’s public sector
could enroll in a trading system between non-Parties and abide
by the modification of the COPs.61
In addition, Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol does not
exclude the participation of private entities, so Taiwanese private
entities could still practice emissions trading among Parties.
They have the option to enroll in a voluntary agreement like the
Chicago Climate Exchange (“CCX”) or use their subsidiaries in
ratified countries to participate in trading.62 This increases the
possibility that Taiwan could participate in non-Kyoto party
emission trading mechanisms and gain various emission reduc-
tion credits, because the current regulations are vague and prece-
dent has not yet formed in the emissions trading markets. 
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If Taiwan does not receive recognition by the Convention,
it can still pursue several paths. First, Taiwan could create clos-
er linkages with the United States and Australia as they are also
non-Kyoto ratifying countries. Taiwan could further create
more favorable policies to encourage investors from the United
States and Australia to perform GHG emission reduction proj-
ects on the island. Further still, Taiwan could enlarge the scale
of the non-Parties and then wait until the Kyoto Parties decide
to recognize its system. 
Second, the small developing countries in Southeast Asia
might share concerns over the PRC and India, which will attract
most of the industrialized countries’ CDM activities. Since
Taiwan has the same concerns as other small developing coun-
tries, it should pursue bilateral or multilateral negotiations with
similar countries within the international climate regime to cre-
ate an attractive GHG offset market for the Annex I countries’
investment. International coordination of policies and benefits-
sharing might provide synergy for investors and attract greater
investment in the sustainable development of every country in
Southeast Asia. 
Taiwan is not only prevented from enrolling in the emis-
sions system due to its membership issue under the Protocol, but
also because developing countries are not required to have com-
mitments. Developing countries do not have allowances that can
be exchanged in the current commitment period, from 2008 to
2012. On the other hand, if the United States and Australia rati-
fy the Kyoto Protocol, Taiwan might still have a chance to enroll
in each country’s emissions trading systems and trade the
allowances within them. Both the United States and Australia
are important Annex I countries in the global climate change
negotiations, and they also have abilities and seats in the meet-
ings of COPs and Meetings of the Parties (under the Protocol)
to decide whether to ratify the Protocol with their best interests
in mind. If they ratify the Protocol, the allowances or permits
they are currently dealing might be transferred and merged into
the emissions trading systems between Parties by a negotiable
price or terms. 
In order to prevent the severe impact of enforcement in the
foreseeable future, Taiwan should enroll in emissions trading
systems and obtain practical experiences. For instance, Taiwan
could join volunteer emissions trading activities, such as the
CCX63 in the United States. The public sector might be able to
enroll in the national cap-and-trade systems of the United
States or Australia64 and also rely on brokers to “facilitate
trades across the two systems.”65 By developing a close rela-
tionship with the United States and Australia through invest-
ment and trading, Taiwan might be in a better position to enter
the international climate change regime if the Kyoto Parties
decide to recognize U.S. and Australian emission permits and
emissions trading systems.
CONCLUSION
Before the Kyoto Parties determine the future liabilities
and firm regulations governing developing countries and non-
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, it appears that Taiwan has the
freedom to act as it wishes. However, private companies
might urge the Taiwan government to adopt climate change
implementation strategies, because of low management costs
and pressure from their European customers. The Taiwan gov-
ernment might also not want to share responsibilities with the
PRC if the Kyoto parties force Taiwan to become one of the
PRC commitments, especially because of Taiwan’s political
concerns within the international regime and the absence of
Taiwan during the negotiations. In order to prevent an embar-
rassing scenario from happening in the future, the Taiwan
government should take more aggressive measures to adopt
preliminary implementation, with its high financial and tech-
nical abilities. The highest priorities should be the capacity
studies and determining the baseline of Taiwan. Although the
Taiwan government tried to convene “National Energy
Conferences” in 1998 and 2005 and conclude emission reduc-
tion plans, the meetings did not determine a baseline and tar-
gets remain vague. The earlier participation and well-organ-
ized implementation can help the international climate change
regimes adopt Taiwan’s practices and prevent unnecessary
linkages with the PRC system and commitment targets. The
Taiwan government should take more aggressive measures
and policies, but wait until the Kyoto Parties make a conclu-
sion. Early participation and flexible policies are the only
ways for Taiwan to achieve sustainable economic and stable
social development under global competition.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change is emerging as one of the major environ-mental issues of our time, and lawyers are playing anincreasingly active role. To help build awareness of this
urgent issue in the legal community, American University’s
Washington College of Law (“WCL”); the American Bar
Association Section on Environment, Energy, and Resources;
the Center for International Environmental Law (“CIEL”); and
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) sponsored
The Legal Dimensions of Climate Change conference on
November 15, 2005 at WCL. This one-day primer provided an
overview of the many legal dimensions of climate change.
The conference was attended by more than 150 participants
representing a broad spectrum of the legal community: law stu-
dents and faculty, in-house counsel, law firm attorneys, govern-
ment policymakers, and public interest advocates. The attendees
gained information about the latest developments in the field,
with a special focus on the challenges and opportunities faced by
the business sector. Case studies explored how leading compa-
nies assess risk, evaluate their emissions, and develop reduction
strategies. Participants left the event with information and skills
they will be able to use to help assess corporate climate risks and
opportunities, and develop strategies for the future. This report
provides a précis of the panelists’ presentations.
BACKGROUND
Although the United States has not ratified the Kyoto
Protocol, important legal developments are taking place at the
corporate, municipal, state, federal, and international levels.
Lawyers are involved at each of these levels: advising companies
on emerging best practices for climate change risk evaluation
and management; assisting federal, state, and local governments
to develop innovative programs for monitoring and controlling
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions; and exploring the potential
of litigation and other legal tools to promote or delay action.
No matter whose interests they represent – companies, gov-
ernment agencies, or non governmental organizations – lawyers
need to be fully informed about the legal implications of climate
change and potential response options. Business lawyers, in par-
ticular, need to understand the risks of climate change and the
challenges and opportunities posed by emerging climate poli-
cies. Companies that ignore the problem of climate change face
ever increasing business and legal risks from shareholders, reg-
ulators, litigators, and lawmakers. They also may overlook
opportunities to remain competitive as new markets develop for
cleaner, more efficient energy and products. Companies cannot
evaluate and make informed decisions to respond to these risks
and opportunities without the advice and guidance of a knowl-
edgeable bar. 
THE BASIC SCIENCE OF GLOBAL WARMING
Before delving into the legal dimensions of climate change,
the conference was given an overview of the basic science by
Dr. Jonathan Pershing, World Resources Institute. Six GHGs are
controlled by a few emerging regulatory regimes. The three pre-
dominant GHGs – carbon dioxide (“CO2”), nitrous oxide, and
methane – occur both naturally and as byproducts of human
activities. The other three – hydrofluourocarbons, sulphur hexa-
fluouride, and perfluorochloride – are entirely man-made.
Although they comprise a comparatively small part of the
atmosphere, these man-made substances have a large impact on
the climate due to their potent heat-trapping properties and long
residency times in the atmosphere – in some cases several thou-
sands of years.
Most GHG gases are emitted as a result of fossil fuel com-
bustion, forest fires, and land use changes. The gases trap ener-
gy near the earth’s surface that would have escaped into space,
much as a greenhouse causes the sun’s rays to heat the air
trapped within. A changing temperature trend exists in all hemi-
spheres, but particularly in the Arctic, where temperatures in
some areas have risen ten degrees or more in recent decades.
Retreating sea ice and melting permafrost have exposed coastal
communities to much more powerful winds and waves, causing
erosion that sends cabins sliding into the sea, and forcing resi-
dents to begin the long and costly process of relocation.
WHY SHOULD LAWYERS CARE
ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE?
Ken Berlin of Skadden Aarps gave a comprehensive
response to the question “why should lawyers care about cli-
mate change?” He touched on the many legal components of the
Kyoto Protocol with its three trading mechanisms, multi-faceted
registry system, complex reporting guidelines, rigorous certifi-
cation, monitoring and verification rules, and ground-breaking
compliance system. The Clean Development Mechanism
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(“CDM”) alone, which allows projects in developing countries
to sell credits to buyers in developed ones, could keep a battal-
ion of lawyers busy for decades to come.
THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
Donald Goldberg of CIEL gave participants a brief
overview of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), which was established in 1992.
The goal of the UNFCCC is to stabilize GHG concentrations in
the atmosphere to prevent dangerous human interference with
the climate system. The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was
ratified by 156 countries, and came into force in February 2005.
The initial commitment period is from 2008–2012, with
assumed contiguous commitment periods for the future. 
Mr. Goldberg pointed out that, because the United States has
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, it cannot participate fully in the
trading market it established. He canvassed three potential impli-
cations for the business community. First, while U.S. entities
may be able to buy credits from Kyoto-impacted countries to ful-
fill GHG targets under a potential domestic regulatory system,
they will not be able sell credits on the international market
established by the Protocol. This may create a buyer’s market,
effectively devaluing U.S. carbon credits. Second, non-participa-
tion may have a chilling effect on the development of green tech-
nologies in the United States relative to the rest of the world.
Third, he discussed the possibility of Kyoto-impacted market
competitors using border tax adjustments or other trade measures
to address any competitive advantage U.S. companies may gain
as a result of escaping expenses associated with GHG reduction. 
In the United Kingdom, a Kyoto-impacted country, the
emphasis is on binding regulation and research and develop-
ment. Jim Reilly, who presented on behalf of the British
Embassy, relayed the words of Tony Blair: “Climate change
will only be addressed through both technological development
and a robust, inclusive, and binding international treaty.” And
what’s more, he said, the UK is on track to meet its Kyoto tar-
get. The UK Emissions Trading Scheme was instituted in April
2002, three years before the EU trading scheme began. But the
European carbon market is now truly up and running, with CO2
trading at €20 – 30 per ton. 
Crucial to the Kyoto regime from a sustainable develop-
ment perspective are the CDM and joint implementation (“JI”)
mechanisms, which allow developed countries to contribute
funds and technology towards clean development projects in
developing countries and countries with economies in transi-
tion, in exchange for CO2 reduction credits. Flavia Rosembuj of
the World Bank (“WB”) gave the conference technical details
on the operation of the WB Carbon Finance Unit (“CFU”),
which acts as a clearing house for the CDM and JI investment
schemes. She told the conference that the CFU improves liquid-
ity in the carbon market by benchmarking carbon asset creation
and expanding frontiers of the market into poorer regions. The
CFU also addresses market distortions by opening markets for
small projects and small countries and strengthening technology
development for less developed countries. 
THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE
Robert Nordhaus of Van Ness Feldman ran through the
main problems with the current domestic regulatory landscape.
First, no definitive stance has been taken by the EPA on whether
to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). Second, lit-
igation is unlikely to be an effective means of controlling U.S.
GHG emissions in light of various federal district court deci-
sions that rejected the common law nuisance theory as a basis
for litigating corporations that emit GHGs. Third, state initia-
tives are vulnerable to state preemption or commerce clause
challenges, or intervention by Congress.
Mr. Nordhaus then gave participants a tour of potential fed-
eral actions. He concluded that federal actions would provide
corporations with greater regulatory certainty and would ensure
that GHGs are comprehensively monitored. Various bills pro-
posing the implementation of an economy-wide cap-and-trade
system have been introduced over the years, but none have been
approved by Congress. Other proposed federal options include
an electricity industry cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax.
The Pew Center on Global Climate Change’s Judith
Greenwald provided a closer look at some of the more advanced
state and regional climate action programs, including the new
California auto emissions standards and the nine-state Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), which is modeled after the
EU Emissions Trading System. She highlighted the importance
of state and regional initiatives by pointing out that the emis-
sions from RGGI-participant states and California alone
approach emission levels of the whole of Japan. 
David Berg, from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office
of Climate Change Policy, gave the conference an overview of
the Bush Administration’s three-part climate change strategy.
The first part encourages industry to help achieve the Bush
administration’s goal of reducing GHG emissions intensity by
eighteen percent by 2012 through voluntary programs. One of
these, Climate VISION, implements work plans under which
industry partners report GHG reductions, hasten the develop-
ment and adoption of GHG reducing technologies, and work on
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strategies to reduce GHG emissions in other economic sectors.
The second part of the Bush Administration’s strategy is the
Climate Change Science Program. This program is designed to
help the U.S. government understand and manage the risks asso-
ciated with climate change. The final part of the Bush
Administration’s strategy is the Climate Change Technology
Program. This program invests in the development of key tech-
nologies, including energy efficiency and renewable energy, and
advanced CO2 capture and sequestration techniques. Mr. Berg
also brought the conference’s attention to the international part-
nerships through which the United States is collaborating with
other countries to tackle climate change, including the Asia
Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate.
STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMPANIES
John Ramsey brought his experience as General Electric’s
(“GE”) Vice President of Environmental Programs to the con-
ference. He began his keynote address by quoting a statement by
the G8 ministers: “[w]hile uncertainties remain in our under-
standing of climate science, we know enough to act…” His
presentation used GE’s ecomagination project as an example of
how companies can take action on climate change while still
maintaining and improving their relationship with clients. GHG
policies are also an opportunity to work on a company’s corpo-
rate image, he said, referring to the media coverage GE had
received as a result of its approach to global warming. 
In the absence of any strict targets from the government,
GE voluntarily sets high environmental and profit goals, and
links its promise to consumers of operating performance with a
promise of environmental performance. To enable businesses to
use similar strategies, he said, government regulation should
implement flexible policies and sensible environmental goals. 
RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
J. Kevin Healy of Bryan Cave LLP gave the conference an
update on pending lawsuits. In Connecticut v. AEP, eight states
and New York City brought claims against the five biggest
power producers in the country under the federal common law
of public nuisance. The Court decided that these were policy
decisions for Congress and the President, rather than the courts.
The case is now on appeal to the Second Circuit. In Friends of
the Earth v. Watson, the plaintiffs alleged that the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of
the United States were violating National Environmental
Protection Act by not preparing an environmental impact state-
ment prior to financing major power projects abroad. The Court
denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding
that the plaintiffs had demonstrated the requisite “injury in fact.”
In Massachusetts v. EPA, a petition was submitted to EPA under
provisions of the Clean Air Act arguing that the EPA has a
mandatory duty to set limits on CO2 emissions. The petition was
denied by EPA, and the petitioner appealed up to the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal was denied, and a petition
for rehearing has now been filed.
Litigation is just one risk to companies. Others include the
direct effects of climate change on operations or the cost of
complying with new regulations. To what extent should man-
agers and directors be required by corporate governance rules to
disclose the company’s exposure to potential liabilities of glob-
al climate change? 
Mindy Lubber, President of the Coalition for
Environmentally Responsible Economies (“Ceres”), was the
luncheon keynote speaker, and provided an overview of the
work Ceres has done with its Investor Network on Climate Risk
(“INCR”) to raise awareness among institutional investors about
the need to assess climate risk of their holdings. Ms. Lubber
discussed the successful INCR meeting in May 2005 at the UN
that included several dozen state treasurers and major invest-
ment firms, and gave highlights of recent shareholder activity
requesting companies to assess and disclose their climate risk.
Dave Buente of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP offered
the conference some perspectives on the fiduciary duties of
directors and officers in the context of climate change. He sum-
marized the key aspects of Corporate Governance and Climate
Change, published by Ceres in 2003. The Ceres corporate gov-
ernance paradigm mandates special actions on climate change
from the board and management levels, including public report-
ing of risks and opportunities. Mr. Buente discussed the poten-
tial issues in relation to climate change reporting duties, includ-
ing the uncertainty of the effects of climate change, and the dif-
fering nature and extent of risks and opportunities from sector to
sector, and business to business. 
As an energy company whose facilities produce approxi-
mately 74 million tons of coal per year, Cinergy Corporation
would be particularly vulnerable to government regulation of
GHGs. Despite the absence of strict rules on the degree of risk
disclosure, the corporation decided to have an open dialogue
with stakeholders on the topic. The General Manager of
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Environmental Economics and Finance, Kevin Leahy, told the
conference about the process of producing Cinergy
Corporation’s Air Issues Report to Stakeholders in collaboration
with Mission Responsibility Through Investment and Ceres.
This report discloses Cinergy’s regulatory risk, its risk mitiga-
tion strategy and voluntary GHG reduction program, as well as
the possible impact of regulation on Cinergy’s customers. Mr.
Leahy reported that tackling the issue head-on has paid off, and
that “Cinergy is better today for having discussed its vulnerabil-
ities and shared its vision.”
MITIGATING RISK AND SEIZING OPPORTUNITY
Mary Anne Sullivan of Hogan & Hartson LLP said that a
mandatory national cap-and-trade program is all but inevitable,
but brought the conference’s attention to the hurdles the United
States faces in bringing one about. At present, the U.S. carbon
market lacks all the key features of an efficient market: estab-
lished rules, volume, and liquidity. Current efforts are limited in
scope and voluntariness, and Congress has been unable to reach
consensus on the exact rules that an economy-wide cap-and-
trade system should adopt. On the other hand, she pointed out,
the potential cost of inaction, and the relative affordability of
investment in the carbon market, point towards voluntary
action. Ms. Sullivan advises lawyers investing on behalf of
clients in nascent carbon markets to ask themselves, “are risk
and reward in proper balance?”
Investing in the carbon market is just one of a range of risk
mitigation actions. Lisa Nelowett Grice, of CH2MHill, told the
conference that a complete risk management plan should include:
• A complete GHG inventory;
• Reporting GHG emissions and energy emissions;
• Voluntary program membership;
• Setting GHG emission reduction or related goals;
• Implementing specific internal GHG reduction
actions; and
• Investing in GHG offsets.
She said that industry experience thus far shows that the
process of crafting an inventory management plan creates a
more robust vision for managing GHG emissions. 
United Technologies Corporation (“UTC”) has been
engaged in corporate climate change action since 1997, when it
launched its energy program. Ellen Quinn, Director of
Environmental Programs, reported that since then, UTC has:
• Brainstormed energy reduction opportunities;
• Introduced a shut off program;
• Educated its staff through an energy awareness
program;
• Run a leak management program; and
• Identified best practices amongst its facilities.
The results, she reported, were positive: an audit of 35 man-
ufacturing plants across Europe, Asia, South America, and the
United States showed that the measures UTC had taken resulted
in an average energy saving of twenty percent, with energy con-
servation measures paying for themselves after just three years.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether the federal government introduces
mandatory GHG targets tomorrow or in five years, lawyers and
their corporate clients need to take action now in order to miti-
gate risks and seize business opportunities. By bringing togeth-
er legal and corporate leaders, The Legal Dimension of Climate
Change gave participants a sense of direction, as well as practi-
cal ideas, in an otherwise uncertain domestic regulatory land-
scape. The discussion highlighted that, despite the challenges, a
culture of openness rather than avoidance will yield the best
results for all sectors of the community. 
The conference concluded with general agreement that
there is value in convening annually on climate change and its
legal ramifications and opportunities. For more information on
participation, or to obtain copies of the PowerPoint presenta-
tions from the conference, please contact WCL’s Office of
Special Events at (202) 274 4075. 
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The Environmental and Energy Study Institute(“EESI”) is a non-profit organization dedicated topromoting environmentally sustainable societies.
EESI believes meeting this goal requires transitions to
social and economic patterns that sustain people, the
environment, and the natural resources upon which
present and future generations depend. EESI produces
credible, timely information and innovative public policy
initiatives that lead to these transitions. These products
take the form of publications, briefings, workshops, and
task forces.
EESI publishes the weekly Climate Change News, 
available online at http://www.eesi.org/publications/
Newsletters/CCNews/ccnews.htm, which provides brief
updates from around the world. The following articles are
reprinted courtesy of EESI:
INCREASING CLIMATE RISK A CONCERN
FOR INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND BUSINESSES
(reprinted from Climate Change News, January 20, 2006)
An article in the January 17 issue of Fortune says that
climate change may bring weather changes more violent
and sooner than experts had thought. This has some
insurance companies and businesses concerned. Though
it is not possible to predict future specific weather events
under climate change scenarios with certainty, these
companies are beginning to respond and plan for such
extreme weather events. 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the
United States, insurers stopped writing policies that
automatically included coverage of terrorist attacks.
Ultimately a law was passed shifting responsibility for
damage from future terrorist attacks to the US
government. A number of major construction projects
had to halt because banks would not finance them
without terrorism coverage. 
Similarly, Fortune says that as climate change starts
inflicting losses, insurers will pull back, shifting financial
risk to businesses and homeowners, the banks that
finance them—and finally to taxpayers. This is already
being seen. Increases of up to 40 percent in insurance
rates in Florida in the wake of last year’s active hurricane
season are already making it harder for people to sell
homes. In coastal Cape Cod, the effects of Hurricane
Katrina have led to a 20 percent rise in reinsurance costs.
The increase prompted Hingham Mutual Group, a
property and casualty insurer, to drop coverage for 6,500
commercial properties. Further, insurance rates for some
offshore oil platforms have risen 400 percent in one year.
For insurers the hazards of climate change become more
concrete each year. Andrew Dlugolecki, a risk analyst at
the Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research in
Britain, recently estimated that if climate gradually
warms, the chances of the insurance industry getting
wiped out by weather-related catastrophes will rise from
about one in 100 worldwide today to nine in 100 by
2050. John Dutton, dean emeritus of Penn State’s College
of Earth and Mineral Sciences, estimated that $2.7 trillion
of the $10-trillion-a-year US economy is susceptible to
weather-related loss of revenue. Fortune concludes that
as businesses begin to recognize the dangers of climate
change, markets will help economies adjust, pricing the
risks and shifting resources. However, markets may
underprice long-term or novel risks. In the case of
climate change, where large-scale actions must be taken
to mitigate risk, Fortune says that a purely market-based
response would be too little, too late and that
governments need to get involved to address the risks. 
SHARP INCREASE IN CO2 CONCENTRATION
MAY ACCELERATE CLIMATE CHANGE
(reprinted from Climate Change News, January 20, 2006)
According to The Independent, new unpublished
measurements of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2)
concentration indicate a sharper increase in 2005 than
anytime previous in the data record. CO2 measurements
have been collected at the US Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) observatory at the
11,400 foot summit of Mauna Loa in Hawaii since 1958,
yielding a continuous record of CO2 concentrations.
Until the 1990s, CO2 concentration rose by an average of
1.3 parts per million (ppm) per year. In the late 1990s,
the rate of increase rose to 1.6 ppm per year, and rose
again to 2 ppm per year in the early 2000s. The
unpublished figures released to The Independent on
January 15 indicate a rise of 2.2 ppm in the first 10
months of 2005. 
Scientists involved with this study believe this may be
the first evidence of a CO2-climate feedback, in which
increasing temperatures at the Earth’s surface cause the
ecosystem to release more CO2 driving temperatures
even higher. This feedback could result in increases in
the rate of global warming, pushing the Earth’s climate
into a new and potentially unpredictable state of
accelerating warming.
RESOURCES FOR MONITORING CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY STUDY INSTITUTE’S
CLIMATE CHANGE NEWS
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Nations. He sees that the United States and Canada are not
as likely to pursue a strategy of harmonization. Thus, while
harmonization would be ideal, Mr. Shimada doubts it is
practical or feasible.
Mr. Marco Loprieno
Compliance is at the core of the credibility of any trading
system. According to Mr. Marco Loprieno, Principal
Administrator in the Climate Change, Ozone, and Energy Unit
of the European Commission, trust must be present for the suc-
cess of emissions trading. The only way to build trust is with
strong, credible compliance. Emissions trading is an instru-
ment to facilitate the global battle against climate change, and
so by definition it is part of a multilateral approach. At the
present, there are limitations to cross-border harmonization,
such as the impending obstacle of only being able to harmo-
nize with those that have signed onto the Kyoto Protocol. In
order to bring countries into a regulatory program, it is impor-
tant to have a common understanding of the definition of goals.
Before these efforts are achieved, though, countries will still be
able to improve their emissions trading systems by sharing
knowledge and experiences. 
Ms. Jane Barton
Compliance is important in making emissions trading
work because in a program that is intended to address health-
based issues like smog, you must be able to ensure the result,
according to Jane Barton, the Chief of the North American
Smog Program for Environment Canada. While the U.S. acid
rain and ozone transport trading programs have resulted in sig-
nificant air quality gains that have translated in health gains, in
Canada, a similar trading program does not yet exist. However,
the Canada-United States Emissions Cap and Trading
Feasibility Study found that, with certain key elements in
place, NOx and SO2 emissions cap and trading could be feasi-
ble between Canada and the United States. One element essen-
tial to “seamless” cross-border trading would be the use of the
same emissions monitoring systems in both countries. The
Feasibility Study found that the rigor of the emissions moni-
toring and tracking systems was an important factor in compli-
ance with the emissions cap reductions. Conclusions reached
by the Feasibility Study regarding the elements necessary to
ensure that the environmental goal is met through “borderless”
trading, and robust markets may be useful where multilateral
trading designs are being developed. 
VIEWPOINTS FROM AROUND THE WORLD Continued from page 25
ASIA-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ON CLEAN
ENERGY MEETS IN SYDNEY
(reprinted from Climate Change News, January 13, 2006)
On January 11-12, ministers from Australia, China, Japan,
India, South Korea and the United States, representing the
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and
Climate (AP6), met in Sydney to discuss plans to reduce
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through technology
investment and business partnerships that do not require
internationally-binding emission targets such as the Kyoto
Protocol. Before the meeting, Australia’s Environment
Minister Ian Campbell said, “The consensus of scientists
around the world is that we need 50-60 percent lower
emissions this century.” The ministers identified eight
strategies they would pursue to reduce GHG emissions,
including carbon capture and storage, nuclear power,
energy efficiency and renewable energy.
The partnership contains four of the world’s top five coal
producers; all depend heavily on coal for their domestic
energy. Speaking on carbon dioxide (CO2) sequestration,
Louis Wibberley of the Australian government’s
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organization (CSIRO), said “[The] post-combustion
capture route is where you strip the CO2 from the flue
gas and then compress it to be stored underground....
That process effectively consumes 20-25 percent of the
power station’s output.... That also gives you a multiplier
effect on the cost; and with current technology you will
approximately double the cost of electricity.”
At the meeting, the United States and Australia pledged a
combined $127 million to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by promoting renewable energy sources and
cleaner ways to use coal—$75 million from Australia
over five years and $52 million from the United States in
the FY ‘07 budget. Environmentalists said the pledges
were far too little and complained that the forum focused
on untried technologies to support the fossil fuel industry.
A report by the Australian government’s Bureau of
Agricultural and Research Economics (ABARE) stated
“global greenhouse gas emissions are projected to almost
triple between 2001 and 2050” without the partnership.
Catherine Fitzpatrick, Greenpeace’s climate and energy
campaign leader, said “ABARE’s claim that the pact
would lead to 20 percent reductions in emissions cannot
be taken seriously as this is only 20 percent less than
business-as-usual emissions growth, not absolute
reductions of 20 percent.... This means the pact will
actually lead to a doubling of greenhouse pollution by
2050, when scientists tell us we must reduce pollution by
at least 60 percent if we are to prevent the worst impacts
of climate change.” 
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